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Abstract 
 
This study considers the life and career of Professor Samuel A. Stouffer (1900-1960) as it relates 
to the landmark sociological work Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volumes I and 
II, more commonly known as The American Soldier. During the Second World War, Dr. Stouffer 
served as an expert consultant to the Secretary of War in his capacity as chief social science 
analyst of the US Army‟s Research Branch, Information and Education Division. Stouffer and 
his colleagues surveyed approximately half a million soldiers to determine their attitudes, and the 
information Stouffer provided on attitudes had a profound effect on policy; influencing the 
content of the military newspaper Stars and Stripes, the awards system, demobilization plans, 
and scores of other aspects of personnel management, from race to the content of propaganda 
films. Although Stouffer‟s immediate task was one of social engineering, his study represented 
the largest sociological survey conducted up to that time, and business, science, government, and 
a host of other institutions and agencies were quick to recognize the value of both the 
information he presented and his survey research techniques. In addition to exploring the 
impulses which gave rise to The American Soldier, how was it perceived, planned, and executed, 
and how it affected institutions and disciplines, this study also tracks the trajectory of Stouffer‟s 
life and work and his effect on sociology, government policy, business, and the identity of 
American soldiers. Stouffer represents the rise of the expert and the growing importance of 
research over intuition as a basis of knowledge in both the American military and the United 
States as a whole in the twentieth century. He also represents what the United States was willing 
to bring to bear, in addition to traditional means, to ensure victory in World War II. 
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Samuel Andrew Stouffer (1900-1960) 
Photo Courtesy of the American Sociological Association 
 
 
Sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer was born on June 6, 1900 in Sac City, Iowa. The son of Samuel 
Marcellus Stouffer, a Sac City newspaper owner and editor, Stouffer took his B.A in Latin at 
Morningside College (1921), followed by an M.A. in English at Harvard (1923). He returned to 
Sac City from Cambridge to manage and edit his father‟s newspaper until 1926, when he entered 
the University of Chicago to study sociology. Completing his PhD in 1930, he spent the 
following year as an instructor of statistics at Chicago and at the University of Wisconsin, and 
then departed for a postdoctoral year at the University of London for additional study of 
statistics. Upon his return to the United States in 1932, Stouffer served as a professor of social 
statistics at the University of Wisconsin. In 1935 he accepted a sociology professorship at the 
University of Chicago, where he remained until 1946. During the Second World War, Stouffer 
served as the senior sociologist of the U.S Army‟s Research Branch, Information and Education 
Division, whose job it was to survey soldiers and recommend personnel policies based on their 
findings. In 1946, Stouffer became the founding director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at 
Harvard, where he remained until his death on August 24, 1960. During these years he produced 
two of the most influential works in American sociology - The American Soldier (1949), a two 
volume summary of the survey work of the Research Branch during the war, and Communism, 
Conformity, and Civil Liberties (1955), a study of American attitudes towards communism in the 
McCarthy era. Stouffer also served as the 42
nd
 president of the American Sociological 
Association (1953). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Samuel A. Stouffer 
 
 
 The Liberty Limited arrived in Washington, DC on August 4, 1941 - a day when  
everyone knew what a Pullman train was, and when women were about to learn how to draw 
stocking lines on their legs with eyebrow pencils. Alighting from the train was a diminutive man 
on his way to the War Department. He had no official status, no military rank, and although at 
forty-one  he had reached a certain level of prominence in his field, no one would have noticed 
him much in a national capital that knew it was likely to go to war. The man stepped into the 
welter of pre-war activity, met a colleague for breakfast, and then headed for the Munitions 
Building. It was already hot, but it would get hotter still before the day was out - late summer in 
Washington, DC.
1
 
 Nineteen years and twenty-one days later, The New York Times ran an extended obituary 
for the man, entitled “Samuel Stouffer, Sociologist, Dead.” Readers learned that Stouffer (1900-
1960) was from Sac City Iowa, and that he had held sociology professorships at Wisconsin, 
Chicago, and Harvard. He had been the founding director of the Laboratory of Social Relations 
at Harvard, and president of both the American Sociological Association and the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research. Readers also learned what had come of Stouffer‟s train 
trip from Chicago to Washington DC nineteen years before: “Dr. Stouffer was the principal 
author of „The American Soldier,‟ an exhaustive study of the citizen-soldier….The book was a 
report developed from the research work he directed during World War II at the Education and 
Information Division of the War Department.” Lieutenant General James Gavin, commander of 
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 Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.” Private papers of Mrs. Jane Williams, 
daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer, Wicomico Church, VA.  
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the famed 82
nd
 Airborne Division in World War II, was interviewed for the obituary, and he 
commented that Stouffer had made “a monumental contribution to the science of making citizens 
of a free country win its wars.”  The obituary also indicated that the knowledge gained in 
Stouffer‟s studies applied to business, urban planning, population control, public-opinion polls, 
civil liberties, and economics. Those were the bare bones of an influential and innovative 
professional career.
2
  
Stouffer‟s work is cited in journals as diverse as Child Development Abstract, The  
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, and Commentary. He served as a consultant to 
scores of private and public institutions, including the American Standards Association, the 
Cooperative Test Service of the American Council on Education, the University of California, 
the American Economic Association, the Population Association of America, the National 
Committee on Atomic Information, and the American Psychoanalytic Association. He was also a 
delegate to the International Conference on Population in Paris (1938) as well as a member of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Philosophical Association, Phi Beta 
Kappa, the American Statistical Association, the Sociological Research Association, the Institute 
of Mathematical Statistics, the Population Association of America, the Psychometric 
Association, and reflecting part of his social life, the Harvard and Cosmos Clubs.
3
 
 General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army in World War II, believed 
that Stouffer‟s The American Soldier represented “the first quantitative studies of the impact of 
war on the mental and emotional life of the soldier.” Like others, Marshall also emphasized that 
                                                 
2
 “Samuel Stouffer, Sociologist, Dead: Chief Author of  „American Soldier‟ Led Harvard Unit - Studied 
Public Opinion.” The New York Times, Thursday, August 24, 1960. 29. 
3
 Stouffer Correspondence 1946-1960, Harvard University Archives. 
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 “the value of these books goes beyond their obvious importance to military training….”4 After  
reading The American Soldier at La Finca Vigia in Cuba, Ernest Hemingway wrote to Charles  
Scribner that it was “An excellent and impressive work….”5 And the eminent sociologist C. 
Wright Mills included in The Sociological Imagination (1959) the flat statement that “apart from 
the official history of the War, the most elaborate body of research is probably the several-year 
inquiry made for the American Army under the direction of Samuel Stouffer.”6 
 By the time Princeton University Press published The American Soldier in 1949, many 
more influential figures both in and outside of government had recognized the value and 
potential applications of Stouffer‟s work. Frank Stanton of the Columbia Broadcasting System 
(CBS) wrote in 1944 that “the work Sam Stouffer has done for the Army is by all odds the best 
to come out of the war. For that matter, his program represents the most complete thing of its 
kind to date….in this mass of data there are buried the answers to many methodological 
problems in the entire field of sampling and attitude measurement….”7 Without fail, credible 
authors writing of the American military experience in World War II, or sociological research 
methods, include The American Soldier in their bibliographies. The American Soldier has 
become what scholars refer to as a landmark work. 
 Landmark though it may be, it is seldom read.
8
 Like the classics or the Constitution, it is 
constantly referenced, praised as “standard,” and memorialized into quaintness. Although The 
American Soldier appears in multitudes of bibliographies, it is clear from many of these books 
                                                 
4
 George C. Marshall to Frederick H. Osborn, April 7, 1950.  The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer. 
(HUG FP 31.6, Box 1), Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. 
5
 Carlos Baker, ed., Ernest Hemingway, Selected Letters 1917-1961. New York: Scribner Classics, 2003. 
658. 
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 C. Wright Mills. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  53. 
7
 Frank Stanton to William Benton, June 17, 1944. Private papers of Mrs. Jane Williams, daughter of 
Samuel A. Stouffer, Wicomico Church, VA.  
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 Sociologists Craig Calhoun and John Vanantwerpen observed that “Stouffer has faded from memory….” 
in “Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Hierarchy: „Mainstream‟ Sociology and its Challengers,” in Craig Calhoun, ed. 
Sociology in America: A History. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 2007. 392. 
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that Stouffer‟s findings were either never fully read or were misunderstood. Stouffer and the 
Research Branch of the War Department‟s Information and Education Division surveyed over 
half a million servicemen during World War II; work which represents the largest scientifically - 
conducted survey of its kind. Sadly, what he learned is not widely taught, and what he knew is 
not generally known; as a result, social and particularly military history is often so fraught with 
myth, heritage, and nostalgia that it is becoming increasingly difficult to classify as history. More 
immediately, citizens and military policy makers reach decisions about the management of  
soldiers while ignorant of Stouffer‟s extremely useful findings. Knowledge then of The 
American Soldier - which quite literally analyzes at least 500,000 primary documents - by any 
standard should be helpful in distinguishing fact from fiction, and in providing decision-makers 
with the fundamentals for understanding American soldier attitudes and behavior.  
 Sociologist C. Wright Mills believed that “no social study that does not come back to the 
problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its 
intellectual journey.”9 The purpose of this study is to discover what impulses gave rise to The 
American Soldier, how was it perceived, planned, and executed, and how it affected institutions 
and disciplines - and to do so through the life and work of Samuel A. Stouffer. Specifically, this 
work undertakes to follow the advice of historian Sir Michael Howard regarding the three tasks 
of constructing narrative history: “First, find out what happened. Then, establish a chain of 
causation. Finally, apply critical judgment.”10 This study is not a biography of Stouffer. Rather, it 
is a synthesis of his ideas as a sociologist as they met and in some respects formed military 
culture. From this meeting emerged modern military sociology and modern survey research. A 
welcome result of this approach is a narrative that crosses genres - a story that includes 
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 C. Wright Mills. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 6. 
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 Michael Howard. Captain Professor: A Life in War and Peace. London: Continuum, 2006. 130. 
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biographical, cultural, social, intellectual, and military histories, yet without the pretensions of 
grand narrative. Although somewhat out of fashion, the attempt is to follow von Ranke‟s advice, 
as a goal, to render history as “wie es eigentlich gewesen,” rather than to engage in an historical-
interpretive debate with other historians. And because Stouffer‟s work is inseparable from both 
sociology and the military, the chapters will, perforce, telescope in and out of one another, as is 
common when tracing ideas that do not pass neatly from one person or institution or time to 
another. A continuing theme will be the lengths to which the United States Government 
Government was willing to go during World War II to keep the guns of its conscripted army 
pointed at the enemy. 
      Stouffer repeatedly stressed in the introduction to The American Soldier that his work 
during World War II was a task of social engineering rather than one of social science. “It must 
not be forgotten,” he wrote, “that the Research Branch was set up to do a fast, practical job; it 
was an engineering operation; if some of its work has value to for the future of social science this 
is a happy result, quite incidental to the mission of the branch in wartime.” (Hence the validity of 
General Gavin‟s comment in Stouffer‟s obituary. For his part, Stouffer would have been gratified 
to read that the general had defined Stouffer‟s work as “science”). Still, Stouffer recognized the 
potential of his work when he also observed in the introduction that “we have here a mine of 
data, perhaps unparalleled in magnitude in the history of any single research enterprise in social 
psychology or sociology.”11 The data of which Stouffer wrote have been largely unmined by 
historians, particularly when compared to their counterparts in sociology. The American Soldier 
echoes and reverberates in the scholarship of sociology, but most historians, though familiar with 
it, have yet to analyze it in detail. Two possible reasons for this historical neglect may have been 
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 Samuel A.Stouffer, Edward A. Suchman, Leland C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Star, and Robin M. Williams, 
Jr. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment during Army Life. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. 29-30. 
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the assumption that the findings about the recruiting, training, and performance of American 
soldiers in World War II were rendered moot by the coming of the atomic age, as well as the 
reflex and rush to document the actions of the great commanders. 
 Stouffer‟s Research Branch was a sub-unit of the ever-evolving Army Information and  
Education Division. The organization, which had begun in March 1941 as the Morale Division, 
took on broader tasks and a new name as the Special Services Division before settling into its 
final incarnation as the Information and Education Division of the US Army Service Forces. The 
Division ultimately had four branches: (1) Information (2) Education (3) Orientation and (4) 
Research. None of the other three branches acted without consulting the Research Branch, 
however, as the data that Stouffer and his colleagues produced were often the basis for decisions 
on how best to inform, educate, and orient the soldier. In Stouffer‟s words, “the information and 
Education Division…was an agency of communication. Most of its branches were concerned 
with imparting information to soldiers. The Research Branch was mainly concerned with 
analyzing and imparting information which it obtained from soldiers.”12 Research Branch was 
established in October 1941, within two months of Stouffer‟s arrival in Washington, DC.13 
Almost immediately, its utility as a social engineering mechanism became apparent. 
“The army reported that at the point of embarkation in New York, there were a great 
many desertions,” remembered Major General Frederick H. Osborn, Chief of the Information 
and Education Division and Stouffer‟s wartime boss. “The army got much disturbed and asked 
                                                 
 
12
 Stouffer et. al. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment 
during Army Life. 9-12. See also Frederick H. Osborn, “Recreation, Welfare, and Morale of the American Soldier.” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 220, Organizing for Total War, (March 1942): 
50-56. Osborn and others tend to use the words “branch” and “division” interchangeably. Osborn refers to his 
original organization as Morale Branch, which had six divisions: the Army Exchange Service, the Army Motion 
Picture Service, the Welfare and Recreation Division, the Services Division, the Morale Research Division, and the 
Information Division. Various reorganizations and name changes occurred as the war progressed. 
 
13
 Stouffer et. al. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment 
during Army Life. 9-12. 
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the research division to make a study of what was happening.”14 Osborn explained that he had 
earlier “called in Sam Stauffer [sic] head of the Department of Sociology at the University of 
Chicago, whom I had gotten to know before the war. He was not only on the hard factual side of 
sociology, but he had also been a newspaper reporter and had a keen sense for getting things 
done.”15   
To address the army‟s concerns about desertions, Stouffer ran a quick study. He 
discovered that the army was sending men home on leave in civilian clothes, and he 
recommended that they be required to go in uniform instead. “There were few desertions at the 
point of embarkation after that,” said Osborn, “It was a simple thing and such an amusing 
solution.”16 Stouffer‟s recommendation was indeed simple to the point of elegance and doubtless 
amusing to a man with Stouffer‟s sense of humor. Masters of their trades often make the 
complex look simple, the difficult look easy. If they are very good, they make it all look a bit 
amusing as well.  
 That Stouffer could solve a desertion problem with a change of clothing was not 
alchemy. He knew, as Osborn later remembered, “when soldiers went home or went to their 
families or friends in uniform they were made much of as soldiers. Their families were proud of 
                                                 
 
14
 Frederick H. Osborn Papers, Part II, page 16. US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. (Bldg 22, 
Room 211, Row 30, Unit A, shelf 6). Frederick. H. Osborn is a compelling character in the dramatis personae of the 
Information and Education Division. A personal friend of both Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, he was a eugenicist connected to the Museum of Natural History in New York, as well as a 
board member of the Social Science Research Council and a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation. See The New York 
Times, August 20, 1941, page 1, which announces Osborn‟s appointment as head of the Morale Branch. See also 
Thomas Cripps and David Culbert “The Negro Soldier (1944): Film Propaganda in Black and White,” in Peter C. 
Rollins, ed. Hollywood as Historian: American Film in a Cultural Context. Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1983. 113. 
 
15
 Ibid, Osborn Papers. The misspelling of Stouffer‟s name by the typist is understandable. Osborn would 
have pronounced it that way. Stouffer insisted on that pronunciation, and would say “Stouffer, as in louse.” The 
pronunciation is one example of his self-effacing humor. (Interview with Mrs. Jane Williams, Samuel A. Stouffer‟s 
daughter, Wicomico Church, VA, September 4, 2007). 
 
16
 Ibid, Osborn Papers. 17. 
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them and their girlfriends said they were heroes, and saw them back to camp.”17 Just how 
Stouffer understood such things is a compelling question, as ideas such as these do not simply 
spring from the ground. Stouffer‟s own experience, personality, and education certainly come to 
bear, but they are the end, not the beginning, of a long chain of intellectual history that begins as 
far back as the Stoics and their commitment to empirical observation. Sociological survey 
research existed long before it was named, and sociology and armies have been lurching towards 
their dialectical relationship since ancient times. Around the turn of the twentieth century, there 
was a fierce contest between those who struggled to explain war in traditional human terms and 
those who were beginning to explain war in scientific terms. Stouffer was key to this debate, in 
showing how sociometrics could inform theories of human behavior in war. The cockpit of the 
contest was World War II, yet the argument was not entirely settled in the 1940‟s, and continues 
today. 
 Stouffer reported that he and his staff were influenced greatly by the ideas about behavior 
and attitudes extant at the time they wrote The American Soldier. Of these, four were paramount: 
Dynamic Psychology - man not as a rational being, but rather as a creature moved by 
unconscious desires, Learning Theory - conditioned response through rewards and punishments,  
Social Anthropology and Sociology - “The plasticity of the human organism,” and social roles - 
class, adaptation, and “the individual as a member of the social system.”18 
 Stouffer conducted his first survey on December 8, 1941, and he continued through 
November 1945, as the millions of American soldiers who had been summoned to fight World 
War II were demobilized. In these years Stouffer noted, “more than half a million soldiers were 
to be questioned by the Research Branch in all parts of the world. Over 200 different 
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 Stouffer et. al. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment 
during Army Life. 31-32. 
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questionnaires, many of which contained 100 or more separate items, were to be administered.”19 
Stouffer‟s business was to measure attitudes, and he did so, about everything from attitudes 
towards allies to attitudes of men in staging areas. As military operations expanded and revealed 
behavioral issues affecting the prosecution of the war, so did Stouffer‟s mandate. By 1944, in 
addition to measuring attitudes, the Research Branch conducted psychiatric screening tests, 
explored postwar plans for black soldiers, studied psychoneurotics as they were then called 
within the Army, and inquired about soldier savings habits, among many other inquiries.
20
 All of 
this work fell within the broadly defined mission of the Research Branch, “to provide the Army 
command quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which, along with 
other facts and inferences, might be helpful in policy formation.”21                                                                                                                                         
 The First World War had given the army experience with soldier attitudes, and some in 
the 1941 War Department remembered the rapid mobilization of 1917. They had learned the 
wisdom of caring about soldier attitudes in a large, democratic, and conscripted army, and had 
created in 1917 the Commission on Training Camp Activities, or CTCA. The mandate from  
Secretary of War Baker to Raymond B. Fosdick, the director of the CTCA, required him to see 
after the morale and, in Baker‟s mind, the more important moral welfare of the troops.22 The 
army took up in World War II where it left off in World War I, creating the Morale Division 
which evolved into the Information and Education Division of which Stouffer‟s Research Branch 
was a part. And the perceived need was great. Shortly before Stouffer conducted his first survey, 
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 Stouffer et. al. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment 
during Army Life. 12. 
 
20
 Samuel A.Stouffer, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, Robin M. Williams, Jr., M. 
Brewster Smith, Irving L. Janis, Shirley A. Star, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr.  Studies in Social Psychology in World 
War II: The American Soldier, vol. II, Combat and Its Aftermath, Appx. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. 
645-651. 
 
21
 Stouffer et. al. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment 
during Army Life. 5. 
 
22
 Newton D. Baker. Frontiers of Freedom. New York: George H. Doran, 1918. 94. Another guidepost for 
the World War II US Army was the experience with the Civilian Conservation Corps during the Great Depression. 
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the War Department had in its Victory Program “projected an Army with a peak strength of 213 
divisions,”23or about 3.2 million men, larger than World War I‟s approximately 2.9 million. By 
1945, counting non-divisional soldiers, the Army Air Corps, etc., the army fielded about 8.2 
million men, most of them drafted.
24
 Stouffer surveyed nearly sixteen percent of them. 
 Notwithstanding World War I, Secretary Baker, and the CTCA, the intellectual line 
between ancient times and Stouffer is a long one, particularly when one considers the 
commentaries on soldier behavior to be found in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Homer. To be sure, 
the pawns of the gods in The Iliad seem terribly distant from Stouffer‟s self-determining World 
War II G.I.s who read Yank, the Army Weekly, and Stars & Stripes, (written specifically for 
them), watched Frank Capra‟s “Why We Fight” films, (produced specifically for them), and 
made demands that resulted in revisions of pay scales, changed award policies, and created the 
point system for demobilization. Stouffer and his Research Branch were intimately involved in 
gathering the data which resulted in all of these measures - an undertaking which would have 
been incomprehensible to Agamemnon. 
 The yawning gap between Homer and Stouffer, or rather the evolution of military 
sociology, is not, however, without some significant mile markers. Julius Caesar, Machiavelli, 
Napoleon, Grant and dozens more have noted soldier attitudes and behavior and commented on 
how they might be formed. Stouffer may not have read Grant‟s Memoirs, but it is almost certain 
that he read at least some of Caesar‟s Commentaries. His high school and college transcripts, as 
well as the institutional catalogues of his education, tell much about his intellectual development. 
Additionally, there are Stouffer‟s own writings and behavior, all of which indicate a classically 
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educated, insatiably curious modern Stoic going about finding hard data rather than relying on 
impressions, intuition, or conventional wisdom to make his case.
 25
 
 Stouffer was born in Sac City Iowa on June 6, 1900. He could not have known during his 
boyhood that he would research and form the attitudes of American soldiers landing at 
Normandy forty-four years later. What he did know as he entered his teenage years was that war, 
and the behavior of men in it, was a compelling subject. His father, Samuel Marcellus Stouffer, 
had purchased the Sac City Sun newspaper in 1893,
26
 the year of the great Chicago Exposition 
where Frederick Jackson Turner had delivered his “Frontier Thesis,” and to which Iowa had sent 
goods and services worth a princely $125,000.00.
27
 On the cover of the Iowa Exposition‟s report 
is a flag-waving, musket-bearing soldier, not unlike the bronze Union soldier placed on a 
pedestal opposite the Sac County Courthouse the year before.
28
 As a youth Stouffer often sat on 
the porch of his father‟s newspaper office, listening to Civil War veterans spin yarns of their 
experiences.
29
 In 1923, when Stouffer returned from Harvard with his M.A., he edited the 
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newspaper until 1926 - a time when many Civil War veterans were dying, and their funeral 
announcements and obituaries regularly appeared in local newspapers.
30
 
 Of his early formal education, his transcripts reveal an emphasis on the classics common 
at the time. At Sac City High School he studied Latin through Caesar, Cicero, and Virgil, as well 
as English composition, French, German, history, and economics. These subjects were 
supplemented with a healthy dose of the hard sciences (physics, biology, and mathematics - both 
algebra and geometry). Graduating in 1918 and moving to nearby Morningside College in Sioux 
City, he took a B.A. in Latin in 1921, studying French, English, trigonometry, Bible literature, 
and military science.
31
 Although sociology was offered at Morningside as a major, Stouffer took 
no sociology courses.
32
 Instead, he concentrated on rhetoric, taking courses in public speaking 
and participating successfully in intercollegiate debate. One of his yearbooks mentions that 
Stouffer could “find more to say and say it in less time than any member of the class. He is 
always ready to take the lead and is always hunting new work. He disguises himself and many 
are the things he finds out. Among his accomplishments are those of a book agent, newspaper 
man, debater and comedian.” A dizzying array of extracurricular activities - Tennis, YMCA, 
Student Council, editor of the college paper, Republican Club, Literary Society - provide insight 
into his restless energy and devotion to self improvement.
33
 While in college he also met Ruth 
McBurney, whom he married in 1924, and with whom he had three children. 
 By the time Stouffer and his colleagues published The American Soldier in 1949, he was 
a master of the major ideas in sociology, psychology, and anthropology, and his formal 
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education was supplanted during the war with a rich array of scholarly contacts. The colleague 
he breakfasted with upon his arrival in Washington in August 1941 was political scientist Harold 
Lasswell, who had written his doctoral dissertation on World War I propaganda, and who was a 
pioneer in the field of applied psychology.
34
 After lunch the same day Stouffer met with Walter 
Bingham, holder of doctorates from both Harvard and the University of Chicago. Bingham was 
founder and director of the Carnegie Institute of Technology‟s Division of Applied Psychology, 
and during World War I he had designed the classification, personality, and intelligence tests for 
the Army that were the starting point for similar tests in World War II, and which became the 
basis for modern Scholastic Aptitude Tests. During World War II, Bingham was the Army‟s 
head psychologist.
35
 The next day at lunch Stouffer met Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Office 
of Scientific and Research Development, which oversaw the beginnings of the Manhattan Project 
and the development of, among other things, radar, the proximity fuse, and the Norden 
bombsight.
36
  
 Stouffer spent the war years working with these gentlemen and many like them. In 
acknowledging the contributions of his colleagues to The American Soldier, Stouffer named 
some of the most influential scholars, government officials, and businessmen in the country at 
the time - from some of the most prestigious institutions.
37
 Like Stouffer, these contributors had 
                                                 
 
34
 Ellen Herman. The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996. 24-25. Also the Jane Williams papers, Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival 
in Washington DC.” 
 
35
 “Walter Van Dyke Bingham Collection, 1880-1952 [1900-1916]. Staff and Faculty Papers, Carnegie 
Mellon University Archives. http://www.library.cmu.edu/Research/Archives/UnivArchives/BinghamAid.html. 
(October 21, 2007). Also the Jane Williams papers: Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.” 
Bingham was also instrumental, along with Bruce V. Moore, in developing questioning techniques, largely due to 
his work in the interwar years with industrial psychologists. See Jean M. Converse. Survey Research in the United 
States: Roots and Emergence, 1890-1960. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.76-77, 127, and 335.  See 
also Walter V. Bingham and Bruce V. Moore. How to Interview. New York: Harper & Bros., 1931. 
 
36
 The Jane Williams papers: Samuel A. Stouffer, “Notes on Arrival in Washington DC.” 
 
37
 Stouffer et. al. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, vol. I, Adjustment 
during Army Life. 18-29. 
 
14 
 
the ability to transcend their own disciplines to work with others on the problem at 
hand…winning the war. They did not live in a world of Cartesian separations which would have 
prevented them from apprehending the dynamics of a world war, or would have hindered their 
cooperation. The rigid divisions which exist today in many places between academic disciplines 
were not then yet in place. 
 The Research Branch, ostensibly a sociological organization, is notable for its significant 
role in Ellen Herman‟s intellectual history of modern American psychology, The Romance of 
American Psychology (1995). She notes that Stouffer encouraged “an eclectic intellectual 
approach in the Research Branch that combined psychoanalysis, learning theory, cultural 
anthropology, and social systems theory, along with the latest statistical techniques in opinion 
 polling.”38 No surprise then, that in the index to The American Soldier, one will find references 
to Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Gunnar Myrdal, I.P. Pavlov, and Max Weber.
39
   
 Still, the Research Branch had a definitive compass, found in its name. Stouffer believed 
in the value of research and empirical evidence. He commented early in the study on “the 
experimental tradition,” and went on to write that “just as medicine did not make distinctive 
progress until the exclusively clinical approach gave way to controlled experiments as a methods 
of rigorous verification of hypotheses, so social psychology is likely to be limited in its 
development until the habit of required experimental verification is firmly established in research 
in social psychology.”40 His tool was the survey. 
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 A look at Stouffer‟s doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago (1930) is 
instructive in this connection. In “An Experimental Comparison of Statistical and Case History 
Methods of Attitude Research,”41 Stouffer studied the attitudes of 238 University of Chicago 
students towards prohibition. He demonstrated that statistical methods rendered almost the same 
results as case-histories evaluated by experts, and he stressed that his conclusion “rests on 
experimental evidence,” which he presented in detail.42 Should any further focus beyond survey 
research have been required for Research Branch, there was of course the war. As Herman notes, 
“Dedicated throughout the war to enlarging their own sphere of influence, experts nonetheless 
quickly grasped that furthering a psychological science of social relations or theory of society  
was not the point. Winning the war was.”43 
 After the war, academia, business, and government took full advantage of the Research 
Branch‟s labors. The G.I. Bill, for instance, was based on Research Branch‟s findings. Scholars, 
executives and government officials began to speak of human and social engineering, at first as a 
means to avoid future wars, and later as a means for better education, business, race relations, 
and government. Those who had worked with Research Branch in World War II took up 
prominent positions in universities, business, and government, from which they kept in touch 
with each other and exerted a major influence of post-war psychology and sociology.
44
 Seven of 
the twenty-four presidents of the American Sociological Association between 1945 and 1968 
either served with or consulted with Research Branch during the war, and seemingly everyone 
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wanted Stouffer‟s opinion on how to run things, from pollster Elmo Roper to the Greyhound Bus 
Company.
45
 Shortly before his death in 1960, Stouffer was in Puerto Rico conducting research 
on population control, and only the swift progress of the cancer that killed him forced him to 
leave his work behind.
46
 
 Among the contributions of The American Soldier which has had a continuing influence 
on sociology is the concept of relative deprivation. Stouffer calls this idea “simple, almost  
obvious,” and defined it as comprehension of sacrifice in becoming a soldier as “greater for some 
than for others, depending on their standards of comparison.” He noted that the idea was related 
to “well known sociological concepts,” such as “„social frame of reference, „patterns of 
expectation,‟ or „definitions of situation.‟”47 Relative deprivation was an idea that had legs. 
Sociologist Robert K. Merton developed the idea further in his Social Theory and Social 
Structure (1949), as did R.G. Runciman in his Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (1966).
48
  
Relative deprivation is not the only concept Stouffer developed for sociology. In the late 1930‟s 
he formulated the idea of “intervening opportunities” in migration, which considered the effect 
of enroute as well as destination opportunities and their affect on American migration patterns.
49
 
 Stouffer could not have predicted his influence when, having returned to Sac City from 
graduate work in English at Harvard in 1923, he opted three years later to enter the PhD program 
in sociology at the University of Chicago. His decision to do so was in part attributable to the 
visit of sociologist E.A. Ross to Sac City. Once at Chicago, Stouffer was influenced by 
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psychologist L.L. Thurstone and sociologists Ellsworth Faris and William F. Ogburn, both of 
whom were heavily engaged in applied sociology.
50
 From this point onward, Stouffer became 
increasingly committed to what he would call “scientific sociology.” By 1948, he was arguing in 
a debate with a mathematician at Harvard that human behavior could in fact be predicted, and 
that, “the controlled experiment [in social sciences] is coming into its own.” He even claimed 
that the work of sociologists would “help regulate the complex civilization wrought by physical 
science and technology.”51 
 Stouffer, like many in the “soft sciences” of his day, was doing what he could to harden  
his discipline into a proper science. Happily, his grounding in the liberal arts, particularly his 
graduate work in English and his experience as a newspaper editor never left him. His lectures 
were peppered with both Shakespeare and baseball statistics, making his work both enjoyable 
and accessible in a way they would not have been had he left these things behind. He also 
maintained a keen sense of history and geography, and much of his summer vacations were 
devoted to travelling with his family. He wanted his children to see every state capital, and when 
he visited the Tower of London he told them, with some relish, of the beheadings and 
imprisonments that had taken place there. He also ensured that his children had a good sense of 
sociological problems in the United States, at times taking them to the South to visit Jim Crow 
first hand, at other times allowing them to accompany him as he did his field work.
52
  
 Part of the value then of The American Soldier is the voice in which it was written - clear, 
simple prose, free of bureaucratic or scientific jargon. Stouffer was also, refreshingly, quick in 
                                                 
 
50
 The President and Fellows of Harvard College. The Lives of Harvard Scholars. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1968. 45. It was Ogburn who made plain to Stouffer the importance of statistics in sociology. See 
Philip M. Hauser “In Memoriam: Samuel A. Stouffer, 1900-1960.” The American Journal of Sociology vol. 66, no. 
4 (January 1961): 364-365. 
 
51
 “Bridgeman, Stouffer Disagree About International Role of Social Science.” The Harvard Crimson, vol. 
120, no. 61 (April 21, 1948): 1. 
 
52
 Bisconti-Stouffer-Dyke and Williams interviews. 
18 
 
The American Soldier to explain his survey and research methods and to point out their 
limitations. All of his written work reads as profoundly human, as if it has been written not by a 
man striving to be a scientist, but rather by a man wanting to convey complex ideas simply and 
elegantly. His attempt is to illuminate and to convince through evidence and reason, rather than 
to argue and advocate from an entrenched philosophical position. Stouffer‟s voice is therefore a 
reflection of his personal life as well as his professional education.
53
 
 After completing his PhD at Chicago, Stouffer remained for a year (1930-31) and taught 
statistics there and at the University of Wisconsin. While he was teaching his Introduction to 
Statistics Course, some of the most famous sociologists in the United States were teaching with 
him. William F. Ogburn taught Research in Quantitative Sociology, Robert Ezra Park taught 
Human Migration and The Crowd and the Public, and Herbert Blumer taught Introduction to the 
Study of Society.
54
 Ogburn had previously taught sociology at Columbia, and had served as 
President of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in 1929. Park had been secretary to 
Booker T. Washington, and had also been ASA president (1925).
55
 Blumer was the first chair of 
sociology at Berkeley, and was also an ASA president (1956). Stouffer clearly was in on the 
ground floor as sociology developed as a discipline in the United States. (The American 
Sociological Association was founded in 1905). Additionally, Stouffer spent the academic year 
                                                 
 
53
 Stouffer commented at the funeral of one of his mentors, William F. Ogburn, that “torturous prose 
sometimes is associated with profundity, but Ogburn never thought this correlation coefficient very high, and he was 
willing to take the calculated risk that lucid writing can all too easily be taken as evidence of lack of profundity.” 
See “Some Notes on William Fielding Ogburn.” The Samuel Andrew Stouffer Papers. Speeches 1959-1930 Box 1 
Voice of America engagement speech (1959) Speaking Engagements: Correspondence (1948-1956) HUG FP 31.45 
The Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. 
 
54
 Summer Quarter Time Schedule, 1930, p. 9. University of Chicago Special Collections Research Center, 
ARC Ref. 1, LD 909. 
 
55
 Faris., 156, 159. 
19 
 
of 1931-1932 pursuing postdoctoral work in statistics at the University of London, where he 
studied with British statisticians Karl Pearson and R.A. Fisher.
56
  
 Frederick H. Osborn, Stouffer‟s wartime boss, persuaded the Social Science Research 
Council (SSRC) to bring Stouffer from the University of Chicago to Washington in the summer 
of 1941. The SSRC had funded Stouffer‟s postdoctoral work in London, and had also during the 
1930‟s been keenly interested in the impact of the depression on American society. They had 
appointed Stouffer to oversee thirteen monographs on the subject, collectively entitled “Social 
Aspects of the Depression.” In addition to mastering the administrative duties needed to run such 
a project, Stouffer made contacts that would be useful during the war. He co-authored one of the 
monographs with Paul Lazarsfeld, who would later consult with the Research Branch and co-
author one of the volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.
57
 Stouffer‟s work 
with the SSRC as well as his academic labors prepared him well for the work the War 
Department assigned him in 1941. So too did his work with Gunnar Myrdal on the landmark 
1944 study An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy.
58
 Additionally, 
Stouffer had previously held a professorship at the University of Wisconsin (1932-1935),
59
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where he worked with the Census Bureau and with the Central Statistic Board - later to become 
the Division of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of the Budget.
60
 
 The most important result of these experiences was Stouffer‟s ability to work as an 
outsider within a large bureaucracy, none of which was more intimidating and tribal than the 
United States Army. He was keenly aware that he had no official status as far as the Army was 
concerned.  He wore no uniform, and although he was ultimately granted the rank and privileges 
of a brigadier general, he was wise enough never to don one, as many of his colleagues did. He 
knew that he had not been through the rights of passage required to wear a uniform, and he 
understood the totemic significance of the uniform within his society. Nor did he arrive in 
Washington full of demands for information, office space, a secretary, letterhead. He took the 
opposite approach, as he had done years earlier when he was an undergraduate newspaper editor: 
He disguised himself, and thus he was able to find out many things. He knew that he would, in 
his words, “not get to first base for SSRC without some kind of War Dept. status.” One of his 
friends in Washington told him that the War Department was the “hardest nut in Washington to 
crack,” and Stouffer understood the truth of it.61 One of the ways he cracked that nut was to feign 
and profess ignorance, thereby making himself non-threatening. A colleague remembered, “Sam 
traded beautifully on a studied innocence of military protocol.”62 
 On Stouffer‟s second day in Washington, Osborn arranged for him to be an expert 
consultant to the Secretary of War. “Expert,” commented Stouffer wryly in his notes, “quite a 
joke; know less about the army than about the Vatican.” But he also knew how to learn. “My 
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idea is to hunt the fellow actually carrying the ball; he may be far down in a hierarchy….I want 
to learn from ground up; not just what is officially said but what is really done.” That he 
understood there is a difference between the two would serve him well in the War Department. 
 Stouffer spent the remainder of his early days in Washington making contacts and asking 
polite questions, looking at records and talking with colleagues about how selection and 
classification of soldiers had been done in World War I. He remained all too aware of how easily 
he could be marginalized. “I don‟t blame old army officers for looking at a layman like me as a 
nuisance…I know darned well how I‟d feel if the V.P. of the university sent a layman around to 
 cooperate with me on my teaching & research & I suspect the army is much more of a club than 
a university.”63 His sensitivity to the army‟s institutional mores helped to produce an  
understanding, and even wisdom, that is not any less valuable because it was achieved sixty 
years ago.  
 After the war, Stouffer took up posts as Harvard professor of sociology and founding 
Director of Harvard‟s new Laboratory of Social Relations, where he remained until his death in 
1960. In addition to his many other duties and consulting projects, he chaired the Joint 
Committee of the National Research Council and Social Science Research Council, which 
continued to refine the survey research techniques he had employed to produce The American 
Soldier.
64
 In 1953 he served as the President of the American Sociological Association (ASA), 
and delivered the customary annual address at their meeting in Berkeley. Unsurprisingly, he 
chose for his subject “Measurement in Sociology.” He asked his audience to consider “the place 
of measurement in the process of invention in sociology itself, as a special case of the general 
working of invention in technology and science” and asked further, “if students of culture do not 
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examine their own discipline as a specimen of culture, who else will do it better?” Clearly, he 
believed that sociology was a science. He spoke of “quantitative methods” and sociology‟s 
ability to “measure interactions.” Nevertheless, he concluded his address by acknowledging the 
value of philosophy and art to sociology, and stated that the best sociological work is done by 
that sociologist or team of specialists who can combine philosophical, artistic and scientific 
methods. His prediction for the future of sociology was a bright one, ending with the phrase, “I 
bid you welcome into a brave new world.”65 
 That summer at Berkeley in 1953, however, Stouffer was not content with simply giving 
an address, and what he did there demonstrates one of the dozens of reasons he has remained 
such an influential figure in sociology. Prior to the conference, he had asked each of the living 
former presidents of the ASA to record a two-minute message to “a young PhD just launching 
his or her sociological career.” The audience then heard from many of the scholars who had 
founded and formed American sociology. Among them were Emory S. Bogardus, Leonard S. 
Cottrell, Jr.,  Henry Pratt Fairchild, Ellsworth Faris, John L. Gillin, George A. Lundberg, 
Howard W. Odum, William Fielding Ogburn, Talcott Parsons, and Rupert B. Vance. Their 
comments, which were duly recorded in the American Sociological Review, provide a brief but 
comprehensive background of the state of the art of sociology in and around the period in which 
The American Soldier was written.
66
 
 Almost a year to the day after Stouffer delivered his address to the American Sociological 
Association, he had to fight a charge from the government that he had been “a close and 
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sympathetic associate of members of organizations cited by the Attorney General of the United 
States as subversive, and of persons who have participated in the activities of such organizations 
and of organizations established as a front for subversive organizations.”67 The charges were 
motivated by Stouffer‟s work for the Ford Foundation, studying not only the Communist Party, 
but also the reaction of American citizens to government measures intended to curtail communist 
activities. An effort was made to deny Stouffer access to classified information, and he was 
required to show why such a denial should not be imposed.
68
 Ultimately, Stouffer won his case, 
and in 1955 published Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, a classic sociological study 
in which he found that few Americans knew who Senator McCarthy was, fewer were concerned 
about communism, and most just wanted to get on with their daily lives.
69
 It is difficult to 
imagine the outrage he must have felt at having to prove that he was trustworthy. Although the 
hysteria of the McCarthy era - largely an illusion according to Stouffer - was an aberration in the 
American body politic (although not without precedent), it hurt Stouffer and many others deeply. 
Fortunately, Stouffer did not allow bitterness to overshadow the five remaining years of his life. 
He remained an active scholar and consultant right up to the end. 
 As has been previously stated, this work is not simply a biography of Samuel A. Stouffer, 
but also an investigation into the people, institutions, events and ideas surrounding the creation 
of The American Soldier. Still, a sense of Stouffer‟s personality in the closing paragraphs of this 
introductory chapter may be useful.  
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 “Sam Stouffer was a wonderful human being,”70 remembered Rutgers sociology 
professor Jackson Toby. And that seems to be the prevailing attitude of those who knew him. 
Tom Pettigrew, a psychology and social science professor at the University of California, Santa 
Cruz, remembered Stouffer as “a truly great social scientist and a wonderful human being,” a 
man of great “warmth and humor.”71 Sociologist Herbert H. Hyman wrote of Stouffer, “What an 
empiricist he was!” in a 1962 Public Opinion Quarterly article. Hyman wrote that unfortunately, 
even Stouffer‟s writings are “too pallid a representation” of Stouffer‟s style. “How passionately 
Sam could attack a table, or an IBM machine, and not only in the darkest hours of night, but all 
through the next day as well.”72 Howard Schuman, a sociology professor at the University of 
Michigan and a student of Stouffer at Harvard, dedicated two of his books to the chief author of 
The American Soldier: “Stouffer had a firm belief in the value of survey research, but at the same 
time a commitment to understanding its limitations and developing its potential so that it could 
be used more wisely for both practical and theoretical ends.”73 
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 A chain smoker who ended most of his working days covered in chalk dust and ashes, 
Stouffer was affable, warm, and possessed of a restless energy that never seemed to fail him. He 
held himself and those around him to high standards, was deeply interested in the education of 
his children, and was, in that hackneyed phrase - the consummate professional. James Davis, of 
the University of Chicago‟s National Opinion Research Center and a former student of 
Stouffer‟s, remembered him as looking “a bit like the men who played fussy bookkeepers in 
1930‟s screwball comedies,” and lacking “the combination of paternalism and narcissism that 
motivates the Great Man. Sam simply wanted to get on with the job….But Sam was a great 
sociologist.”74 
 Modern social historians are deeply interested in identity and how it develops. But 
“identity,” observed historian Wayne E. Lee, “as many historians have discovered, is a funny 
thing. It is simultaneously defined by the self and the observer - usually not in the same way.”75 
Hollywood and scores of books have co-opted the identity of the soldier, and in the United States 
particularly, the identity of the World War II American soldier. These modern Homers may film 
or write basing their findings largely on letters, diaries, Norman Rockwell paintings, recruiting 
posters, and oral histories, and their conclusions are often based on the exception rather than the 
norm. Their efforts do indeed add to the body of knowledge, but they tend to minister to modern 
demands for two-dimensional caricatures of soldiers as either heroes or villains. Neither of these 
cardboard cutouts is found in the pages of The American Soldier, but rather human beings caught 
up in events well beyond their control, and reacting and developing attitudes that are full of 
ambiguity and nuance. What Stouffer offers is much closer to a photograph than a portrait of the 
World War II American soldier. 
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 Stouffer was a kind of circular conduit for soldiers - gathering their attitudes and using 
the data to influence soldier policies. Their attitudes were their identities, and he returned their 
identities to them with policy. Stouffer was asking, in as scientific a way as he knew, how 
soldiers interpret their own experience. He was, in a very real and verifiable way, the best and  
most informed advocate of their identities as they saw them. Here then is the value of Stouffer‟s 
work, and a better understanding of the American World War II G.I. should, it seems, begin here. 
Too, soldier attitudes and Stouffer‟s work with them helped to shape modern sociology - a 
contribution of which most of them would have been oblivious, but that was no less real for it. 
The American Soldier deserves a closer look, for as historian Carl Lotus Becker wrote, “the 
history that lies inert in unread books does no work in the world.”76 Much of this history is not in 
history books, and some of it is in The American Soldier. 
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Chapter 2 
 The American Soldier: Structure and Findings 
 
 
 In the months following its publication, The American Soldier received both rapturous 
praise and scathing criticism. Breathless tones of admiration, “Here is a book! Not since Thomas 
and Znaniecki‟s Polish Peasant has there been a socio-psychological work of such scope, 
imaginativeness, technical rigor, and important results,”77 were answered with outbursts of 
excoriation, “The American Soldier is a ponderous demonstration in Newspeak.”78 Reviewed 
heavily in sociological and intellectual journals, though less so in military and historical ones, the 
two volumes of The American Soldier also made a bit of a splash in daily newspapers. The 
dailies generally published the main points about the books given to them by Princeton 
University Press, which stressed the comprehensive nature of the work, as well as its use of new 
methods in sociological research. Princeton favored such adjectives as “largest” “modern” 
“unique,” and “scientific.”79 The dailies also focused on some of the more provocative findings 
of the books, headlining their articles with titles such as “America‟s Citizen Army in World War 
II Deeply Resented Privileges Given to Officers According to Recently Published Book.”80 The 
volumes were handsomely bound in blue-gray cloth, with the title in gold print on a dark blue 
background and bordered in gold stripes - reminiscent of a naval officer‟s sleeve insignia. They 
sold for $7.50 each, or $13.50 for the set of two. In September 1951, Princeton University Press 
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reported to the authors that over 3,000 sets of the two volumes had been sold and that “there is 
no sign that the sale is tending to stop.”81 What exactly were readers finding in The American 
Soldier, and what did the books say? 
 Prior to a detailed discussion of the structure and findings of The American Soldier, a 
note of explanation regarding the nomenclature and authors of the books may be helpful. The 
American Soldier consists of two volumes, the full titles of which are Studies in Social 
Psychology in World War II: Volume I. The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life, and 
Volume II. The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath. Princeton University Press also 
published an additional two volumes as part of the same series - Studies in Social Psychology in 
World War II: Volume III. Experiments on Mass Communication, and Volume IV. Measurement 
and Prediction. The first two volumes, published in 1949, have over time been lumped in with 
the third and fourth volumes, published in 1949 and 1950, respectively. All four volumes were 
written under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, and funded with a grant from 
the Carnegie Corporation. For the sake of clarity and ease, as the volumes each have different 
and multiple authors, readers may find a complete listing of the four volumes, as well as 
additional explanatory information below.
82
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American Soldier proper which, again, refers to the first two volumes of Studies in Social 
Psychology in World War II. 
 The American Soldier boasts ten authors: Samuel A. Stouffer, Edward A. Suchman, 
Leland C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Star, Robin M. Williams, Jr., Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Marion 
Harper Lumsdaine, M. Brewster Smith, Irving L. Janis, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. All of the 
authors worked in or consulted with Research Branch during World War II, and all of them were 
either former colleagues or students of Stouffer, and/or were prominent sociologists and 
psychologists. Most went on to have highly influential careers in foundations or academia, and 
three of them (Stouffer, Cottrell, and Williams), served as president of the American 
Sociological Association. 
 The authors of The American Soldier, Stouffer in particular, confronted the myriad of 
decisions common to all authors. Chief among these was what form The American Soldier would 
take, and how that form would subsequently be subdivided. The challenge was to condense four 
years of Research Branch work, including 500,000 soldier surveys, into a coherent narrative. 
Stouffer, reasonably if not entirely obviously, chose a two-volume format, separating adjustment 
to the Army from the signal event of a soldier‟s life, combat. Within each volume he further 
subdivided his categories into chapters. The chapters represent not only an organizational 
structure, but also give a major hint at both the concerns of the Army and American society as a 
whole regarding their citizen soldiers. The chapters are also a reflection of the major interests 
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and findings of Research Branch, which in no small way dictated the structure of The American 
Soldier. 
 The process of creating The American Soldier formally began in the summer of 1945, 
shortly after the Japanese surrender. The Carnegie Corporation provided a $40,500 grant for the 
sifting of the data gathered during the war by Research Branch, with a view towards publication 
of the data in narrative form. The sifting and editing process was overseen by a special 
committee of the Social Science Research Council comprised of Frederick H. Osborn 
(chairman), Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Leland C. Devinney, Carl I. Hovland, John M. Russell, 
Stouffer, and Donald Young (ex officio and Director of the Social Science Research Council). 
All of the members, save Russell, had been members of or consulted with Research Branch 
during the war. Cottrell, DeVinney, Hovland, and Stouffer comprised the technical 
subcommittee which oversaw day-to-day operations. 
 For the remainder of 1945 and through most of 1946, the sifting of the surveys took 
place. American University provided quarters for the workers, who included DeVinney, Beatrice 
N. Hardesty, Irving L. Janis, M. Brewster Smith, Shirley A. Star, Stouffer, and Edward A. 
Suchman. Simultaneously, at the Yale Institute of Human Relations, Carl I. Hovland, Frederick 
D. Sheffield, and Arthur A. Lumsdaine sifted the experimental studies, while at Cornell Louis 
Guttman and John A. Clausen, and at Columbia Paul F. Lazarsfeld, began work on what would 
become the methodological volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. As was 
the case with the oversight and technical committees, all of the workers had been members of or 
consulted with Research Branch. The end result was the 1949-1950 publication by Princeton 
University Press of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. The first two volumes 
comprise The American Soldier proper, and deal primarily with survey data. The third volume, 
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Experiments on Mass Communication is described by its title, as is the fourth, Measurement and 
Prediction.
83
 
 Stouffer and the technical committee, using a carefully devised and deliberate process, 
made the significant decisions regarding what information from the surveys, experiments, and 
methodological issues would be included in the four volumes. Although they had spent 
considerable time and effort during the war researching micro-issues for the Army - laundry 
service, rations, etc. - they had also chosen during the war, and for inclusion in the volumes, to 
research and write on what they believed to be the more significant social issues of the time. 
Thus The American Soldier took on the weighty and often controversial issues of education, fear, 
race, class, leadership, veteran adjustment, etc. These subjects and themes run throughout the 
work, and serve to provide coherence and significance. In this way, the committee members 
believed they would be able to transcend the war and provide information which would be useful 
not only to the military, but to historians and sociologists as well. Once Stouffer and his 
colleagues had decided which issues would be most useful, they assigned authors to each subject, 
and chapters to each author. In most cases, the authors were assigned chapters which were 
closest to the specific subjects with which they had worked in Research Branch during the war. 
 As one of the major criticisms of The American Soldier is that data on specific subjects is 
difficult to find (issues on leadership appear in the chapter ostensibly devoted to race, etc.), what 
follows is a brief exegesis of the work to help orient the reader and to provide a sense of its 
richness, complexity, and utility. 
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Volume I: Adjustment during Army Life 
 Chapter One, “How These Volumes Came to be Produced.” Written by Stouffer, chapter 
one “represents, in general, the point of view of the technical subcommittee comprising Leonard 
S. Cottrell, Jr., Leland C. DeVinney, Carl I. Hovland, and Stouffer.”84 Stouffer was lead author 
on volumes I and II (The American Soldier proper), as well as volume IV (Measurement and 
Prediction). A contributor to volume I, Lieutenant Colonel Leland C. DeVinney took over 
Research Branch in early 1945 from Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dollard, after having served as 
head of the branch in the Mediterranean. Psychologist Carl I. Hovland, of the Yale Institute of 
Human Relations, was the lead author on volume III (Experiments on Mass Communication), 
and served during the war as the chief of the Experimental Section, one of the two sections of 
Research Branch. Sociologist Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. served as the head of the other, Survey 
Section, and contributed to volume II of The American Soldier.
85
 
 The first chapter gives rudimentary details as to the structure and function of Research 
Branch as a part of the Information and Education Division, and also provides some information 
on the intellectual underpinnings of Research Branch operations. The chapter does not undertake 
to present a detailed history of Research Branch. That task Stouffer left to “the newer generation 
of historians,” as it was “not the purpose of these volumes to review the history of the Research 
Branch.” Stouffer identified his three major audiences - soldiers, historians, and his main 
audience, social psychologists and sociologists. He also took considerable pains to stress that The 
American Soldier was not a work of science or theory: “The Research Branch existed to do a 
practical engineering job, not a scientific job. Its purpose was to provide the Army command 
quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which, along with other facts and 
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inferences, might be helpful in policy formation.”86 Many reviewers were singularly blind to 
these statements, and like many graduate students tended to judge The American Soldier by what 
it did not do, rather than what it did. 
 No ex-post facto science was attempted (although some hypotheses were presented) in 
the summary of what was a massive survey to gather evidence through empirical observation, 
and then to make generalizations upon which policy could be based. Stouffer did make clear, 
however, that The American Soldier represented “a mine of data, perhaps unparalleled in 
magnitude in the history of any single research enterprise in social psychology or sociology,” 
and wrote of its “potential value to social science.”87 Chapter 1 also introduced the reader to 
Stouffer‟s lucid thinking and clear writing. Even Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the most caustic of The 
American Soldier reviewers, admitted that one must “praise the prevailing modesty and clarity 
with which the results of the research are written up.”88 Stouffer‟s style is conversational, non-
bureaucratic, and explanatory, with no hint of academic pretension. Stouffer was too mature and 
elegant  a writer, and had too much respect for his readers, to thump them with the philosopher‟s 
stone. He was secure enough to present his readers with the evidence and allow them to draw 
their own conclusions. He left the academic argument to the intellectuals, among which he did 
not number himself. The American Soldier reads as if it were written by a human being, unlike 
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many jargon-laden reports of its kind. The chapter is divided into two sections: (1) The Research 
Branch and its Mission, and (2) Indebtedness and Implications. 
 Chapter Two, “The Old Army and the New.” The second chapter describes the pre-war 
US Army, with special emphasis on the differences between the Regulars of that Army and the 
selectees drafted to fight the Second World War. The chapter was written by Stouffer, 
DeVinney, and Edward A. Suchman, the last of whom contributed to volume II of The American 
Soldier and to volume IV, Measurement and Prediction, of Studies in Social Psychology in 
World War II. In his twenties during the war, Suchman had worked and studied with Columbia 
sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and after the war became a sociology professor at the University of 
Pittsburgh.  
 Education and the significance of the differences in levels of education for soldier 
motivation and behavior are the leitmotifs of the chapter, which also provides a preview of tone 
and style for the entire work. The authors presented empirical data both quantitatively and 
qualitatively through charts and diagrams as well as through anecdote - often direct quotes from 
soldiers themselves. It is in chapter two that the reader learns that in the Second World War the 
percentage of high school graduates and men with some college was four times as high as in the 
First World War.  
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The American Soldier vol. I, Chart I, p. 59. 
 Such charts and statistics are commonly followed by an anecdotal illustration of the 
significance of the facts they reveal, in this case the ramifications of time in service trumping 
education and competence. One soldier complained, “this length of service business is a luxury 
this Army can‟t afford. The best man for the job is the most efficient way and the privates can 
see it. It is bad when the privates can see what the generals won‟t admit or  do anything about. It 
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doesn‟t do any good to be bossed by men inferior in every way except length of service.”89 The 
American Soldier is structured similarly throughout, often with follow-up accounts of what the 
Army did to address such findings. 
 Chapter Three, “How Personnel Adjustment Varied in the Army - Preliminary 
Considerations,” Chapter Four, “How Personnel Adjustment Varied in the Army - By 
Background Characteristics, and Chapter Five, “How Personnel Adjustment Varied in the Army 
- By Type of Experience in the Army,” deal with issues of direct concern to the military 
establishment. Authored by Stouffer and Devinney, chapters three through five considered 
adjustment to the Army, and to some extent the Army‟s adjustment to its draftees. Stouffer and 
his co-authors chose four criteria with which to gauge adjustment: 
 Esprit 
 Commitment to the goals of the war 
 Job and status satisfaction 
 Criticism of and/or approval of the Army 
 
The authors demonstrated that the factors are inter-related, and the theme of education remained 
strong - those soldiers who are more educated, Stouffer pointed out, had both better esprit and 
commitment, but were also not as satisfied with their jobs as less-educated soldiers, and were 
more critical of the Army. These three chapters also attempted to distinguish between individual 
and group attitudes and behavior, and the authors made comparisons between individuals and 
between groups to reach their findings and recommendations. 
 The authors considered factors such as marital status and age in addition to education. 
They brought childhood experiences to bear on the analysis, juxtaposed against disciplinary 
problems as soldiers. These chapters, as do many of the others, made use of “panel studies,” 
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those studies in which the soldier is interviewed more than once to determine the reliability of his 
answers. The authors were able to establish in chapter four a correlation between upbringing and 
success or failure in the Army - partly through an analysis of those soldiers who were referred to 
psychiatric care. In chapter five, the authors considered assignment, location, and length of 
service as these factors affected adjustment. Readers learn that the Infantry and the Air Corps 
represented the poles of dissatisfaction and satisfaction, respectively, that overseas assignments 
did not necessarily produce poor morale, and that esprit deteriorated as time in service 
lengthened. Chapter four is sectioned as follows: (1) Variations in Personal Esprit, Personal 
Commitment, Satisfaction with Status and Job, and Approval or Criticism of the Army as 
Associated with Education, Age, and Marital Status, (2) Personal Background Characteristics as 
They Related to Advancement or Maladjustment, (3) Personal Commitment, Personal Esprit, and 
the Concept of Relative Deprivation, (4) Pre-Army Experiences in Childhood and Later as They 
Related to Adjustment in the Army and to Background Characteristics of Soldiers, and (5) 
Attitudes Reflecting Adjustment to the Army as Related to Subsequent Promotion of the 
Respondents - a Case Study. (The case was comprised of 856 privates and privates first class). 
 Chapter Six, “Social Mobility in the Army.” Promotions and potential for promotion are 
the subject of chapter six, written by Suchman, and sectioned into (1) Promotion Opportunities, 
(2) Desire for Promotion, and (3) Factors Determining which Men Got Promoted. The major 
finding of Research Branch was that while soldiers were critical of the “caste system” which 
separated them from the officers, they were also keen to be promoted themselves. Ambition was 
mixed with a healthy dose of skepticism regarding chances for promotion, and the authors 
documented the satisfactions and disappointments soldiers experienced in the system of 
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promotions. The relationship between opportunities for and expectation of promotion is 
interesting and perhaps counterintuitive, and will be highlighted later. 
 Chapter Seven, “Job Assignment and Job Satisfaction.” Written by Stouffer, chapter 
seven reveals the scope and breadth of job possibilities within the Army, most of which have 
little or nothing to do with actual fighting. Seventy-five percent of soldiers did not even see a 
battlefield, fifty percent did manual labor of a sort, and twenty five percent could be accurately 
described as clerks. The authors considered the actual job as it related to satisfaction and  
concomitant adjustment to the Army, and they also inquired into the affect that volition has upon 
job satisfaction - or the relationship between the soldier choosing his own job rather than having 
it assigned to him - and his satisfaction with the job and the Army. The authors also gauged how 
much satisfaction with one‟s assignment affected efficiency. The chapter is divided into two 
sections: (1) Job Satisfaction as a Relationship between the Army‟s Needs and Men‟s Desires, 
and (2) Desires of the Men as Related to Job Satisfaction. 
 Chapter Eight, “Attitudes toward Leadership and Social Control,” written by Suchman, 
Stouffer, and DeVinney, represents the most sensitive of the inquiries Research Branch made 
into adjustment to Army life. The Army, with its hierarchical structure, mission orientation, 
obligation to follow orders, culture of loyalty, and acute self-consciousness, did not propose to 
lead by committee or poll. Still, with the support of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, 
Research Branch was tasked to look into the attitudes of soldiers towards their leaders. Many of 
their findings were later repeated in the postwar Doolittle Report on Officer-Enlisted Man 
Relationships. 
 The authors divided their analysis into three parts: (1) Officers, (2) Noncommissioned 
Officers, and (3) Social Control - Attitudes Reflecting Adherence to Informal Codes as Well as 
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to Formal Codes of Behavior. As their findings will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapters, let it suffice for now that, predictably, soldiers found the privileges officers 
enjoyed to be, in modern parlance, “offensive” (as anecdotal evidence suggests they always 
have), and were loath to recognize the burden of responsibility that officers carried. Soldiers 
also, unsurprisingly, respected those officer most who shared their deprivations and dangers, and 
who led by example. 
 Chapter Nine, “The Orientation of Soldiers toward the War,” is divided into three 
sections which analyze the orientation of soldiers toward the war: (1) Attitudes toward the War, 
(2) Personal Identification with the War, and (3) Efforts to Raise the Level of Personal 
Commitment by Changing Attitudes towards the War. The section titles are revealing, as they 
accurately portray in micro the thrust of Research Branch‟s efforts during the war - to identify 
attitudes, and based on their findings, recommend policy changes to affect those attitudes in a 
way that would equip conscripted soldiers to fight a modern war. The first section deals 
primarily with the impact Pearl Harbor had on attitudes towards the war in general, while 
pointing out that many remained foggy as to the background and aims of the war. The second 
section attempts to analyze the passive, if not detached way in which the soldier tended to view 
the war in relation to himself. The final section highlights those educational efforts expended to 
strengthen personal commitment to the war, and admits that such efforts had limited results. The 
chapter was written by Shirley A. Star, a former student of Stouffer‟s at the University of 
Chicago, who after the war became a prominent figure at the National Opinion Research Center. 
 Chapter 10, “Negro Soldiers,” the last chapter of Adjustment during Army Life considers, 
in the parlance of the day, the attitudes of “Negro” soldiers, and was written by Star, Stouffer, 
and Robin M. Williams, Jr. After the war Cornell Professor Robin Williams served as American 
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Sociological Association president, and he was also the founding editor of Sociological Forum. 
He contributed to both volumes of The American Soldier.  
 The chapter might perhaps have been more appropriately entitled “Negro-White 
Relations,” as the main concern is just that. The chapter does not shy away from illuminating and 
documenting discrimination within the Army. What is perhaps more compelling, however, is that 
the authors made an honest effort to relate how black soldiers saw the Army, with an emphasis 
on the extent to which black soldiers tended to view day to day operations in racial terms. 
Though such an approach had its limitations, the authors were generally successful in revealing 
the ambivalence that many black soldiers had toward the Army and the war. The “Double V” 
campaign (victory against aggression abroad and victory against racism at home) looms large in 
chapter ten, as do the differences and similarities between black soldiers from the North and 
South. The chapter is divided into six sections: (1) The Negro Soldier Population and its 
Characteristics, (2) Negroes Defined Situations in Racial Terms (3) How Negro Soldiers Viewed 
Their Stake in the War (4) Reactions to Prospects of Overseas and Combat Duty, (5) General 
Adjustment of Negro Soldiers in the Army at Home and Overseas, and (6) Comparative 
Reactions to Being Stationed in the North and in the South. 
 
Volume II: Combat and its Aftermath  
 
 Chapter One, “Attitudes before Combat and Behavior in Combat.” Sectioned into (1) 
Company Attitudes and Nonbattle Casualty Rates in Combat, (2) Attitudes of Individuals in 
Training as Related to Performance in Combat, and (3) Basic Data and Technical Notes on 
Relation of Attitudes to Behavior in Combat, chapter one illuminates survey results primarily 
from the 1
st
, 4
th
, 9
th
, and 29
th
 Infantry Divisions of the World War II US Army, a total survey 
sample of well over 9,000 officers and men. (Of these, the 1
st
, 4
th
, and 29
th
 participated in the D-
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Day landings, and the 9
th
 followed on June 10, 1944). Many readers and reviewers have found 
this chapter compelling because it offers a prediction: those soldiers maintaining positive 
attitudes in training will do better than others in actual combat. Sociologists and statisticians 
have also found in section three detailed descriptions of indices and numerical manipulations 
used to generate data. The chapter was written by Stouffer, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Marion 
Harper Lumsdaine. Arthur Lumsdaine contributed to volume II of The American Soldier and 
volume III (Experiments on Mass Communication), and Marion contributed to volume II, The 
American Soldier. 
  Chapter Two, “General Characteristics of Ground Combat,” is by Williams and M. 
Brewster Smith. A psychologist, Smith contributed to volume II of The American Soldier, and 
later served on the faculties of Vassar, New York University, the University of Chicago, and the 
University of California (Berkeley and Santa Cruz). Chapter two attempts to explain combat to the 
uninitiated. Unsectioned, it defines combat by both geography (distance from the firing) and 
activity, and to demonstrate the eternal verities of soldier reactions to combat. Chapter two is 
valuable, as one sociologist reviewer noted, as a conceptual discussion: “It is often assumed that 
the empirical research man just goes out and collects data as one might count pebbles on the 
seashore. Here it is shown how difficult it is to dissect terms like „combat situation,‟ or „active 
theater,‟ or „victory‟ into their component elements so as to make them amenable to empirical 
study.”90 Chapter two also offers a listing of the stresses which accompany soldiers to combat - a 
list thought to be common sense, but often revealed to be forgotten as laymen, with an air of 
discovery, are shocked at soldier behavior in combat. The list bears repeating: 
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    1. Threats to life, limb and health. 
     2. Physical discomfort - from lack of shelter, excessive heat or 
   cold, excessive moisture or dryness, inadequacy of food or water or  
   clothing; from insects and disease; from filth; from injuries or wounds;  
   from long-continued fatigue and lack of sleep. 
    3. Deprivation of sexual and concomitant social satisfactions. 
    4. Isolation from accustomed sources of affectional assurance. 
    5. Loss of comrades, and sight and sound of wounded and dying men. 
    6. Restriction of personal movement - ranging from the restrictions of 
  military law to the immobility of the soldier pinned down under 
  enemy fire. 
    7. Continual uncertainty and lack of adequate cognitive orientation. 
    8. Conflicts of values 
   a. between the requirements of duty and the individual‟s 
   impulses toward safety and comfort. 
   b. between military duty and obligations to family and dependents 
   at home, to whose well-being the soldier‟s survival is important. 
   c. between informal group codes, as of loyalty to comrades, and 
   the formal requirements of the military situation which may some- 
   times not permit mutual aid. 
   d. between previously accepted moral codes and combat imperatives. 
    9. Being treated as a means rather than an end in oneself; seemingly arbitrary 
  and impersonal demands of coercive authority; sense of not counting as an 
  individual. 
    10. Lack of „privacy”; the incessant demands and petty irritations of close 
  living within the group.  
    11. Long periods of enforced boredom, mingled with anxiety, between 
  actions. 
    12. Lack of terminal individual goals; poverty and uncertainty of individual 
  rewards.
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 Chapter Three, “Combat Motivations among Ground Troops,” treated the question of 
why soldiers fought. Smith wrote chapter three, and pointed out the major factors which served 
as inoculations of a sort to help soldiers withstand the rigors of combat: Personal ideology and 
prayer, the primary group (normally the soldiers‟ squad), coercion, beliefs concerning the war, 
and personal leadership. Those soldiers who increasingly relied on prayer as their combat tours 
progressed found it to be of some comfort. They also, however, found the idea that they could 
not let a comrade down to be a significant motivator. “Coercive Institutional Authority” was also 
                                                 
 
91
 TAS vol. II. 77. 
43 
 
a significant motivator. The threat of court martial, imprisonment, garnering of pay, and the 
accompanying shame or guilt helped keep the soldier facing the enemy, as did the comforting 
space of the primary group, and the leadership by example of his most immediate non-
commissioned and commissioned officers. And although the soldier in general “was typically 
without deep personal commitment to a war which he nevertheless accepted as unavoidable,”92 
he did concede that he had a part to play in finishing the job. Ideology tended to be a social faux 
paus in the context of the squad: 
 Probably the strongest group code, except for condemnation of 
 expressions of flagrant disloyalty, was the taboo against any talk 
 of the flag-waving variety. Accounts of many informal observers 
 indicate that this code was universal among American combat troops, 
 and widespread throughout the Army….The usual term by which 
 disapproval of idealistic exhortation was invoked was „bullshit….‟93 
 
Given this insight, the irony that the ideology of the American soldier in World War II, “the 
greatest generation,” has been used to justify and prolong subsequent conflicts is rich indeed. 
            Chapter Four, “Problems Related to the Control of Fear in Combat,” was written by 
psychologist Irving L. Janis, a contributor to volume II of The American Soldier and the 
Yale/Berkeley professor who later came up with the concept of “groupthink.” This chapter  
explores fear, controlling fear, and the difficulties of doing so. The Army made use of several 
practices to recognize, control, and attempt to prevent fear, as the chapter reports. Janis 
illuminated all of these practices in a discussion of the Army‟s permissive approach toward fear - 
that it is a natural phenomenon and that everyone in harm‟s way will feel it. Additionally, he 
discusses the methods and effects of screening out men who were “psychologically unfit for 
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combat.”94 Finally, Janis reported on the various methods used in training to accustom and 
desensitize recruits to fear and the battlefield. 
 Chapter Five, “The Combat Replacement,” written by Smith, situates combat 
replacements firmly between unwilling (for combat) veterans and willing new soldiers in units 
which had not yet seen combat. Smith explains that the attitude of the combat replacement was 
heavily influenced by the presence, if not necessarily the experiences, of the veterans in the unit 
to which he was assigned. Replacements tended to be more loyal to their units and the Army than 
even veterans. Smith ends the chapter with a discussion of the efficacy, or lack thereof, of 
leaving soldiers in combat too long. 
 Chapter Six, “Attitudes of Ground Combat Troops toward Rear Echelons and the Home 
Front,” also written by Smith, catalogues the resentment frontline soldiers felt against those in 
the rear echelons, and to a lesser extent those in the United States. It is fair to classify this view 
as one in which frontline soldiers felt that anyone whose foxhole was behind theirs was the “rear 
echelon,” (a term of scorn) and the farther one got away from the front in overseas theaters, the 
less one was respected by frontline troops. While holding these feelings, frontline troops for the 
most part also felt that service troops were doing their best to support the fighting troops - an 
indicator of the complications and paradoxes inherent in attitudes. An additional indicator of 
such complexity was the illogical belief held by many frontline troops that “the people at home” 
were not doing enough to win the war, but that their own family and friends were: 
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The American Soldier  vol II. Chart X, p. 322. 
 Chapter six also reveals the relationship between proximity to the front and status. The 
closer a soldier got to the fighting, the more superior he tended to feel to those behind him. This 
attitude was underwritten by the increasing informal privileges he obtained the closer he got to 
the front. Distinctions between officers and enlisted men were much dampened by the sound of 
the guns, and the emphasis on spit and polish -“chickenshit”- often disappeared completely. 
 Chapter Seven, “Morale Attitudes of Combat Flying Personnel in the Air Corps,” and 
Chapter Eight, “Objective Factors Related to Morale Attitudes in the Aerial Combat Situation,” 
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were written by Janis, and consider the unique position of the Army Air Corps in the Second 
World War. Readers will immediately discover that morale in the Air Corps was much higher 
than in the Army as a whole, despite the dangers inherent in the job. Janis noted that the Army 
was very particular in its selection of Air Corps personnel, the crew design of the Air Corps 
limited the status differences between officers and enlisted men, and the prestige of Air Corps 
service was higher than anywhere else in the Army. All of these factors, Janis argued, 
contributed to high morale. Unsurprisingly, and despite high morale, the more missions a crew 
flew, the higher became their anxiety, and the lower their willingness for combat duty. Janis also 
pointed out that the survey data indicated a relationship between morale and the size of airplane 
flown, with the smaller aircraft pilots (fighters) demonstrating higher morale, and the larger 
aircraft pilots (bombers) lower morale. Janis offers several explanations for these differences in 
attitudes - confidence in aircraft design, the increased responsibility bomber pilots has vis a vis 
their crews as opposed to fighter pilots who flew alone, exposure to aerial combat, etc. None of 
his ideas, however, were definitive, and he wrote at the conclusion of chapter eight only that “a 
number of hypotheses were formulated, in terms of differentials in the conditions of combat 
flying which may account for attitude differences on items indicative of motivation for 
combat.”95 
 Chapter Nine, “Psychoneurotic Symptoms in the Army,” written by Shirley A. Star, took 
on perhaps the most provocative and difficult topic in all of The American Soldier - 
psychoneurotics. Awash in cultural mores, and squabbled over continually by officers, 
physicians, and enlisted men, the point at which a soldier breaks down and becomes unfit for 
combat remains a subject of furious debate, as do the methods to prevent such breakdowns and 
subsequent actions when they occur. Star encapsulated the general distribution of psychoneurotic 
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cases as they occurred within the Army, relating that it was no surprise that the governing factor 
was proximity to combat. She considered screening criteria, including the efficacy of screening 
devices, and she also summarized what the survey data indicated in relation to exogenous factors 
such as age, physical health, and education levels. The data as she interpreted it indicated that 
early breakdowns were most often seen in soldiers “who would ordinarily be considered 
psychologically predisposed” (or who should have been screened out). “Once these had been 
weeded out,” she continued, “the psychiatric rate was regarded as leveling off until the mounting 
tensions of combat brought a rise in breakdowns among men who would usually be regarded as 
within the normal ranges.”96 She discussed what were commonly known at the time as 
“psychosomatic symptoms,” and concluded as tentatively as did Janis regarding the Air Corps, 
“While in many cases our data were suggestive rather than final, taken together they permit the 
tentative generalization that transition from one phase of the Army cycle [adjustment] to another 
[combat] was marked by a rise in the level of psychoneurotic symptoms.”97 
 Chapter Ten, “Problems of Rotation and Reconversion” also written by Star, summarized 
Research Branch observations of soldiers returning to the United States from overseas before 
war‟s end. In his expository review of The American Soldier, Paul F. Lazarsfeld described this 
chapter as “almost like a description of displaced persons in a new country, or a chapter in a 
textbook on social disorganization.”98 Star noted that the major challenge the War Department 
faced was settling on a rotation policy - which they did not do until 1944 - and then integrating 
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men who had been deployed into stateside units successfully. Research Branch documented 
many cases of severe psychological displacement in the returnees. Veterans felt guilty for having 
returned home and having deserted their buddies, (three-fifths of them reported that they missed 
their overseas units), and their expectations of life at home often exceeded reality. Even with 
these attitudes, however, twenty-percent of returnees believed they should remain in the United 
States until those soldiers who had not served in overseas commands had done so. 
 The desires of returnees and the Army often ran at cross purposes. Returnees desired to 
be stationed near their homes, they wished to retain the rank and status they had held overseas, 
and they wanted to serve as trainers for those who had yet to deploy. Rarely could the Army - 
wrestling daily with the exigencies of an ongoing world war - accommodate such wishes, and 
when expectations collided with reality, the adjustment of the soldier to Army life in the states 
was retarded significantly. Returnees, Star concluded, “were a disgruntled group,” but “only a 
minority of returnees ever got so completely fed up as to wish they had never come back to the 
United States or had returned only for a brief furlough.”99 
 Chapter Eleven, “The Point System for Redeployment and Discharge,” written by 
Stouffer himself, offered a summary of Research Branch findings related to the attitudes of 
soldiers towards demobilization and separation, and the point system created to manage them. 
The problem of demobilization was a thorny one. There were many more service than combat 
troops overseas, but the combat troops were most needed there to maintain order in the chaos 
that was post-war Europe and the Pacific. Yet combat troops felt that they had “done their bit” 
and were clamoring for immediate return to the United States. Nor could the Army haphazardly 
release the support personnel required to administer units and keep them running. The Army had 
learned to turn to Research Branch for policy recommendations when encountering such 
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problems, and it was Research Branch which came up with the point system in an effort to make 
the best of a bad situation. To decide which soldiers were to return home first, the Army under 
the point system considered total time in the Army, the number of months of overseas service, 
combat service to include wounds, and the number of dependent children the soldier had waiting 
for him at home, assigning each a point value. 
 In September 1944, the War Department announced the point system to the public, 
making it clear that the system was based on the attitudes and opinions of the soldiers 
themselves, as determined by Research Branch. Soldiers were to be returned not with their units, 
but rather as individuals ordered according to the points they had earned under the four criteria 
listed above. Reaction to the plan was overwhelmingly positive - it was seen as both fair and 
efficient by the majority of the American public.
100
 Most soldiers thought the plan was relatively 
fair, although many of those who had been in combat believed that their service at the front was 
not given enough weight. 
 Stouffer, perhaps more than any of the other The American Soldier authors, included in 
his summaries not only the charts and statistical data which helped to summarize Research 
Branch findings, but also considerable anecdotal evidence to help bring the data to life. Often he 
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include verbatim statements of soldiers, and those who complained about the point system give 
readers a feeling both for the time and the mercurial attitudes of individual soldiers in a way no 
chart can: 
 Letting men out of the Army after VE Day has become a joke. 
 The Army let a lot of men out at first just to keep their word to 
 the American people. Why let men get out as soon as they hit the 
 States with 95 points when some of us got back four months ago, 
 have  95-115 points and still can‟t get out? 
 
 I thought the point system was very good prior to May 12. Since 
 my discharge was turned down I am completely disgusted with the 
 Army….I‟ve been overseas for 39 months, then I get a dirty deal 
 like this. 
 
 The point system is near perfect if it were worked right 
 as possible. 
 
 I think somebody is pulling a fast one. 
 
 Frankly we are being held to give goldbricking officers 
 a job which keeps them from going overseas.
101
 
 
 Anticipating a long war with Japan after VE Day, Research Branch nevertheless reacted 
immediately to VJ Day with recommendations for a revised point system. Although some in the 
War Department wanted to reduce or eliminate points for combat service after victory in the 
Pacific, Research Branch surveys indicated such a policy would be counter-productive, and the 
original system was kept in place. Stouffer also wrote in chapter eleven that it was the rate of 
discharge, (perceived by many as very slow) as much as the system itself, which created 
disgruntlement. 
 Stouffer‟s conclusion in chapter eleven is heavy on history and its judgments: “Although 
in retrospect history may find that the greatest American Army ever created was broken up too 
rapidly, history also will record the irresistible political pressure to „bring the boys home,‟ and 
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the impatience of the soldiers themselves, some units of whom behaved in a manner hardly 
describable in terms other than mutiny.” He also asks the reader to consider the enthusiasm with 
which soldiers preparing for the invasion of Japan would have approached their task had they 
“heard of the wholesale discharge at home of millions of men, including new recruits who had 
never left the States.”102 Here he reminds us of historical contingency, and the blindness which 
often attends hindsight. He concludes by defending the wisdom of the point system and the 
surveys used to advocate it in historical context: 
 There are „ifs‟ which history cannot definitively answer. In 
 taking its calculated risks, the Army won its gamble. One  
 cannot say for certain what would have happened, after VJ Day 
 as well as before, if there had not been an objective method of 
 demobilization which the majority of men regarded as fair in  
 principle. Because „military efficiency‟ is not independent of 
 „morale,‟ there are grounds for believing that the War Department 
 chose correctly when it broke all precedent and went to the 
 enlisted men for their opinions before promulgating its 
 redeployment and demobilization policy.
103
 
   
 Chapter Twelve, “The Aftermath of Hostilities,” offered in one sense a coda to the 
immediately preceding chapters. Its author, Leonard Cottrell, employed a rather unique device: 
He held one of his own memoranda, written in the late summer of 1944, up to historical scrutiny. 
Research Branch, and Cottrell in particular, had been asked by the War Department to outline 
“the major morale and discipline problems of the post VE Day period,” and to suggest “ways and 
means of meeting these problems through the I and E program.”104 Cottrell‟s memorandum made 
several predictions regarding what would happen to soldier attitudes at the cessation of hostilities 
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in Europe. As the memorandum is nine pages long, it is too long to reproduce here, but among 
the predictions were: 
 -The sense of purpose and need to cooperate for survival when facing an active 
enemy would weaken among soldiers, requiring the Army to strengthen coercive 
measures to ensure discipline within the ranks. 
 
 -Individual goals would eclipse collective goals among the men. 
 
 -Soldiers would go though the five stages of victory (verbatim from the 
memorandum): 
 
1. The thrill of being victorious. 
2. The desire for „celebrating‟ (wine, women, song, hell raising). 
3. A general feeling of relief that their tough part of the war is 
over and they have survived it. 
4. These will be followed immediately by a rapidly growing feeling 
of: „Well, they don‟t need us here any more so let‟s get the 
hell home.‟ (Meantime it should be remembered that the Pacific 
and CBI troops, still having tough going, will react to the news  
with the feeling, „Now they can really send us plenty of help 
to clean this job up fast‟). 
5. Very shortly there will be the reaction, „I wonder what is going 
to happen to me now. Will I go home, stay here, or be sent to 
another theater?‟105 
 
 -Disgust at the destruction of the war would set in. 
 -Loss of motivation and preoccupation with self. 
 -Loss of aggression towards the enemy, and an increase in aggression towards the 
Army, the government, civilians, and allies. 
 
 Cottrell‟s memorandum then predicted the different and by no means desirable reactions 
of troops sent to another theater, assigned to occupation in Europe, sent home as a strategic 
reserve, or demobilized. The reactions, he warned, would include bitterness, depression, 
resentment, lack of desire to train, demands for a timeline of release, frustration, and anxiety. To 
combat these reactions, the last half of Cottrell‟s memorandum enumerates a number of 
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strategies to mitigate the negative affects on the Army of the end of the war in Europe. Among 
these were propaganda designed to send the message that everyone was needed to successfully 
complete the war in Europe, occupy Germany, and finish Japan, entertainment, recreation, and 
education programs, strict attention by commanders to the morale of their men, and accurate 
news on the progress of the war. 
 Most of Cottrell‟s predictions came to pass, as indicated in part by the following two 
charts: 
 
The American Soldier vol. II, Chart I, p. 561. 
 
54 
 
 
                               The American Soldier vol. II, Chart IX, p. 588. 
 While acknowledging that some predictions had not been realized to the degree laid out 
in the memorandum - notably resentment toward allies - Cottrell concluded his chapter by 
emphasizing that most of them did in fact come to pass, calling them “a fairly accurate forecast 
of the state of mind of the troops in Europe following the war.”106 Cottrell, a sociology professor 
at the University of Chicago and Cornell, served as the 40
th
 president of the American 
Sociological Association (1950) three years before Stouffer held the same post. He was also 
employed for seventeen years by the Russell Sage Foundation. 
 The final chapter of The American Soldier, thirteen, “The Soldier Becomes a Veteran,” 
was co-authored Stouffer and Cottrell. The authors were quick to admit that the study of veterans 
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was outside their writ from the War Department and outside the scope of The American Soldier. 
Still, they commented early on in the chapter, referencing an “intensive survey of a small sample 
of discharged veterans” conducted shortly before the end of the war, that “perhaps the single 
most striking fact about the evidence available is the absence of any pronounced tendency either 
for personal bitterness or for social action.”107 The vast majority of veterans, it seemed, were 
simply absorbed again by American society. 
 Their summary of the survey sample revealed that although some soldiers felt minor 
anxiety about their prospects for civilian employment, most of them believed they would be fine. 
Paradoxically, however, they felt that their Army experience had hurt more than helped them. 
They also confined their concerns to themselves, and were little interested in the betterment of 
society. Most of them were able to bring to fruition employment plans they had formulated 
before or while serving in the Army; therefore their re-integration into civilian society was 
unremarkable. Twenty-one percent worried about what kind of employment they would pursue 
after the war. Nineteen percent were concerned that they would not be able to enter the fields 
upon which they had planned before their Army service. Sixteen percent worried that they might 
not be able to get a job at all after the war, and an equal number expressed some concern at their 
ability to “settle down.” Eleven percent evinced some concern about normalizing relations with 
their significant other, and only six percent expressed any concern at all over the fate of 
democracy in the United States after the war.
108
 Not, in short, the picture one gets for example in 
the Hollywood film “The Best Years of Their Lives.” Stouffer and Cottrell conclude this last 
chapter of The American Soldier as follows: 
  Books are likely to be written about the shattering experience of Army 
  life. It is true that some men were physically ruined by the war and others  
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  bear scars which will never disappear. Others broke emotionally under 
  the strain. But, unless the data reviewed in this chapter are to be largely 
  disregarded, there has seemed little reason for doubting the reabsorbtion 
  of the vast majority of American soldiers into the normal patterns of 
  American life. These millions of young men, responses of samples of whom  
  have been recorded in these volumes, gave their sweat and often their 
  blood to winning a war which they accepted without enthusiasm as 
  unavoidable. Loving American freedom, they chafed under the authori- 
  tarianism and social customs of an institution, which, though alien to 
  democratic ways of life, was an agency for preserving those ways of 
  life. This job done, they wanted to get out, get home, and by and large 
  resume where they had left off. They had their prejudices, some of them  
  bad by ideal standards. Although they were not postwar isolationists, they  
  had plenty of ethnocentrism. From some points of view they were too 
  complacent in their unreadiness to sponsor big social or political changes 
  in the United States. There would be agreement on one fact: though our 
  armies crossed all the seas and lived on all the continents, the men whose 
  attitudes provided the data for these volumes came home, as they went out, 
  indubitably American.
109
 
   
 Although it would be neither useful nor wise to rehearse all of Research Branch‟s  
findings here - there were hundreds, many with addenda, provisos, and sequelae, - one may get a 
sense of the substance and tone of The American Soldier by reviewing a few of the more 
significant discoveries in addition to those which have already been offered. The findings may be 
generally categorized in three ways: (1) Those findings which confirmed knowledge generally 
held to be true in the contemporary climate of opinion as of the mid-twentieth century, (2) Those 
findings which ran counter to contemporary conventional wisdom, but which were not 
counterintuitive, and (3) Those findings which not only contradicted conventional wisdom, but 
which also, in and of themselves, were counterintuitive. This last category is the most 
compelling, as of necessity it required the authors to explain conflicting data and phenomena. 
Category three was therefore most productive of hypothetical explanations for observations, if 
not necessarily productive of theoretical innovations. Three findings are offered as samples in 
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each category. All of the findings however, and indeed the purpose of Research Branch in 
general, served to inform leaders on what best equipped (or most hindered) citizen soldiers 
(draftees) to move to the sound of the guns. 
 Sample findings in Category I (the “no surprise” category):  The Old (Regular) and New 
(Draftee) Armies Were Radically Different Institutions. The Army leadership in 1940 was keenly 
aware that the Army they were about to create was very different indeed from the one that they 
had. With the exception of World War I, the United States had not conscripted since the 
American Civil War, and the Army in the interwar years had returned to the constabulary and 
imperial-policing habits it had developed between the Civil and First World Wars. In addition to 
size (the Army grew from approximately ¼ million to 8 million soldiers between 1940 and 
1945), there were two other major differences highlighted by The American Soldier. The first of 
these was that the members of the draftee Army were on the whole much better educated than 
their Regular Army counterparts. “In the first war,” Stouffer wrote in The American Soldier, the 
percentage of high school graduates and college men was 9, in the second 41.” This difference, 
he continued, “could hardly fail to be productive of tensions:” 
 
  The old peacetime Army was not accustomed to such a high educational 
  Level among enlisted men as it was to get in World War II. The Regular  
  Army enlisted man was a youth of less than average education, to whom the  
  security of pay, low as it was, and the routines of Army life appealed more  
  than the competitive struggle of civilian life. By self-selection he was not 
  the kind of man who would be particularly critical of an institution  
  characterized by authoritarian controls. He might get in trouble, of course  
  there were problems of drunkenness, venereal disease, and AWOL 
  [Absent With Out Leave]. But he would be more likely than the kind  
  of new citizen-soldier to accept the Army‟s traditional forms as right.  
  This is the kind of soldier to whom the old Army was adapted and who 
  on the eve of World War II would, as a noncom, be the immediate boss  
  and teacher of the new selectee.
110
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 Evidence that there was a general understanding within American society of the 
difficulties in combining old regulars with new draftees can be found in the contemporary 
popular media. The Warner Brothers 1943 musical film “This is the Army” gave us not only the 
debut of “God Bless America,” sung by Kate Smith, but also a grumbling old regular, Sergeant 
McGee (Alan Hale), who groused, “I keep tellin „em, you don‟t get no soldiers outta no 
draft….Civilians, even in uniform, they‟re still civilians.”111 Civilians in uniform they may have 
been, but their education, as Research Branch demonstrated, proved to have a salutary affect on 
their performance in the Army. And while Stouffer was careful to highlight that education was 
“correlated with ability…and socio-economic status,” the better educated a soldier was, the more 
likely he was to succeed in the Army. They may have been more critical of the Army, but they 
also got better assignments, faster promotions, had better esprit, etc.
112
 
 In addition to the difference in education, there was the separate but related issue of 
institutional culture. The old Army, as The American Soldier noted, was an institution bounded 
by a stratified, authoritarian structure where tradition trumped initiative. Stouffer and his co-
authors realized that comparable institutions could be found in the civilian world, but also wrote 
of “the conflicts and the grinding of the gears within the Army” that resulted from the collision 
of the Regular Army, which tended to brook neither argument nor question from its lowest 
rankers, with a conscripted and well-educated horde of constantly questioning and challenging 
private soldiers.
113
 It was the recognition that those gears would need to be oiled that was the 
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impulse for founding Research Branch, or as, the officer told Sergeant McGee in the musical, 
“Sergeant, there‟s a very necessary element in soldiering. It goes by various names, but let‟s call 
it morale.”114 
 Another of the findings in Category I was confirmation that A Stable Upbringing Made 
for a Good Soldier. Stouffer made inquiries into broken homes, child health, sociability, truancy, 
fighting, and dating to determine the backgrounds of soldiers as they related to adjustment to the 
Army. Not surprisingly, he found that the best soldiers were those who were the best adjusted in 
their childhoods, as reflected in the following chart: 
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The American Soldier vol. I, Chart VI, p. 133. 
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 The chart is representative of scores like it found in The American Soldier. Stouffer and 
his colleagues rarely looked at one attribute, attitude, or situation individually. They almost 
always made comparisons and controlled variables based on their lines of inquiry, thus 
accounting for context by comparison as well as the specific case. In this particular case, the 
relationship between broken homes and poor adjustment to the Army is slight, while the 
relationship between sociability and adjustment is stronger. 
 A third example drawn from Category I was The Problem of the Infantry. Early in The 
American Soldier, Stouffer reported that “particular attention was given, at home and abroad, to 
the very serious morale problems of the Infantry.” These problems, he continued, “were too large 
and approached too late to be solved at any fundamental level.” Research Branch did, however, 
conduct studies that indicated the magnitude of attitude, morale, and adjustment problems in the 
Infantry, and made what recommendations they could to ameliorate these problems or mitigate 
their effects. These recommendations included “the revision of pay scales, the introduction of 
symbols such as the Combat Infantryman‟s Badge and the Expert Infantryman‟s Badge, and the 
development of an aggressive program of publicity.”115 
 Among the conditions which contributed to morale problems within the Infantry were   
proximity to combat and all that such an exposed position entailed. Additionally, there was the 
bypassing of the replacement training center (basic training) for Infantry recruits at times when 
Infantrymen were in short supply,
116
 the desire of Infantrymen to switch to other branches,
117
 the 
belief of the Infantrymen that “he would be kept under enemy fire until he became a casualty or 
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the war ended,”118 and the inexorable math which indicated that although the Infantry 
represented only ten percent of the Army, they suffered seventy percent of the casualties.
119
 
Added to these factors was what Stouffer and his colleagues called “relative deprivation:” The 
Infantryman could compare his lot to that of his fellow soldiers in the service forces and see the 
glaring differences in danger and living conditions. He could also compare himself to those in 
the Army Air Corps, who suffered high casualty rates, but unlike him spent their final hours in 
relative comfort.
120
 Though this last concept might have been eye-opening to the general reader, 
he would not have been surprised that the Infantry had the toughest lot in the war, as has been the 
case since time immemorial. 
 Sample findings in Category II: (those findings which ran counter to contemporary 
conventional wisdom, but which were not necessarily counterintuitive) include first: Defining 
Combat. Combat, as it turned put, proved to be “extraordinarily difficult to define,” according to 
The American Soldier. Part of the definitional problem had to do with the awards system, 
wherein campaign stars were awarded to soldiers in combat theaters, regardless of whether they 
had actually “seen the elephant.” Stouffer and his colleagues, ever with an eye towards correct 
historical interpretation, advised that the data they gained “are important for historians, because 
they represent the Army‟s only source of tabulated information on the proportion of the Army 
engaged in combat.” “All in all,” the authors stress, “these are about the best data which 
historians are likely to get.”121 The data to which the authors refer were summarized in the 
following chart: 
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The American Soldier  vol. I, Chart III, p. 165. 
 The sample was of 17,000 enlisted men and 5,000 company grade officers stationed 
throughout the world, and the results indicated that a minority (27%) of them had actually seen 
64 
 
combat, though many of them serving in rear areas were subject to the occasional bombing raid. 
“2 out of 5 reported that they had been in actual combat, about 1 out of 5 reported that they had 
had been under enemy fire, but not in actual combat, while 2 out of five offers and men overseas 
had not, according to their own reports, even been under enemy fire,” The American Soldier 
reported.
122
 Stouffer and his colleagues, basing their judgment on this data, remarked that “the 
old beat-up GI Joes of Mauldin‟s cartoons or Ernie Pyle‟s dispatches, or the airmen who flew in 
the substratosphere thorough flak and fighter opposition to wipe out another German or Japanese 
city may, in the public eye, too much symbolize the American soldiers overseas.”123 
 Malaria pills. In February 1944, Research Branch conducted a survey of men on 
Guadalcanal and New Georgia islands, all of whom were supposed to be taking atabrine 
regularly to prevent malaria. 25% admitted to not taking the pills, and about 40% told the 
surveyors that no one checked closely to see if they were taking their pills. Still, the proportion 
of men who took their pills was higher in units that did not check than in units that did check to 
see if their soldiers took the pills. The finding was counter to the conventional wisdom that 
disciplinary standards could solve these sorts of problems. What Research Branch discovered 
was that soldiers tended to take atabrine voluntarily in areas where the need for the pills seemed 
most apparent. In areas where the average soldier did not detect a need, the disciplinary measures 
in place to ensure he took the pills failed. The men, in the absence of a coherent educational 
program to demonstrate the need for atabrine, instead relied on rumor and surmise. 25% thought 
it was unhealthy, and another 25% thought it might be so. Some thought it would make them 
impotent. 10% believed that men contracting malaria were automatically returned to the United 
States, and saw malaria as a small price to pay for such a trip. The survey helped Pacific 
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commands to develop programs to educate soldiers effectively on the efficacy of atabrine and the 
dangers of malaria. 
 Climate adjustment. Conventional wisdom held, and still holds, that those from warm 
climates will have significant problems adjusting to cold climates, and vice-versa. “One might,” 
wrote the authors of The American Soldier, “expect men from Southern states to adapt somewhat 
better than men from the North to the heat of the tropics, and the reverse in Alaska.” What they 
found, however, after inquiring into climatic adjustment in Panama and Alaska, “was no 
significant difference in attitudes of Northern or Southern men to their physical condition - in 
either Alaska or Panama.” In fact, the only significant difference in attitudes between northerners 
and southerners concerned black-white relations.
124
 As with the definition of combat and the 
taking (or not) of malaria pills, conventional wisdom, which affected personnel selection, 
training regimens, equipment requests, and a host of other policy decisions, turned out to be 
flimsy material upon which to plan operations. 
 Sample findings in Categories I and II covered those findings which either confirmed 
knowledge generally held to be true or ran counter to contemporary conventional wisdom, but 
which were not necessarily counterintuitive. Category III findings were not only surprising but 
also counterintuitive. These findings not only contradicted conventional wisdom, but were also 
unpredictable without data to support them. They not only defied intuition, but would not occur 
by the normal means of deduction ascribed to “common sense.” 
 One startling example of findings in Category III (Counterintuitive) was: White soldiers 
experiencing continual contact with black soldiers were less likely to oppose integration, and 
had better relationships with black soldiers than was anticipated. Conventional wisdom had for 
centuries dictated that familiarity breeds contempt and that the best way to keep peace between 
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the races was to keep them separated. This idea had become so strongly entrenched that it had 
become intuitive - a gut reaction to the problem of race relations. Surprised at the time, however, 
were soldiers, officers, and researchers who discovered that those companies which had black 
platoons serving within them were not only amenable to, but enthusiastic about the arrangement. 
Research Branch visited seven divisions which were so structured, and discovered that “in the 
companies in which Negro platoons served, the overwhelming majority of white officers and 
men gave their approval to their performance in combat…and there was some indication in the 
data that the performance of Negro troops was rated highest by the officers and men in the 
companies in which the colored platoons had had the most severe fighting.” 93% of the officers 
and 60% of the enlisted men surveyed reported that white and black soldiers got along well.
 125
 
 Notwithstanding the findings above, the authors of The American Soldier showed in this 
as in many of their findings their characteristic skepticism and unwillingness to give pat answers 
when they offered several different, more negative explanations for their findings: 
  It should be remembered, however, that not all the white support 
  of using Negroes as infantrymen necessarily reflected „democratic‟ 
  or „pro-Negro‟ attitudes. It could be simply a reflection of the desire 
  of combat men to have their own burden lightened by letting others 
  do part of the fighting; it might even conceal the most extreme attitudes 
  of racial superiority leading to the reasoning that inferior Negro lives 
  should be sacrificed before white lives. Moreover, the Negroes were 
  still in separate platoons, which, to some Southern respondents, 
  preserved at least the principle of segregation.
126
 
 
The American Soldier is full of such addenda and proviso - one reason why it is not a didactic, 
theoretical, thesis-driven, or agenda-laden work. The authors offered the evidence, along with 
                                                 
 
125
 TAS vol. I. 588-592. 
 
126
 TAS vol. I. 590. 
67 
 
several alternative interpretive schema, yet they also distinguished clearly between facts and 
implications.
127
  
 The second counter-intuitive finding offered in this brief sampling was that soldiers did 
not necessarily improve with experience, as the following chart indicates: 
 
 The American Soldier vol. II, Chart III, p. 285. 
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 It is logical to assume that effectiveness increases with experience. What the authors of 
The American Soldier found, however, was that most soldiers enjoyed their peak of combat 
effectiveness at three or four months of combat, after which they experienced a sharp decline in 
their ability to perform effectively. Research Branch surveyors got at this information by 
interviewing eighty-seven rifle platoon leaders just before VE Day and asking them which three 
non-commissioned officers and which three riflemen (replacements) they would be most 
reluctant to lose. Once the names were obtained, the surveyors then determined how much 
combat experience each man had. The data indicated, as reported in The American Soldier, that 
“men who have had more than eight months of combat time are apparently less likely than men 
with less time in combat to be rated as the best men in their outfits.”128 The intuitive notion that 
experience and effectiveness have a positive relationship proved to be wrong in the case of 
soldiers in combat. 
Such findings dovetailed nicely with information that had been gathered previously. 
Psychologists Roy L. Swank and Walter E. Marchand made observations of soldiers while 
following an Infantry battalion inland for eighty days after their landing at Normandy. Like the 
authors of The American Soldier, they came up with a combat effectiveness/time in combat chart 
which is known famously as the Swank & Marchand Curve: 
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Swank & Marchand Curve 
 The curve, much like the combat effectiveness chart in The American Soldier, indicates 
that fatigue and bitterness trump experience within a relatively short period (depending on the 
duration and intensity of combat). While The American Soldier offered no hard theoretical 
explanation for the evidence, the authors did observe that “it represents a limitation inherent in 
the individual replacement system,” and the data itself seemed to gainsay the almost intuitive 
image of the grizzled non-commissioned officer who leads his replacements safely through 
combat.
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 The final sample from Category III (counterintuitive findings) has to do with one of the 
age-old assumptions regarding what background makes a good soldier - soldiers from the farms 
did not adjust to the Army more readily than those from the cities. Intuition, or common sense, 
has dictated for millennia that a rural background, with its hardships, makes for a better 
soldier.
130
 Research Branch discovered no such correlation existed, particularly as it regarded the 
esprit of individual soldiers. Nor did soldiers with rural backgrounds gravitate towards the 
Infantry. The opposite was true: “The men who were least enthusiastic about Infantry or overseas 
service were…the less educated rural men.” The American Soldier, for a fleeting moment, did 
away with “one stereotype of the kind of man who would like the Infantry, or at least would like 
overseas combat service…a man with low education from a farm or village, the kind of man 
„who can shoot a squirrel‟s eye out at ninety feet.‟” 131 
 The structure and findings of The American Soldier tell us a great deal about the concerns 
of its authors, their willingness to question conventional wisdom, and to some extent their efforts 
to offer alternate explanations for soldier attitudes and behavior. What they do not tell us is what 
impulses led to the creation of Research Branch and how they went about their labors, and it is to 
these issues we now turn. 
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Chapter 3 
Impulses: World War I and the Interwar Years 
 
 
 Stouffer‟s notes about his initial visit to Washington DC in the late summer of 1941 have 
survived. Written in his crabbed hand, they reveal much about where Research Branch began its 
work of discovering and managing the attitudes of American soldiers in World War II. “I must 
read a good deal about the experience in the last war,” Stouffer told himself, “Got two books on 
the Personnel program in the last war from Army library.” He also “saw some reports from G-2 
[Army Intelligence] on morale in the French & German armies; rather interesting.” The material 
that caught Stouffer‟s attention most, however, were the papers and reports of Raymond B. 
Fosdick, who had been the Army‟s “Morale Czar” in the First World War.  “Fosdick‟s report to 
the Secy of War in 1918,” Stouffer wrote, “about the YMCA. Officer-private relations, etc. 
Plenty of Dynamite in that report if it had got out at the time.” Stouffer recorded that he also 
“spent rest of afternoon and all evening [August 11, 1941] reading a detailed history of the 
building of classification & testing programs in the last war. They started from scratch and made 
plenty of mistakes, which are frankly recorded. From what little I know, the present system is 
built on the 1918 experience. But how much?” As it turned out, a great deal. The Army‟s 
experience in World War I led its personnel officers to concentrate on aptitude and morals, and 
that is where they began in 1941. Stouffer and Research Branch would formally change the 
Army‟s focus to attitude and morale, but there were other forces in the interwar years which 
were already moving the Army in that direction.
132
  
 The first impulse that led to the founding of Research Branch and ultimately to The 
American Soldier was the Army‟s experience in the First World War, out of which came the 
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Morale Branch, as well as the idea of psychological testing to delimit and classify recruits.
133
 
Additionally, the pressures of 1940-1941 as the US geared up for war resulted in a major morale 
crisis in the Army, a crisis of sufficient seriousness to cause General Marshall to turn to Stouffer 
and survey research to understand and manipulate soldier attitudes. Finally, Stouffer brought his 
own education and experience as a sociologist in the interwar years - a time when psychology 
and sociology were moving towards empiricism - to Morale Branch, and converted it into an 
organization based on survey research. 
 While the First World War brought questions about the fragility of civilization and the 
influence of militarism to the sociological world, some US Army officers had learned from the 
conflict - much to their alarm - that their combat power could be significantly reduced by 
dynamics located in the psychological and sociological realms, collectively referred to as 
“morale.” They also learned that authoritarian modes of coercion - particularly in democratic 
societies - no longer ministered with complete effectiveness to the management of mass, 
conscripted armies in the era of industrial warfare. Even as most of their fellow officers clung to 
authoritarian modes, these officers began to shift, as sociologists Morris Janowitz and Roger 
Little have observed, “from domination to increased reliance on manipulation or managerial 
authority.” In 1937, historian Alfred Vagts suggested that the US Army in World War I and the 
interwar years had slipped into militarism. Because militarism exaggerated the differences 
between officers and enlisted men, Vagts observed that in the First World War, “signs of 
resentment appeared.” The resentment of enlisted men against their officers in the US Army, and 
the seeming obliviousness of most officers to this dynamic, became a key stimulus to the study 
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of enlisted attitudes - culminating in the interwar years with the founding of Research Branch 
and their work during World War II. As the war approached, General Marshall was prepared if 
not happy to enlist psychology and sociology to help the Army make the transition from 
authoritarian to managerial models, and psychologists and sociologists were prepared to help. 
They had been doing some work of their own on the military, and they had also begun to develop 
survey research models to assist them in their work.
 134
 
 Psychiatrists, psychologists, social psychologists, and sociologists had no little interest in 
things military, which they saw both as a source of funding and of professional legitimacy. 
Sociologists Kurt Lang in his review of sociological literature related to the military (1972) noted 
1,325 journal articles and books on the subject, of which a full 120 (9%) were written before 
1945. A sample of some 10% of these writings includes: 
 
 Dr. Campeneau. “Questions de sociologie militaire.” Revista Internacional de Sociologie, 
1903. 
A. Hamon. Psychologie de militaire professional, 1904.  
 
C. Gini. Problemi sociologici della guerra, 1921. 
 
K. Hesse Der Feldherr Psychologos, 1922. 
 
M. H. Cornejo. La guerre au point de vue sociologique, 1930. 
 
H.E. Fick. Der deutsche Militarismus der Vorkriegszeit: ein Beitrag zur Sociologie des 
Militarismus (German militarism in the prewar era; an inquiry into the sociology of 
militarism), 1932. 
 
J.S. Roucek. “Social Attitudes of the Soldier in Wartime.” Journal of Abnormal Social 
Psychology, 1935-1936. 
 
J.D. Clarkson and T.C. Cochran, eds. War as a Social Institution, 1941. 
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E.E. Hadley. “Military Psychiatry: a Note on Social Status.” Psychiatry, 1943. 
 
J.F. Cuber. “The Adjustment of College Men to Military Life: Case Data.” Sociology and 
Social Research, 1943. 
 
P.L. Prattis. “The Morale of the Negro in the Armed Services of the United States.” 
Journal of Negro Education, 1943. 
 
H.W. Dunham. “War and Mental Disorder: some Sociological Considerations.” Social 
Forces, 1944. 
 
 
 Lang‟s analysis of these and other works draws a direct line between First World War 
experience, the scholarship of the interwar years on military sociology, and Research Branch: 
 
 World War I revealed dramatically, as other wars had before, the 
 inadequacies of traditional orientations regarding military discipline 
 and troop leadership. These had always been exclusively under the 
 direction of the military, and it must be recognized that some military 
 men despite professional and class biases exhibited considerable acuity 
 analyzing the interplay between material and moral, i.e., social factors 
 in war, the direction of war, the nature of military leadership, and the 
 factors in combat effectiveness. One illustration of this is the work of 
 Colonel Ardant du Picq, who in his Battle Studies developed generalizations 
 based on 19
th
-century wars that in many ways anticipate sociological 
 propositions subsequently rediscovered by social scientists once they turned 
 their attention to the behavior of troops in combat and in captivity. A 
 sizeable body of literature on this topic was produced during and after 
 World War I, most of it by medical specialists including psychologists. 
 Although the rigor with which these studies were conducted fell far short of 
 present-day standards, they nevertheless amounted in their totality to a 
 damning indictment of the traditional philosophy of military leadership 
 and manpower management….As methodology in the behavioral sciences 
 advanced in the interwar years, officials gradually recognized that techniques 
 useful in studying other areas could yield similar returns for military 
 management….Initially sociologists had little to do with these innovations. 
 The first major step toward their full involvement came in the United States 
 where the Army Research Branch, formed in 1941 and headed by an academic 
 sociologist [Stouffer], conducted attitude surveys among servicemen to locate 
 and diagnose morale problems that would inevitably arise during rapid 
 mobilization.
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 Lang included in his bibliography the 1921 translation of Ardant du Picq‟s Etudes sur le 
Combat, the translation that Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy - who would later review The American 
Soldier - read as a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the interwar 
years.
136
 The pattern from the samples is easy to see: The Europeans, hurt and disillusioned 
much more by the First World War than the Americans, began their military sociology inquiries 
earlier, but the Americans, pace Lang, caught up with “a high sociological output in the United 
States over several decades.”137 Interest in mental hygiene, intelligence and aptitude testing gave 
way in the interwar years to attitude formation and emphasis on morale, while intuition and 
“common sense” gave way to empirical research and statistics. The state would come to rely 
more on hard data than on the opinions of learned and experienced officers and gentlemen. So 
many advances were made in the interwar years that Stouffer was able to write in 1943: 
 At the time of World War I social psychology and sociology, as the journals 
 of that period will show, had not advanced particularly far beyond the essay 
 stage. Theories flourished, but it was the practice to illustrate them with examples 
 somewhat as a preacher illustrates his sermons rather than to submit ideas to 
 empirical tests. There was a great deal of bandying-about of the word „science,‟ 
 but one does not need to engage in a controversy on the definition of science 
 to say that at least one of the important elements of science, namely, verification, 
 was usually missing. The two decades after the Treaty of Versailles have been 
 decades of unprecedented advance in sociology and social psychology. A serious 
 effort has been made to phrase some of the theories in forms permitting at least 
 beginnings of scientific verification. At the same time, the techniques developed by 
 statisticians, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, and other have been refined. It would 
 be silly to say that, when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, social psychologists 
 and sociologists were ready with a set of theories and techniques perfectly adapted  
 for aiding the Army. But it is true that the accumulated experience of years of patient 
 work has given the sociologist and social psychologist an opportunity in the war 
 effort which he could not have taken advantage of two decades ago.
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 Sociologists had indeed made advances in the interwar years, and Stouffer was a key 
figure in bringing about those advances. The Army, based on their World War I experience, had 
made some changes in the way they did business, but its leaders for the most part remained 
reflexively tied to intuition rather than science when it came to leading enlisted men and 
managing their attitudes. Still, they had availed themselves of psychology in World War I, 
turning to psychologists Robert M. Yerkes (1876-1956) and Walter V. Bingham (1880-1952) to 
help them manage screening and classification of new recruits. Yerkes was a comparative 
psychologist interested in social control who took charge of the Army‟s World War I intelligence 
testing, and who continually hectored official Washington for a place at the World War II table 
for psychology. He once said that “theoretically man is just as measurable as is a bar of steel.”139 
During World War II, Bingham was the Army‟s head psychologist, having been appointed a 
colonel and chairman of the Committee on Classification of Military Personnel.
140
 After first 
meeting Bingham in 1941, Stouffer described him as “gray, friendly, maybe a little tedious. He is 
now chief consultant to army personnel service; don‟t know quite what it means. Only one in 
Washington, he says, who built the personnel & testing programs in last war.”141  
                                                                                                                                                             
a consideration of primary importance. The formation of huge conscript armies in place of professional, mercenary, 
or volunteer forces has compelled attention to the so-called spiritual factor. There is need of developing among 
conscript soldiery a spirit to fill the place of what is otherwise accomplished by habit, interest, and wish. The 
appearance of so-called total warfare has led to a similar concern. The enlistment of all citizens in the war effort and 
the subordination of their institutions to this enterprise set a problem of developing allegiance, of implanting 
convictions, and of establishing a new outlook.” 
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 In terms of setting up psychologists and sociologists for success in World War II, the 
World War I psychological program had mixed results. On one hand it confirmed the side of 
Progressive Era thinking which cleaved to experts and scientific management, on the other, it 
rejected the opinions and attitudes of the masses as guides for policy decisions. First World War 
American psychology was also not innocent of the principles of eugenics, and many of the 
69,394 recruits rejected for military service were rejected on those grounds. Still, the thought that 
there could be a systematic, scientific process for screening and assigning soldiers gave weight to 
the idea in the interwar years that there might be a similar process for determining and modifying 
their attitudes.
142
 Stouffer, writing in the middle of the Second World War, saw nothing but value 
in the participation of psychologists in World War I test design and testing. “In World War I a 
distinguished American psychologist was asked, „What can psychology contribute to winning the 
war?‟ He is reported to have replied, „Nothing.‟ He was, of course, quite wrong.”143 
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 The Army also recognized, late in the First World War, that something had to be done to 
create and husband good morale for those soldiers it decided to keep. In the early months of the 
war, most officers in the War Department believed morale to be the province of individual 
commanders, even though the psychologists in their employ were advocating for an Army-wide 
morale strategy. Experience on the Western Front, the collapse of Russia, and the French Army 
mutinies in 1917, however, began to turn the tide in favor of some form of systematic morale 
management. Captured documents helped the case - illuminating the German Army‟s program of 
psychological indoctrination for troop motivation. All that was needed was an advocate, and one 
presented himself in the person of Army physician Colonel Edward Lyman Munson (1869-
1947). Already a legend when he began his campaign for a Morale Branch, Munson had 
followed his medical training at Yale with service in China during the Spanish-American War, 
and had been one of the surgeons who attended President McKinley after the president was shot 
by an assassin. He had been Professor of Military Hygiene at the Army Service School in 
Washington, and had designed the boots worn by doughboys in World War I. Munson was 
persistent. He told his superiors that “men, money, and munitions” might provide the Army with 
a soldier ready to fight, but to keep him that way, “psychological stimulus” was needed. Munson 
won the battle, and in May 1918, a Morale Section was created as part of the War Department‟s 
                                                                                                                                                             
new approaches in psychological theory. The work of Dr. L.L. Thurstone and his colleagues at the University of 
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Training and instruction branch. For his pains, Munson was given the task of organizing the 
Morale Section.
144
  
 Munson‟s work in many respects prefigured Stouffer‟s, and if Stouffer was attempting to 
bring sociology onto a more scientific footing, Munson was doing the same with the Army and 
morale. Shortly after he founded and was appointed director of the Army‟s Morale Section, he 
published an 800 page treatise entitled The Management of Men: A Handbook on the Systematic 
Development of Morale and the Control of Behavior (1921), which he dedicated “to the younger 
officers of the service and all future leaders of men.” Munson saw little utility in continuing with 
the intuitional methods of the past, and he hoped his audience of young officers would be 
receptive to his ideas. He knew that their somewhat hidebound superiors would not be.  
 The first few sentences of The Management of Men are instructive for Munson‟s 
dismissal of intuition and “leadership” as a basis upon which to build and maintain consistently  
high morale:  
  The management of men and the development of morale are so  
  inseparably associated that they are properly to be considered  
  together. Each has heretofore been regarded as an art, in the  
  application of which success by the individual largely depended  
  on the relative degree in which the latter possessed inherent qualities 
  of leadership. The purpose of this book is to show that they should 
  also be considered as a science, whereby mental state and human 
  behavior can be comprehensively and effectively controlled by the 
  scientific application of the fundamental laws governing human  
  nature itself. 
 
 Despite Munson‟s efforts, the Army was not quite ready to embrace progressive 
psychology or science in the pursuit of morale. Instead, physical fitness and morality became the 
emphasis of Morale Section, and there the emphasis remained - dampened by the end of the First 
War - until those frantic few months before Pearl Harbor and the reactivation of a moribund 
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Morale Branch under Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall.
145
 Nevertheless, Munson 
did exert influence on Stouffer and Research Branch. Early in their labors, Stouffer asked one of 
his colleagues, Leonard S. Cottrell, to review the literature on morale. Cottrell went to both the 
War College Library and the Library of Congress, and produced a report for Stouffer in which 
Munson‟s work, particularly The Management of Men, figured largely. Additionally, Munson‟s 
son, E.L. Munson, Jr., was one of the military chiefs of Research Branch.
 146
 
 As noted previously, Stouffer began his research of the Army‟s World War I experience 
at the most compelling, succinct, and obvious place: Raymond B. Fosdick‟s “Report of the 
Chairman on Training Camp Activities to the Secretary of War, 1918,” and various of Fosdick‟s 
other papers and writings from the First World War. Appointed by Secretary of War Newton D. 
Baker, Fosdick had been a lawyer, progressive reformer, and investigator for the Bureau of 
Social Hygiene, and had investigated troop conditions on the Mexican Border in 1916 during the 
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pursuit of Pancho Villa.
147
 Fosdick‟s report of what he found on the border made for interesting 
and alarming reading. Focusing on the military installations in or near San Antonio, Brownsville, 
El Paso, Nogales, and other Texas locales, Fosdick wrote of the increase of prostitution 
coincident with the arrival of the Army - with prostitutes “flocking” to swell the red light 
districts adjacent to Army camps. San Antonio, as described by Fosdick, was burnishing its “evil 
reputation,” and was filled with scarlet women and libertine soldiers. The provost guards, he 
observed, did almost nothing, and he made a quick connection between the debauchery he 
witnessed and the high rate of venereal disease.  
 Fosdick recommended to Baker that the War Department threaten to move the camps if 
the towns did not “clean house,” energize the provosts, abandon the idea that prostitution could 
be regulated or controlled, and recognize the “scar on a man‟s life” that prostitution and all its 
evils could render. He ended the section of his report on prostitution - the other section, on 
saloons, painted an equally grim picture - by telling Baker that none of these measures were 
more than stop-gaps, and that what was really needed was a “committee or council of army 
officers, physicians of modern training and scientific spirit, and perhaps civilians who have had 
experience with the problem.” 148  
 Ostensibly the problem was a moral one, but Fosdick, Baker, and most Army officers 
viewed it from the perspective of preservation of combat power. Bad morals meant bad morale 
which produced the poor discipline that ultimately rendered poor combat performance. As 
American entry into the European struggle looked to be increasingly likely in the year following 
Fosdick‟s 1916 report from the Mexican Border, the Army‟s leaders decided that the nation 
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could not afford the drunkenness, venereal disease and poor morale that came with such loose 
morals, and they certainly could not afford it in the numbers that conscription would bring. 
Something had to be done, and therefore Baker in April 1917 created the Commission on 
Training Camp Activities (CTCA),
149
 placing Fosdick at its head.
150
 
 The report Fosdick provided Baker on the CTCA at the completion of the First World 
War was every bit as full of “dynamite” as Stouffer, reading it in the summer of 1941, had 
written in his personal notes. The dynamite, however, was perhaps a bit old - more useful for the 
Progressive Era than the era of scientific sociology. Fosdick reported to Baker that the purpose of 
the CTCA had been “to keep the man in uniform healthy and clean, physically and mentally, by 
safeguarding him against evil influences [liquor, prostitutes, and venereal disease] and 
surrounding him with opportunity for sane, beneficial occupation for his spare time.” Toward 
that end, Fosdick had organized the CTCA into six divisions, departments and committees: The 
Athletic, Social Hygiene, and Law Enforcement Divisions, the Camp Music Department, The 
Military Entertainment Committee, and the National Smileage Committee, which dedicated itself 
to selling coupon books which would fund tickets for soldiers to attend wholesome 
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entertainments. It was the job of these organizations “to keep the camps and surrounding 
neighborhoods free from vicious influences which would render the soldier mentally and 
physically unfit for military service; and to supply so far as could be done social and recreational 
facilities to replace in his new environment the normal conditions of life he enjoyed at home.” 
Aiding (and often vexing) Fosdick in his work, and supervised by the CTCA were The Young 
Men‟s Christian Association (YMCA), Young Women‟s Christian Association (YWCA), 
National Catholic War Council (Knights of Columbus), the Jewish Welfare Board, War Camp 
Community Service, the American Library Association, and the Salvation Army.
151
 
 More along the lines of still viable “dynamite” for Stouffer was Fosdick‟s report on 
officer-enlisted relations - a major issue in the Second World War.
152
 After having spent four 
months with the A.E.F. in France, Fosdick reported to Baker than many soldiers would be 
returning to the US “disgruntled,” and that the root of this disgruntlement could be “found in 
what may be called a misfit in the relationship between officers and men,” that was “galling to 
the democratic spirit of the troops.” Prefiguring the findings of Research Branch as reported in 
The American Soldier, Fosdick‟s “dynamite” on this issue was explosive indeed: 
  In our army both officers and men are drawn from a common economic 
  and social reservoir. There are plenty of men of superior education and 
  high mental and moral qualities in the ranks of the A.E.F. Conversely 
  there are plenty of commissioned and non-commissioned officers who 
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  have none of these attributes. I do not believe that an army was ever 
  recruited in which the common soldier possessed such a high average of 
  intelligence and social experience as in the American Army of 1917 to  
  1919. By the same reasoning it must be admitted that in no army have the 
  officers been superior to their men by so small a margin. Yet the differences 
  between officers and men in point of the privileges and social position 
  conferred upon the former has been emphasized to what seems to me to 
  be a totally unnecessary degree. Under foreign service conditions, both 
  officers and men are limited to practically the same public facilities for their 
  means of recreation and relaxation. Yet the possession of a Sam Browne 
  belt in the A.E.F. has carried with it advantages out of all proportion to 
  disciplinary requirements or to the needs of the occasion, and officers have 
  been allowed and encouraged to claim and even monopolize such advantages  
  in ways that have shown a total lack of the spirit of fair play.
153
 
 
 Fosdick went on to cite examples: Officers peremptorily taking the seats occupied by 
soldiers at theater performances and athletic events, blithely moving to the head of any line, 
placing local villages out of bounds for enlisted men but not themselves, and using enlisted men 
for menial labor. He attributed the situation to “Regular Line Officers” who failed to recognize 
“that the army of America which this war called into being is made up of men of a far different 
stripe and caliber from those represented by the post and garrison troops who he was accustomed 
to command in pre-war days.” These men were to Fosdick, “independent young Americans, full 
of initiative and imagination,” and they harbored considerable bitterness against “a caste system 
which has no sanction in America.” American soldiers, Fosdick continued, “are too wide awake, 
too critical by habit, and too well educated to concede special privileges that have no military 
significance or value to officers who are the mental and moral inferiors of half of their 
subordinates.”154 One can easily see why Stouffer saw “dynamite” in this report, and it is clear 
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from his subsequent actions that his approach to this particular problem would be to introduce, as 
it were, enlisted men to officers through an illumination of enlisted attitudes. Also striking is 
Fosdick‟s own change of attitude and emphasis. In 1916, and well into 1918, Fosdick remained 
convinced that the two great threats to morale were liquor and prostitutes, and that athletics and 
singing could largely deal with these threats. By 1919 he was seeing something else - the 
production of poor attitudes in soldiers by the poor attitudes of officers, and he named this 
particular malady as the most significant that confronted Army. Indeed, the officer-enlisted 
problem remained a tough nut to crack, and even survived the Second World War despite the 
efforts of Stouffer and his colleagues. One of Bill Mauldin‟s best World War II cartoons summed 
up the issue in Mauldin‟s characteristically wry and insightful way: 
                                                                                                                                                             
experiences of World War I were so deeply engrained that they led to serious defects in policy, such as the 
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Ginzberg, James K. Anderson, Sol W. Ginsberg, and John L. Herma. The Ineffective Soldier, vol. I. The Lost 
Divisions. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 13-14. For additional ideas on what was and was not 
learned from the First World War, particularly as it pertains to “emotional disturbances,” see Edward A. Strecker 
and Kenneth E. Appel. Psychiatry in Modern Warfare. New York: Macmillan, 1945. iii-v. 
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“Beautiful view! Is there one for the enlisted men.”155 
 Even as Stouffer was studying Fosdick‟s papers in the summer of 1941, the Army was in 
crisis over the very issues upon which Fosdick had placed his thumb in 1919  - officer-enlisted 
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relations and the wide gulf between the Regular and conscripted Armies. Largely erased from 
popular memory by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which had a unifying effect on the 
Army to be sure, this morale crisis six months before the attack was palpable indeed, and 
demonstrated starkly the need for systemic methods to study soldier attitudes and make policy 
decisions based on those findings. 
 In response to the war in Europe, President Roosevelt had begun to federalize National 
Guard units in September 1940, as well as instituting conscription, with the understanding that 
draftees would only serve for one year. In July 1941, with the Germans ransacking the Ukraine 
and Japanese assets frozen in the United States, the president asked Congress for a six month 
extension, which passed by only one vote.
156
 The divisions in Congress also applied to the Army, 
where conscripts chaffed against what many of them saw at best as a breach of contract and at 
worst as an outright betrayal. Kept away from home and family and living in spartan Army 
camps on about thirty dollars a month, many of the draftees began writing to their congressmen - 
a breach of both tradition (one does not jump the chain of command, it just is not done) and of 
the Articles of War. Some started the “OHIO” campaign, for Over the Hill (desertion) in 
October, while others saved their invective for officers whom they felt were both incompetent 
and out of touch. (For their part, many Regular Army officers, noncommissioned officers, and 
soldiers tended to view the draftees as spoiled, soft, and - crime of crimes - disloyal).
157
 
 Morale became so poor in the summer of 1941 that it seeped into both the Congressional 
Record and the national press. The debates therein searched for causes for the low morale, which 
                                                 
 
156
 See J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr. The First Peacetime Draft. Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1986, and J. Garry Clifford and Theodore A. Wilson, “Blundering on the Brink, 1941: FDR and the 203-
202 Vote Reconsidered,” in J. Garry Clifford and Theodore A. Wilson, eds. Presidents, Diplomats, and Other 
Mortals. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. 
 
157
 Stephen D. Wesbrook. “The Railey Report and Army Morale.” Military Review vol. 60 (June 1980): 11-
24. 
88 
 
included the aforementioned softness, the lack of clarity presented by the war in Europe (in stark 
contrast to the First World War, when American ships had been torpedoed by the Germans (not 
to mention the notorious Zimmerman Telegram), and the failure of leaders to orient their men to 
the war (to instill in them the urgency of the situation and the proper fighting spirit).
158
 Senator 
Chavez of New Mexico held forth in Congress on the need for “purpose,” and Representative 
Wilson of Indiana decried the “lack of fighting spirit” in the young men of the day. Articles on 
morale began to appear in Life, The New Republic, Look, The Saturday Evening Post, and the 
Atlantic Monthly, as well as scores of newspapers across the country. The Army Chief of Staff, 
General George C. Marshall, conceded that World War I and the problems illuminated by it had 
brought “that French word [morale] from comparative obscurity to widespread usage.”159 
 Even more disturbing than the low morale resulting from extended commitments was the 
major rifts the morale crisis illuminated between officers and enlisted men and the Regular and 
draftee armies. In June 1940, the Army carried 267,767 men on its roster. Only a year later, that 
number had risen to 1,460,998 - a 500% increase in 12 months.
160
 Historian Lee Kennett likened 
the massive influx of civilians into the tradition bound, regimented life of the constabulary 
Regular Army to a chemical reaction: “Pouring millions of men into the Army in a short space of 
time was like pouring a rich chemical solution into a receptacle that already contained quite a 
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different solution; and interaction, a reaction, was inevitable.”161 The reaction was the morale 
crisis of the summer of 1941.  
 The Regular Army, in addition to having to house, clothe, feed, and train over a million 
more men than it had been required to do the previous summer, was also faced with something of 
a cultural crisis. The draftees simply refused to toe the line. They questioned orders, they 
slouched, they failed to salute, and they “did not have,” according to Kennett, “the regular 
soldier‟s notion of subordination or his respect for channels.”162 They bypassed the chain of 
command, they complained endlessly, and they wrote to their congressmen and to the Chief of 
Staff with their complaints (unheard of in the Regular Army).
163
 
 Although Marshall was quick to recognize the morale problem, his training and 
experience led him to initially conclude, as Fosdick had, that much of the problem could be 
addressed with bolstered morals and hygiene - cleanliness, diet, church, and above all, 
athletics.
164
 The problem was serious enough, however, that Marshall agreed to release National 
Guardsmen and draftees after fourteen to eighteen months of service “unless the world situation 
                                                 
 
161
 Lee Kennett. G.I: The American Soldier in World War II.  New York: Scribner, 1987. 66. 
 
162
 Kennett. 67. 
 
163
 Occasionally General Marshall would answer these letters. To one private he wrote, “Since the receipt 
of your letter, complaining about the lack of attention you have received, your case has been investigated by the 
Commanding General at Fort Bragg. I am told you believe you are suffering from arthritis, but that the surgeon has 
been unable to make a definite diagnosis. But what is more to the point, I am told that prior to December 31, 1940, 
your service was satisfactory, but since that date it has not been satisfactory. You married without permission; you 
were absent without leave on January 6
th
 and again for three days from January 15th; you entered the hospital on 
January 18, and were absent without leave on January 19
th
. There are more than one million young men in the Army 
today. If conduct such as yours was a frequent occurrence, it would be impossible to build up an efficient army and 
utterly impossible to administer it. The fact that the Chief of Staff of the Army has taken the time to write to you 
directly should indicate to you the harm done by unjustifiable complaints such as yours. It is your job now as a 
citizen and soldier in this great emergency to do your duty without further derelictions.” George C. Marshall to 
Frank W. Clay, April 7, 1941 (Document #2-416). George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected 
Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia. 
 
164
 Marshall had a message published in Ladies Home Journal which sought to sooth the worries of 
mothers of citizen soldiers. He told them that “Morale and physical fitness are attributes of a good soldier. In this 
new Army of ours we are paying a great deal of attention to both. Our men…have been trained and conditioned 
during the past month like athletes….Their religious welfare has been most carefully provided for and is the subject 
of continuous inspection.” George C. Marshall. “A Message to the Women of America,” Ladies Home Journal vol. 
58 (August 1941): 6. 
90 
 
becomes more serious.” Marshall also sent a memo about Army morale to President 
Roosevelt,
165
 agreed to an external review, and appointed Frederick H. Osborn to head the 
Morale Branch of the Army on August 19, 1941.
166
 (Morale Division - later renamed Morale 
Branch - had been created in July 1940 and oversaw such matters as athletics, libraries, leave 
policies, and postal services).
167
 Marshall also included in the May 22, 1941 edition of Field 
Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations - Operations the idea that intuition, common sense, 
and “leadership” were insufficient to ensure strong morale. “Good morale and a sense of unity in 
a command cannot be improvised; they must be thoroughly planned and systematically 
promoted.”168 
 The confidential external review of Army morale, conducted by Hilton H. Railey of The 
New York Times, confirmed for Marshall that church and cleanliness and boxing would not be 
enough to manage the morale of the 1941 draftee and National Guard Army. Railey, a World 
War I veteran, began the research for his 200 page report “Morale in the US Army” on August 
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19, 1941 – about two weeks after Stouffer‟s initial visit to Washington, and the same day 
Marshall appointed Osborn to head Morale Branch. Railey turned the confidential report over to 
the Army on September 29th, and it has henceforth been known as “The Railey Report.” Within 
its pages were Railey‟s findings after having interviewed over 1,000 soldiers of all ranks, visited 
seven posts, and observed the Louisiana Maneuvers. Historians Lee Kennett, Stephen Wesbrook, 
and Roger Fosdick (not to be confused with Raymond B. Fosdick) have written that the Railey 
Report made for sobering reading in the early fall of 1941. Among the problems Railey found 
were junior officers afraid of their soldiers, senior officers out of touch with their men, blatant 
insubordination, and, of course, rock bottom morale. One division commander, emblematic of 
many of his peers, was convinced that his soldiers‟ morale was high, although he admitted that “I 
don‟t pretend to know what my men think of the world situation, or anything else, for that 
matter, and I don‟t see the point of asking them.” Railey, impressed by this particular brand of 
vincible ignorance, reported to the War Department that “Command, vintage of 1917…appears 
naively and disconcertingly unaware that its men, vintage of 1940, are a different breed of 
cat….The present breed (mark well) is questioning everything from God Almighty to 
themselves.” 169 Railey‟s bottom line was: “With extraordinary uniformity…the morale of the 
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United States Army, as I have sampled and verified it from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is not 
reassuring.”170  
 Railey also observed that what the Army had done to date to see to morale had been 
insufficient. The responsibility for morale rested with unit recreation officers, indicating the 
Army‟s idea of where the locus of morale rested. Per Railey, “this is virtually the only morale 
work done. The entire emphasis is on entertainment and amusement.”171 At the time Railey made 
his assessment, he was correct. Even as late as December 5, 1941, Osborn was extolling to 
Congress the virtues of athletics and recreation in improving morale.
172
 What Railey did not 
know was that since August Osborn had assigned Stouffer and his team to work on a more 
sophisticated, scientific way of assessing morale and to recommend policies to shape it. General 
Marshall was also leaning further towards a more effective way of gauging and improving 
morale, and was casting about for better ideas to solve the issue among subordinates in the War 
Department.
173
 Additionally, Morale Branch by early 1942 had become a much more influential 
and articulated organization - an organization that had moved well beyond athletics and camp 
sing-alongs. According to a 1942 article by its chief, (Osborn), “under the impetus of the new 
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science of psychology, the War Department set up a Morale Branch charged with research into 
factors affecting the morale of the troops and with development of remedial measures.” The 
branch by that time had around 70 officers and 150 civilians on its roster, and 6 divisions - “the 
Army Exchange Service, the Army Motion Picture Service, the Welfare and Recreation 
Division, the Services Division, the Morale Research Division, and the Information Division.” 
(A comparison of these divisions with those of Raymod B. Fosdick‟s CTCA speaks volumes 
about the evolution of thinking when it came to morale. Fosdick‟s divisions were the Athletic, 
Social Hygiene, and Law Enforcement Divisions, the Camp Music Department, The Military 
Entertainment Committee, and the National Smileage Committee).  
 Osborn‟s description of the Research and Information Divisions gives one an idea of how 
far the concept of “morale” and its maintenance had evolved in the interwar and early World 
War II years: 
  The Morale Branch is concerned with studies on factors affecting the 
  morale of the soldier, and methods of orientation to help him to adjust 
  to his new life in the Army and to understand his purpose and role in the  
  country‟s defense. These functions of Morale Branch are carried out by the 
  Research Division and the Information Division.…The work of the Research  
  Division develops recommendations on factors affecting morale in the whole of  
  the soldier‟s environment….The Information Division supervises the publication  
  of camp newspapers, conducts radio programs within and without the camps,  
  develops orientation films under the supervision of an experienced motion picture 
  director commissioned in the Signal Corps and assigned to the Morale Branch, 
  and employs other personnel for lectures and public relations contacts.
174
 
   
 Although Osborn entitled his article “Recreation, Welfare, and the Morale of the 
American Soldier,” it is clear from the article that those terms meant something different in 1942 
than they had in 1917. It was a different war, a different time, and thinking on morale had 
evolved to the point that it did not revert to form in an emergency but rather gained “added 
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impetus” from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Osborn closed his article, which he published in the 
“Organizing for Total War” issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, with the acknowledgement that “more is being done [for morale] than has ever been 
done for any army before. But in the final analysis of results, innumerable factors must be taken 
into account: new levels of civilian education, new civilian ideals, a new cause, and the different 
character and quality of the present generation.”175 The Army‟s leadership, through the efforts of 
men like Raymond Fosdick, Edward Munson and Hilton Railey, had learned in the interwar 
years, and were clearly moving away from intuition and towards science when it came to morale. 
 By the time Osborn wrote his article for the Annals, Stouffer had been working for him 
for about eight months. What of Stouffer do we see in Osborn‟s article, which described the state 
of the art on morale and attitude research and formation? What was Stouffer‟s particular part in 
sociological advances between the wars? What was he doing from 1920-1940, and who was 
influencing him in these years? The Army had showed some willingness to move in the direction 
of scientific sociology…what was Stouffer doing to bring scientific sociology and survey 
research about? The next chapter attempts to answer these questions. 
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Chapter 4 
Stouffer in the Interwar Years 
 
 
 After completing his bachelor‟s degree in Latin at Morningside College in Sioux City, 
Iowa, (1921) Stouffer took an M.A. in English at Harvard, and then returned to his hometown of 
Sac City Iowa in 1923 to take over the editorship of his ailing father‟s newspaper, the Sac City 
Sun. The Lives of Harvard Scholars reports that while Stouffer was pursuing journalism, the 
sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross (1866-1951) visited Sac City and encouraged, either directly 
or indirectly, Stouffer to pursue a career in sociology.
176
  
 Stouffer sold the Sac City Sun in 1926 and headed for the University of Chicago, closing 
the deal only three days before the fall term began. “Here we are, two blocks from the 
University,” he wrote to his brother Tom, “in a cozy little apartment which we are renting from 
the University…..We are quite a distance from the machine gun belt, and our only experience 
with Chicago outdoor sport thus far is to have our baby carriage stolen.” Despite the distractions 
of a city like Chicago, Stouffer was committed to his studies. “I don‟t know how long we‟ll be 
here and I don‟t care much; I‟m going to keep on studying and sinking foundation piers until I 
am satisfied that the superstructure won‟t cave in a few years from now,” he told his brother.177 
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 Chicago during Stouffer‟s graduate student days was indeed the home of Al Capone, and 
Stouffer would have doubtless read of the St. Valentines Day Massacre (1929) and other gang 
activities. But Chicago was also, and had been for some time, the home of sociology in the 
United States. Sociologist Don Martindale in his essay “American Sociology before World War 
II”  refers to “the virtual knowledge explosion that occurred in the Chicago School” in the 1920s 
and 1930s.
178
 Eastern schools, particularly New York University, Harvard, and Columbia would 
in the second half of the twentieth century develop excellent schools of sociology, but the first 
half belonged to Chicago.  
 Although the intellectual trajectory of Stouffer‟s life peaks only at his death at sixty in 
1960, the chronological arc peaks in 1930, at the end of his graduate studies in Chicago. In 
addition to the influence of E.A. Ross, Stouffer remembered that he was motivated to go to 
Chicago by his “first hand experience in human nature” gained while running the Sac City Sun. 
“I got to know everybody and all their troubles,” he said, “The main thing, it seemed to me, is 
that people were tossing a lot of bunk around and it seemed a good idea to try to pin some of 
these things down.”179 The question was how to do that, and his professors at the University of 
Chicago had the answers: survey research and statistics. 
 Louis Leon Thurstone (1877-1955), William Fielding Ogburn (1886-1959), and 
Ellsworth Faris (1874-1953) exerted the most influence on Stouffer at Chicago. Thurstone 
crossed disciplinary lines in a manner almost unimaginable today. He received his master‟s 
degree from Cornell in 1912, in mechanical engineering, before beginning his psychology 
                                                 
 
178
 Don Martindale. “American Sociology before World War II.” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 2 
(1976): 137-139. “Among the advantages of the Chicago [sociology] department was the presence throughout the 
university of the same spirit that infused the sociology department: a disinclination to pursue abstractions or 
philosophical principles for their own sake, a concern for empirical investigation, and faith in the ultimately 
practical importance of knowledge.” 
 
179Helen Dudar. “Prof. Stouffer‟s Startling „Stuff.‟” The New York Post, Sunday April 24, 1955. 
97 
 
studies at the University of Chicago (PhD, 1917). Thurstone was interested in measurement, 
particularly in the education and psychology fields - what has come to be known as 
psychometrics. In January 1928 he published “Attitudes Can Be Measured” in the American 
Journal of Sociology, which Stouffer referenced on the first page of his doctoral dissertation. 
Thurstone used terms such as “base line” and “frequency distribution.” He defined his terms, he 
differentiated carefully between attitude and opinion, and he confined himself to a “linear 
continuum.” He sounded every bit the scientist, and his essay is as far away from intuition 
masquerading as knowledge as one can get.
180
 
 William Fielding Ogburn arrived at the University of Chicago in the same academic year 
as Stouffer (1926-1927). A Columbia PhD (1912), he had come from eight years as a sociology 
professor at Columbia, and would later serve as sociology department chair at Chicago from 
1936 until his retirement in 1951. Ogburn also served as president of the American Sociological 
Society in 1929, and entitled his presidential address, “The Folkways of Scientific Sociology,” 
wherein he spoke of a “differentiating process…of methods” as the future of sociology, when 
“the more strictly scientific methods will be differentiated from methods that more properly 
belong to activities other than those of science.” These other than scientific activities he named 
as “ethics, religion, commerce, education, journalism, literature and propaganda,” a listing that 
bears a considerable resemblance to the original departments of early American social science.
181
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Ogburn saw science as progress. His teaching dwelt on statistics, and he was a natural for the 
presidency of the American Statistical Association in 1931, and the chairmanship of the Social 
Science Research Council, 1937-1939.
182
 Upon his death in 1959, Social Forces journal 
remembered him as “the statistician, conversant with the current census, the Cost of Living 
Index, and the latest figures on the national product.”183 Ogburn was one of the first to 
congratulate Stouffer on the publication of The American Soldier, writing to him in April, 1949, 
“I can see it is just the kind of book I like to see published.”184 When he died ten years later, only 
a year before Stouffer‟s own death, Stouffer remembered him as a dealer in science and 
wisdom.
185
 The Ogburn-Stouffer Center for the Study of Social Organizations, part of the 
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, memorializes their professional 
relations and friendship.
186
 
 Ellsworth Faris, Stouffer‟s dissertation advisor, had planned to be a civil engineer, but 
life intervened and he found himself working as a missionary in the Belgian Congo instead. After 
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a short sojourn teaching philosophy at Texas Christian University on his return from Africa, 
Faris entered graduate school at the University of Chicago, where he studied philosophy and 
psychology. He taught psychology at both Chicago and the University of Iowa, and was later 
brought into the sociology department at Chicago, where he became department chair in 1925. 
Faris served as ASA president in 1937, seven years after he signed Stouffer‟s doctoral 
dissertation.
187
 Stouffer remembered Faris warmly in his dissertation, “Besides his obligation to 
many other faculty members and graduate students, the writer is under particularly deep 
indebtedness to his teacher, Professor Ellsworth Faris, whose criticisms of attitude research 
encouraged the present study and kept it from going off the track even more times than future 
research may prove it to have done.”188 
 Stouffer chose a timely topic for his dissertation, prohibition, and sought to prove that 
statistical analysis of attitudes would yield the same results as the traditional case-history method 
of study, and would be more reliable due to a larger sample and a repeatable methodology. 
Stouffer surveyed 238 students at the University of Chicago, while a panel of four judges, each 
working alone, read and evaluated case histories. (The judges were Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., a 
later member of Research Branch and co-author of The American Soldier, Robert E. L. Faris, 
Everett V. Stonequist, and Edgar T. Thompson). “The judges were told to use whatever concepts 
of attitudes of prohibition they chose, to set their own standards of favorable or unfavorable, and 
to try to judge all papers by the same standards.”189 The dissertation yielded the expected and 
desired results, “attitudes as measured by the test and attitudes as measured by the case history 
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ratings are quantitatively very much the same.”190 What Stouffer had proved, and what would be 
so critical to his work with Research Branch in World War II, was that a well designed test, or 
survey, was just as reliable as a panel of experts. No such panel, however hard working, could 
possibly have evaluated the 500,000 soldiers Research Branch surveyed in the Second World 
War. Nor could they have provided results in a timely enough manner to affect policy with the 
speed required by a world war. 
 The case-history method required subjects to provide a “brief, interesting, sincere sketch 
of your experiences from childhood to the present day which affected your attitudes toward 
drinking yourself and toward prohibition laws.”191 The sketch was to be no longer than 1,000 
words. Under these instructions, Case #22, a nineteen-year-old male wrote, “My earliest 
recollections are that my father would send me to the neighborhood saloon, and there was one on 
every corner in those days.” He continued to record that even so, his father had advocated 
moderation, he himself did not drink in high school, he understood the relationship between Al 
Capone and bootlegging, and concluded that “prohibition laws, thus far, have proven a failure, 
and should receive careful study for a complete remodification.”192 The four judges, graduate 
students “among those best equipped, by technical experience in the interpretation of case 
materials,” had three weeks in which to read 238 papers such as this one in their “spare 
hours.”193 
 The test, or survey, employed the following questionnaire, which was developed by Dr. 
Hattie N. Smith using L.L. Thurstone‟s method of equal appearing intervals: 194 
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 Case # 22‟s survey compared favorably, as did most all surveys, to the case history 
analysis done by the four judges: 
  
Samuel A. Stouffer. “Prohibition Survey.” “Experimental Comparison of Statistical and Case History Methods of  
 Attitude Research.” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1930), 222. 
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 Long before Research Branch, Stouffer understood the implications of his prohibition 
survey:  
  The value for attitude research should be rather far-reaching…. 
  The fact that a simple test, which can be taken in 10 or 15 minutes 
  and scored rapidly and objectively, is a fairly valid measure of attitudes 
  would make it possible to study cheaply in a single investigation the  
  relationship between the attitudes of several thousand subjects… 
  The fact that, contrary to the expectation of some students of attitudes, 
  the present study has shown that it is possible to get fairly high 
  agreement, even among laymen with extremely diverse viewpoints, 
  in interpretation of attitudes from case history materials should lend 
  encouragement to those who see in the case history a useful tool of 
  attitude research. The case history provides a sequence of events in 
  their cultural setting.
195
 
 
 Stouffer the scientist had hit upon the statistical formula, rather than demography alone, 
for attitude research, (it certainly would have been difficult to deny the utility of a purpose-built 
survey) but Stouffer the classically-educated newspaper-man who had taken his M.A. in English 
at Harvard and loved Shakespeare understood the importance of anecdotal evidence from the 
“cultural setting,” analyzed by experts who could put experience into context. Science and 
wisdom. In other words, the statisticians of Research Branch could tell Stouffer how many 
draftees went absent-with-out-leave (AWOL) at a port of embarkation, but it took the 
imagination and wisdom of the seasoned expert to connect that number to a solution as simple as 
a change of clothing.
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 In the introduction to The American Soldier, written almost twenty years after publishing 
his dissertation, and in a much more seasoned voice, Stouffer explained the need for both 
imagination and statistics in understanding attitudes: 
  Among social scientists, as in the public at large, there are those 
  who feel that literary descriptions are so useful that any other form 
  of inquiry is supernumerary. One book by Ernie Pyle or Richard 
  Tregaskis or Bill Mauldin, one drama like A Bell for Adano or Command 
  Decision, it will be said, gives one more of a sensitive feeling for the 
  “realities” of World War II than any collection of statistics, however 
  competently analyzed. This position is quite plausible if we do not  
  examine a word like “realities” too closely. No one can doubt that 
  the “feel” of a hurricane is better communicated through the pages 
  of Joseph Conrad than through the Weather Bureau‟s statistical records 
  of the barometric pressure and wind velocity. But it is no reflection on 
  the artistry of Conrad to point out that society also finds uses for a science 
  of meteorology.
197
 
 
 Stouffer was in a sense a transitional figure. Or, as sociologist Andrew Abbot commented 
in Department & Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred, “men like Stouffer had one 
foot in the old and one foot in the new,” as they conducted their research.198  Stouffer did not 
think of empirical evidence and intuition in terms of the sacred and the profane. He would 
proclaim throughout his career that sociology was indeed a science, but science did not hold the 
final answer to human attitudes and behavior. The cultural setting for Research Branch was an 
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eight-million-man draftee American Army engaged in a world war. And as Stouffer wrote, 
“There were…many problems which could not have been treated on an impressionistic basis 
even if the impressions were trustworthy.” His task during the war was one of social engineering, 
including “estimating how many soldiers would go back to school after the war, how many 
would open new businesses, how many would go to farms, how many would work for an 
employer, how many would go back to their home towns, and how many would settle in regions 
different from their home. Qualitative pretesting was particularly necessary for framing questions 
which would separate actual plans from wishful thinking.”199 
 With the award of his PhD in 1930, Stouffer, and his ideas on empirical survey research, 
became part of what was rapidly becoming the mainstream in sociology in the United States. In 
the decade to follow he became a major figure in the discipline and in the academic community 
at large, as well as within the institutions and government organizations which sought his 
particular talents in survey research. But first, as for all professors, there was the teaching and the 
post-doctoral work.  
 Stouffer began his formal sociological work in the Department of Sociology and 
Anthropology at Wisconsin in 1930-1931 as a part time assistant professor of social statistics. 
(He also taught an introductory course in statistics at Chicago that same academic year). The 
following academic year (1931-1932) he spent in postdoctoral work on statistics at the 
University of London with Ronald A. Fisher and Karl Pearson. Upon his return from London in 
1932, he took on full time duties at Wisconsin, and was promoted to full professor in 1934. (An 
organization connected to the Rockefeller Foundation attempted to hire him at a much larger 
salary than he was earning there, which resulted in his immediate promotion to full professor). 
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 Rockefeller would not be the last organization to offer Stouffer a lucrative position in the 
private sector. While at Wisconsin, Stouffer taught undergraduate and graduate courses in social 
statistics, statistical methods in social psychology, statistics in population research, and statistical 
research in social pathology. His colleagues at Wisconsin included E.A. Ross, chairman of the 
sociology department and former president of the ASA (1914 and 1915), who had been 
instrumental in influencing Stouffer to begin an academic career, John L. Gillin (president of the 
ASA in 1926), John H. Kolb, Ralph Linton, Kimball Young (later to consult for Research 
Branch and to serve as ASA president in 1945), Ellis Kirkpatrick, Helen I. Clark, Charlotte Day 
Gower, Elizabeth Yerxa, and Charles Birt.
200
 Stouffer left Wisconsin in 1935 to take up a 
professorship at the University of Chicago, a post which he held until 1946 and his move to 
Harvard. Ross was sorry to lose him, but wrote to the Dean of the College of Letters and Science 
at Wisconsin (G.C. Sellery), “I do not in the least blame him for Chicago is his alma mater and 
the department there is certainly as strong as any department in the world.”201  
 By the 1935-1936 academic year, Chicago sociology had divided its discipline into six 
subgroups: General and Historical Sociology, Social Psychology, The Community and Social 
Institutions, Statistics and Population, The Theory of Culture, and Social Pathology. Teaching 
then in the department along with Stouffer were Herbert Blumer, Ernest W. Burgess, Michael M. 
Davis, Ellsworth Faris, (chair), Philip M. Hauser (later a Research Branch consultant), Earl S. 
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Johnson, William F. Ogburn, Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Puttkammer, Robert Redfield, Clifford 
R. Shaw, William L. Warner, and Louis Wirth. Warner held a joint appointment in sociology and 
anthropology, Puttkamer was a professor of law, and Redfield was a professor of anthropology. 
Half of the professors in the department that year had been or would later become presidents of 
the American Sociological Association (Park - 1925, Ogburn - 1929, Burgess - 1934, Faris - 
1937, Wirth - 1947, Stouffer - 1953, Blumer-1956). The department also hosted professors from 
economics, social ethics, comparative religion, social economy, and philosophy. In addition to 
Stouffer‟s statistical and quantitative methods classes, students had available to them classes in 
1935-1936 entitled “Play and the Social Utilization of Leisure Time” (Warner),  “Folkways and 
Fashions” (Blumer), “Human Nature” (Faris), “Races and Nationalities” (Redfield), “Culture and 
Sociology” (Ogburn) and “The Growth of the City” (Burgess) among dozens of others.202  
 Throughout the 1930‟s, American sociology turned to the problem of that decade: the 
Great Depression and its effects on American society. Social workers took center stage in 
dealing with the disaster, along with economists and political scientists. The New Deal provided 
massive employment opportunities for social work and inquiry on which to base such work, and 
although sociologists sought to distance themselves philosophically from social workers, the 
nation faced, much as did Stouffer in World War II, an immediate problem of social engineering. 
Demand for statisticians skyrocketed, and although the focus was on those trained in economics, 
men such a Stouffer soon found themselves both tied to and funded by New Deal agencies 
seeking useful study of and solutions to economic woes. Sociologist Charles Camic reported that 
Ogburn, “seemingly omnipresent,” sat on the National Resources Committee, advised the 
Resettlement Administration, and directed the National Recovery Agency‟s Consumer Advisory 
Board. Statistician and sociologist (University of Pennsylvania) Stuart Rice, one of Stouffer‟s 
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first and most important contacts in Washington DC in 1941, was the Census Bureau‟s assistant 
director in mid 1930, headed the Central Statistical Board, and from his chairmanship of  the 
Committee on Government Statistics and Information Services brought Stouffer in to measure 
unemployment.
203
 
 Like many of his colleagues in statistical and survey research sociology, Stouffer‟s work 
in the 1930‟s was bound up with the Depression. The Social Science Research Council sought 
out Stouffer to help document the effects of the Depression on American society, and the 
initiative resulted in the 1937 “Social Aspects of the Depression” series of thirteen monographs, 
each by separate authors under Stouffer‟s direction, which dealt with aspects of the Depression 
from crime to reading to rural life to consumption. Stouffer wrote with Paul F. Lazarsfeld  (later 
a consultant to Research Branch), a “Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression” 
which helped to make the case that there was more to the Depression than economics - and that 
effective recovery would be predicated on an understanding of culture, particularly that of the 
American family.
204
  
 Stouffer had begun the decade with several studies featuring the quantitative data and 
analysis of survey research. Among them were “Local Option and Public Opinion,” (1930) in 
which Stouffer and his co-author Carroll H. Wooddy took on the question of the relationship 
between voting and the stability of public opinion. A few months later, Stouffer, Ruth S. Cavan, 
and Philip M. Hauser published “Note on the Statistical Treatment of Life-History Material.” By 
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1933, Stouffer was willing to write beyond specific cases, and without co-authors. In “A 
Technique for Analyzing Sociological Data Classified in Non-Quantitative Groups,” he 
referenced his dissertation research as an example of “a method of statistical treatment which 
would seem to have possibilities of quite wide application in sociology when the dependent 
variable is on a quantitative scale and the independent variables are not” - once again stating his 
amenability to qualitative as well as quantitative data. The following year he brought out, with 
Clark Tibbitts, “Testing the Significance of Comparison in Sociological Data,” and the 
techniques of which he wrote he applied in 1935 to a study published as “Trends in the Fertility 
of Catholics and Non-Catholics.” The round is a familiar one to scientists - testing of the waters 
in specific cases, development of methods which one shares with one‟s colleagues, and then 
application of those methods to a specific case.
205
 Jean M. Converse, in her masterful Survey 
Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence 1890-1960, points out another Stouffer 
article, which she classified as “something of a watershed between the old social survey and the 
emerging sample survey.”  In “Statistical Induction in Rural Social Research,” Stouffer, through 
criticism of an earlier work, advocated for both more structure in survey research, and for 
consideration of attitudes as well as facts.
206
 
 The 1920‟s and 1930‟s was also the time of the great social inquiry, philanthropic, and 
government organizations which have come to be so relied upon by sociologists and others 
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interested in survey research. Chief among these was the Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC) founded in 1923 to study social issues with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation.
207
 
The SSRC provided support and funding for both Stouffer‟s postdoctoral year in London and his 
initial work with Research Branch during World War II. Rockefeller also supported the Institute 
for Social and Religious Research (ISSR), founded in 1921, which had funded Middletown, 
among over seventy other projects during the 1920‟s through the mid 1930‟s. The Rockefeller 
Foundation maintained its own Division of Social Sciences after 1929, but even before then 
(1923-1928) had allocated over $20 million for social research.
208
 (The support of philanthropic 
organizations such as Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford cannot be overstated, either in general 
discussion of sociology in the United States or as they relate to Stouffer‟s survey research work 
in particular. Carnegie funded The American Soldier, and the Ford Foundation‟s Fund for the 
Republic supported Stouffer‟s 1955 Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties). The list of 
government, academic, and private social research organizations is almost endless. Many were 
part of New Deal alphabet-soup organizations, such as the Works Progress Administration‟s 
(WPA) Division of Social Research. Others sprang from already existing government 
departments, such as the Division of Rural Attitudes and Opinions of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). Still others were and/or are conglomerations of university 
professors, private citizens, and government interest, such as the National Opinion Research 
Center (founded in 1941), and The American Association for Public Opinion Research (founded 
in 1947). Stouffer served as president of the latter. 
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 By the latter half of the 1930‟s, Stouffer had become a major figure in American survey 
research. As such, he was sought out by Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987), a Swedish economist, to 
assist him with his landmark study An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy (1944). What historians often refer to as The Great Migration - the movement of 
millions of black Americans from the rural south to industrial cities in the north, circa 1905-1941 
- had brought black-white race relations into sharp relief in the 1930‟s. Carnegie funded 
Myrdal‟s massive multi-volume study in 1937, which sought to understand the paradox between 
the American creed of liberty and equality for all, and the continuing and often virulent racism 
that severely circumscribed black participation in civic life. Stouffer‟s work on the Myrdal study 
is not clearly understood, but according to Myrdal, it was critical. Myrdal himself returned to his 
native Sweden upon the German invasion of Norway in 1940, leaving Stouffer as director of the 
project, which he completed as the Battle of Britain began in September, 1940. William F. 
Ogburn and Donald R. Young (the latter a consultant to Research Branch) were also involved in 
the project.
209
  
 Stouffer wrote shortly before his death in 1960 that he had been interested in race studies 
since before he had joined Myrdal. Later, work with black soldiers was integral to The American 
Soldier, and, as Stouffer commented, “these studies have been cited perhaps as frequently as any 
product of the Research Branch.” Probably the most visible result of Stouffer‟s race work during 
World War II is “The Negro Soldier” propaganda film (1944), part of Frank Capra‟s “Why We 
Fight” series produced during the war. Detailed discussion of the critical nature of Research 
Branch‟s work with black soldiers will follow in a succeeding chapter. As for the Myrdal study 
and the study of race in general, Stouffer believed “that quantitative studies will play an ever 
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increasing role in studies of race relations in the United States.” He also believed that the focus 
on ideology in the Myrdal study had perhaps eclipsed three of the more important factors 
resulting from the Great Migration. The first of these was the increased political power of black 
Americans in northern and western states. Secondly, with the increased opportunities for blacks 
outside the south, they would be able to demonstrate “that color not only should be, but is, 
irrelevant to achievement.” Thirdly, the combination of these two forces would “emerge as a 
social force with a sledge-hammer effect on values as old as slavery.” Had Stouffer lived beyond 
1960, he would doubtless be pleased to see that his predictions were coming true.
210
  
 Stouffer ended the decade of the 1930‟s and entered the 1940‟s with four additional 
articles demonstrating the increasing influence that both he and survey research were having on 
American sociology. In “Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce,” (1939) Stouffer and his co-
author, Lyle M. Spencer, surveyed twenty-seven states and suggested a possible correlation 
between economic recovery from the Depression and a rise in marriage and divorce rates. While 
the relationship may seem an obvious one, Stouffer throughout his career was much more 
interested in what he could prove through quantitative study rather than what everyone knew to 
be “common sense.” As a newspaperman he had learned that common sense soon becomes 
conventional wisdom, which is often wrong.
211
  
 His next article, “Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating to Mobility and 
Distance” (1940), established what is sometimes referred to as “Stouffer‟s Law of Intervening 
Opportunities.” As he set forth the theoretical rationale in his paper, “the number of persons 
going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and 
                                                 
 
210
 Samuel A. Stouffer. Social Research to Test Ideas. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 224, 
232-233. 
 
211
 Samuel A. Stouffer and Lyle M. Spencer. “Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce.” The American 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 44, no. 4 (January, 1939): 551-554. 
113 
 
inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities.” His interest was in migration 
patterns, and his paper helped to explain why significant numbers of people, intending to migrate 
to one location, ended up settling somewhere else enroute because an opportunity arose for them 
there. As always, Stouffer was quick to point out the limitations of his mathematically-based 
theory. Race, he noted, had a significant affect on migration, as did government policy. But he 
also believed that “it may be found that other sociological phenomena, such as the relationship of 
spatial propinquity to the selection of marriage mates, the relationship between certain types of 
crime and the residence of criminals, the choice of colleges, and the utilization of leisure time in 
vacation travel, may be illuminated by application of the general theory.” The proposition of a 
theory is a bold and risky move - inviting the criticism if not derision of colleagues and others. 
“Intervening Opportunities” then, is a measure of the maturity of Stouffer at age forty, and the 
efficacy of survey research in the United States in 1940. Additionally, the theory of intervening 
opportunities has stood the test of time so far and if nothing else has helped reinforce retailers‟ 
and advertisers‟ sly tactic of placing tempting items for consumers in highly visible places.212 
 With “How a Mathematician Can Help a Sociologist” (1941) Stouffer gave a fair, if brief 
portrait of the state of the art of sociology in the United States in that year. He wrote that 
sociologists were engaged in two activities: “constructing theories of society on a grand scale,” 
and conducting “a good deal of quasi-historical research, usually on contemporary problems.” 
He then offered that mathematics could help in these endeavors by letting the sociologist know 
in advance of his study “how to design his problem and control disturbing factors such that the 
particular test he will use at the end is appropriate and decisive.” In other words, he wrote, “in 
the shadows behind a successful study, at the beginning as well as at the end, stands the 
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mathematical statistician.” It was fortunate for Stouffer that by World War II, International 
Business Machines (IBM) had developed their punch-card tabulating system, for Stouffer was 
soon to become the chief statistician for half a million soldiers.
213
 
 Stouffer, ostensibly committed to mathematics and statistics, returned to the topic of 
case-studies in his November 1941 “Notes on the Case-Study and the Unique Case,” which once 
again explored the “perennial controversy in the social and psychological sciences…between 
advocates of statistics and advocates of the case-study method.” He came out strongly as an 
advocate of both case-study and quantitative study, a position which accrued to the benefit of 
both the American soldier and The American Soldier, because the numbers and the anecdotal 
data used to study soldiers proved to be mutually supporting.
214
 By the time Stouffer published 
this last article, he had been working for Frederick Osborn and the War Department for four 
months, bringing his education and experience to the problem of morale in the US Army. 
 The “Road to Research Branch” was clearly not a road at all, but rather a web of 
sometimes competing, sometimes complementary influences, ideas, impulses, events, and 
personalities in the interwar years which, taken together, informed the decisions of academics, 
military officers, and politicians. Out of this web came the controlling ideas that morale and 
morale studies were not the exclusive province of military officers relying on their experience 
and intuition, and that psychology and sociology had matured sufficiently as disciplines to 
contribute, scientifically, to the management of millions of conscripted soldiers.  
 Sociology, as demonstrated by the interest of sociologists in soldiers and the experience 
of Stouffer, moved increasingly towards empirical observation, the tool of which became 
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Stouffer‟s survey research. Stouffer was in turn informed by the work and observations of 
Raymond B. Fosdick, who learned during the First World War that there was more to morale 
than keeping soldiers away from liquor and prostitutes, and who had discovered that officer-
enlisted relations and the animosity between the Regular and draftee armies constituted the 
morale issue of the First World War. Cognizant of the statistical work done by Bingham and 
Yerkes in World War I intelligence and classification testing, Stouffer was also likely influenced 
by the morale crisis of the summer of 1941, encapsulated in Hilton Railey‟s report “Morale in 
the US Army,” (his boss, Osborn, and Osborn‟s boss, Marshall, most certainly were) as he was 
by Edward Lyman Munson‟s writings on morale and Munson‟s establishment of the Morale 
Section of the Army immediately after World War I.  
 Historian of science Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) posited in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962) that science inhabits what he called “paradigms,” or climates of opinion, 
which not only control the ideas of the day, but which also dictate the tools of analysis and the 
terms of debate. Scientists (and for the purposes of the present study military officers and 
politicians) were like fish to Kuhn, swimming in an element in which they are comfortable, yet 
oblivious that they are wet. As the locus of change (some would say progress) is discomfort, it 
followed for Kuhn that a “crisis” must occur to shake people out of complacency. Kuhn‟s crises 
present themselves as anomalies that cannot be explained by - to torture still further the fish 
analogy - water. When the anomaly is great enough (quality) or there are several anomalies 
(quantity), the contemporary paradigm is shattered, another replaces it, and the process begins 
anew, yet no paradigm ignores those that came before it (Osborn and Fosdick carried on 
extensive discussions during World War II). Two world wars and the crises in morale they 
presented sufficed for the US Army - enough at least for some officers to reconsider their faith in 
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their infallibility when it came to managing men. The quality of morale and the quantity of 
draftees were enough to demand re-thinking about the issue. Such a reconsideration, in no small 
way influenced by Stouffer and his colleagues, moved the sine qua non of soldier management 
away from morals and aptitude and toward morale and attitude. Rather than telling the soldier 
what he should be doing and what he was able to do, the Army in World War II asked the soldier 
what he thought, and used his responses to support him. New thinking, the Army determined, 
required new data. How Research Branch gathered that data - what Stouffer and his colleagues 
did and how they did it during World War II - is the subject of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Stouffer and Research Branch during World War II - Beginnings 
 
 
 Thirty-three months after Pearl Harbor and twelve months before Hiroshima, Research 
Branch produced a standard operating procedure (SOP). The document, dated August 19, 1944, 
attempted to formalize their herculean efforts, in General Gavin‟s words, to make “a 
monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.” 216 
The SOP signaled the arrival and legitimacy of Research Branch as an integral part of the War 
Department, and its acceptance, sometimes grudgingly, sometimes with enthusiasm, as part of 
the vast mechanism the United States had assembled to fight a war of national survival. In forty 
pages, it described the efforts to which the US had gone and would continue to go to equip its 
soldiers with the motivation to fight a modern war. It was written on the hoof, and represented 
more a summation of experience gained during the first three years of American involvement in 
the war than a pre-conceived model from which to work. The SOP also, unmistakably, bore the 
mark of Samuel Stouffer, who as director of the professional staff of Research Branch, more than 
any other individual, civilian or military, guided the effort to survey soldiers and use their 
responses to formulate Army policy. From first to last, Research Branch was Stouffer‟s 
creation.
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 There was, however, no “Road to the SOP.” The variables were so many, the cultural 
currents so strong, and the times so dire that one would have expected the Army to revert to form 
in an emergency -  to fall back on authoritarian methods of soldier management which had gotten 
them through in the past  - and indeed the Army tried to do so. Resistance to the idea of polling 
soldiers was deeply entrenched, and had to be continually overcome or bypassed throughout the 
war. Organizational structures had to be changed, personnel had to be assigned, missions had to 
be defined, methodology had to be developed, and a myriad of problems had to be faced in a 
culture which was institutionally hostile to the work Research Branch sought to accomplish. In 
the introduction to The American Soldier, Stouffer posed the operative question: 
  The Research Branch was officially established in October 1941 
  within what was known successively as the Morale Division, 
  Special Services Division, and Information and Education Division. 
  Earlier efforts to set up such a machinery within the Army had been 
  blocked by a directive from the Secretary of War, which said: „Our 
  Army must be a cohesive unit, with a definite purpose shared by all. 
  Such an army can be built only by the responsible effort of all of its 
  members, commissioned and enlisted. Anonymous opinion or 
  criticism, good or bad, is destructive in its effect on a military 
  organization where accepted responsibility on the part of every 
  individual is fundamental. It is therefore directed that because of their 
  anonymous nature, polls will not be permitted among the personnel 
  of the Army of the United States.‟ The full story of how the War  
  Department changed from a position of flat opposition to such research 
  to one in which it would use such research not only for internal 
  planning but as justification to the American people for such a vital 
  program as its demobilization system should some day make instructive 
  reading.”218 
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  Instructive reading it makes indeed. The volte-face Stouffer described happened subtly, 
over a period of years, and began well before Pearl Harbor. Nor was it a change of policy per se 
so much as a change in culture, which was reflected in policy - with the understanding that there 
were many who disagreed with final policy decisions. Though it can be said with some authority 
that Research Branch had arrived by the time they published their SOP in 1944, their presence 
was just as often tolerated as it was accepted. It took the subtle maneuverings and hard facts 
presented to the War Department by Stouffer, and the political machinations of his boss, 
Frederick H. Osborn, to bring Research Branch into being and allow it to make “a monumental 
contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.” Once that 
acceptance was gained, they could concentrate on some of the more vexing problems of morale, 
to include the problems presented by the Infantry, officer - enlisted relations, neuropsychiatric 
casualties, race relations, and demobilization. Work began in earnest when Stouffer visited the 
War Department in the summer of 1941.
219
 
 Stouffer was brought to Washington DC by Frederick Henry Osborn (1903-1980). 
Osborn was the nephew of Henry Fairfield Osborn, the president of the American Museum of 
Natural History, and was a longtime friend of Franklin Roosevelt. A Princeton graduate and 
millionaire businessman who had made his money in banking and railroads, Osborn had served 
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with the Red Cross in the First World War, sat on the board of the Carnegie Corporation, and by 
August 1941 when he asked Stouffer to come to Washington DC, he held the chairs of the 
Civilian Advisory Committee on Selective Service and the Joint Army and Navy Committee on 
Welfare and Recreation. In September 1941 he was given a direct commission as a brigadier 
general and appointed head of Morale Branch (later renamed the Information and Education 
Division, of which Stouffer‟s Research Branch was a part). Osborn had General Marshall‟s ear 
and support, and had experience with survey research from his service with the Social Science 
Research Council. In The American Soldier, Stouffer recounts the “factors [which] converged to 
make possible the establishment of the Research Branch” of which there were many. Primacy of 
place, however, he gave to Osborn, praising his “personal prestige…persuasive skill…and his 
deep sincerity.” Notwithstanding Osborn‟s personality, experience, and savoir-faire however, 
Stouffer also stressed that “there were times when even these assets might have availed little 
against occasional opposition at intermediate echelons had not General Marshall unequivocally 
supported the strange new program.” 220 Osborn was fortunate to be in close contact with 
Raymond B. Fosdick, who was a source of constant encouragement. “Because I handled the 
corresponding job in the last war,” Fosdick wrote Osborn in the fall of 1943, “I understand what 
you are doing….I hope you won‟t get discouraged….more than once in the last war I was 
tempted to quit because General March, the Chief of Staff, had little use for what he thought was 
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our „frills‟….The importance of what you are doing will grow with time, and so will the 
appreciation of the Army.”221 
 Osborn, after having spoken with Stouffer in August 1941, used his position as chair of 
the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation “to confer with the most 
qualified persons in this country in their respective fields and to seek their advice and help in the 
many problems which are constantly arising.” Shortly thereafter, Osborn officially offered 
Stouffer the opportunity to be part of a subcommittee which would “advise with the Planning 
and Research Division of the Morale Branch of the Army on psychological factors affecting the 
morale of our service men.”222 Simultaneously, Osborn sought to capitalize on work done in the 
Intelligence Division of the War Department (G-2), which was moving toward soldier attitude 
studies. “Slowly,” Stouffer wrote in The American Soldier, “a small Research Branch evolved, 
with a military chief [Major Edward L. Munson, Jr.], a civilian technical director [Stouffer], and 
a mixed staff of military and civilian personnel.”223 (Research Branch had four military chiefs 
during the war – Munson, John B. Stanley, Charles Dollard, and Leland C. DeVinney. Stouffer 
provided the continuity).
224
 
 Aware that the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was viscerally opposed to attitude 
surveys, Osborn had to move very carefully. He wrote to Stouffer, “Confidentially, a group of 
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psychologists already in the War Department have developed a very intelligent plan for studying 
various factors in Army attitudes and are turning it over for the Morale Branch to sponsor. The 
basic idea seems to be excellent; it needs working out in detail.”225 Stouffer, along with Rensis 
Likert of the US Department of Agriculture, and Quinn McNemar of Stanford comprised the 
entire subcommittee, and worked out the details of a nascent Research Branch.
226
 
 Stouffer wasted no time. Writing from the Capitol Limited train enroute from 
Washington DC to Chicago on October 20, 1941, he outlined for Osborn his thoughts about 
survey research in the Army. He and his colleagues had visited Camp Lee, Virginia, on October 
19 and had interviewed enlisted men. “About 30 questions were eliminated and many rewritten,” 
Stouffer wrote to Osborn. While he believed they had made a “very promising start,” Stouffer 
thought that “too many questions were shotgun assaults into thin air on the general topic of 
morale. Not enough were rifle shots at situations about which branches of the Army concerned 
might be able to take action.” Ever conscious of the hazard of being labeled a “pointy headed 
intellectual,” and understanding his task was one of social engineering, Stouffer in the initial 
planning stages for Research Branch sought utility above all else. He told Osborn he wanted to 
provide the Army with “convincing evidence…of the need for a regular, continuous reporting 
system based on interviewing samples of soldiers.” “Every plan,” Stouffer continued, “should be 
aimed straight at that purpose.” Then he got down to the specifics that demonstrated his mastery 
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of sociology and survey research: Questions that took pot-shots at officers were to be avoided. 
Study of the affect of individual interviewers on interviewees was needed. Survey results had to 
be made available to policy makers as quickly as possible, and the sampling scheme had to be 
beyond reproach. What Stouffer was mulling over in the fall of 1941 matured, with much labor, 
into a system of gathering and processing data which was useful to the Army and others, and was 
ultimately summarized in 1949 in The American Soldier.
227
 Due to Stouffer‟s quick work, 
Research Branch (then called Research Division) was formally established within Morale Branch 
on October 28, 1941. At its inception, it consisted of three officers and twelve civilians, 
including clerk typists.
228
 In August 1942, Stouffer took a leave of absence from the University 
of Chicago, moved to Washington, and was officially appointed as a social science analyst at an 
annual salary of $8,000.00.
229
 
 The survey system Stouffer and his colleagues painstakingly developed, as depicted in a 
Research Branch briefing, had twelve steps: 
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 Much like an impressionist painting, however, the devil was in the details. Each of the 
steps presented its own particular challenges, and before any of them could be accomplished 
systematically, Army resistance to troop polling had to be overcome, or at least reduced and 
bypassed. Osborn and Stouffer were walking on eggshells when they conducted their first 
survey, faced with what mass communications Professor J. Michael Sproule called “an officer 
corps blithely unaware of advances in the study of society and symbols.”230 Fortunately for 
Research Branch, one of those officers was not Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, 
who, according to Stouffer, “unequivocally supported the strange new program” of surveying 
soldiers.
231
 In its initial, tentative activities, the tactic of Research Branch seemed to be to seek 
forgiveness rather than permission. Sensing that Secretary of War Stimson would not enforce his 
moratorium on troop surveys, knowing that Marshall was on their side, and as historian and 
survey researcher Jean M. Converse described it, “through some legerdemain,” Research Branch 
went ahead with their surveys. Impressed with the results, the Army officially agreed to Research 
Branch activities in principle, but throughout the war Osborn and Stouffer had to repeatedly 
convince skittish officers that troop surveys would not undermine officer authority.
232
 Officially 
the Army was ready to enlist the help of sociologists and psychologists to manage their citizen-
soldiers, but this readiness did not necessarily signal a definitive change in Army culture. 
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 With Stimson looking the other way and Marshall‟s weight behind them, Osborn and 
Stouffer still had to “sell” Research Branch to field commanders. A typical negotiation of this 
sort took place between Osborn and Lieutenant General George Brett, Commanding General of 
the Caribbean Defense Command. In a letter to Brett of July 31, 1943, Osborn sang the praises of 
Research Branch, indicated that other commanders had requested surveys, and assured Brett that 
“reports are presented in such a fashion as to be of maximum utility to the command.” 233 In his 
August 31, 1943 reply, Brett admitted to being “slightly skeptical as to any definite results that 
might be obtained,” but acknowledged that “an outside agency unencumbered with local 
atmosphere undoubtedly would bring matters to our attention which we have neglected to 
discover.” He closed his letter to Osborn by promising cooperation with Research Branch.234 
 Resistance was often stiffest when Research Branch reports bumped up against long held 
dogma in the Army, such as the value of hating one‟s enemy as a combat motivator, or the need 
for the proper, yet always ill-defined “fighting spirit.” On December 23, 1943 Osborn submitted 
to Marshall a five-page memorandum summarizing a report on the 1
st
 Infantry Division - a unit 
which by that time had seen combat in both North Africa and Sicily. Among his fourteen 
findings and recommendations he explained that “few men report credible evidence of „dirty or 
unhuman [sic] tactics‟ on the part of the Germans. This fact may relate to lack of hatred for 
Germans, and may suggest that attempts to picture the Germans as dirty fighters can boomerang 
and impair confidence in our training doctrine.” Osborn went further: “Contact with the Germans 
does not produce hatred of the enemy. If anything, those men whose mental attitude toward 
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further combat is relatively most healthy show less vindictiveness than other men.” Osborn also 
reported on the chronic problem of poor officers, and suggested that “it may be proper to 
consider the more rapid weeding out during training of those junior officers who demonstrate 
marked lack of leadership in their personal relations with their men.”235 
 Osborn had touched a nerve - or several. Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the 
commanding general of Army Ground Forces, and as such the officer responsible for soldier and 
officer training and preparation for combat, wasted no time in giving Marshall his opinion on 
Osborn‟s report. His tone, as well as the content of his memo to Marshall, reveal a great deal 
about the attitudes of some officers towards the work of Research Branch. The report, McNair 
wrote, was “interesting and informing to those who study and appreciate such data.” But to him 
the information provided by Research Branch was insignificant: “I detect no item which of itself 
calls for action by the War Department.” Then he applied a series of peculiar logical contortions, 
stating that he did not believe “that the division selected for sampling is a representative one. The 
first division, to my knowledge, did not fight well at Oran and in the last battle of the Tunisia 
campaign.” McNair simply reversed Osborn‟s argument, stating that the failures of the 1st 
Division could be attributed to their lack of hatred for the enemy: 
  It may well be that the fact that the 1
st
 Division did not hate the 
  enemy was a primary factor in their lack of fighting ability. My own 
  impression was perfectly definite that the division lacked the fighting 
  spirit in an astounding degree. On the other hand, if I remember  
  correctly, the 1
st
 Division of the World War hated the German so  
  thoroughly that General Pershing was obliged to give the German 
  high command certain assurances that the division thereafter would 
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  confine its actions to those accustomed by the laws of war.
236
 
 
McNair also argued that some of the blame belonged to the division commander, Major General 
Terry Allen, Sr. Allen, McNair wrote to Marshall, had bypassed the system for replacement 
soldiers and “went to the replacement depot and chose his men individually, regardless of arm or 
specialty, based primarily on their appearance or actions - somewhat as one would buy a 
horse.”237 
 To McNair then, the problem was the method employed in Research Branch‟s study, not 
the findings and recommendations. The 1
st
 Infantry Division had poisoned the well because it 
was a bad division, led by a commander who did not follow procedures - quod erat 
demonstratum. Like many officers, McNair was more comfortable with his own impressions and 
memories than he was with data. More fighting spirit - elan vitale - would do the trick. His 
attitude toward Research Branch revealed his attitude toward soldiering – a set of prejudices 
which guided his actions. 
 Major General Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff also commented on Osborn‟s 
memo, and McNair‟s appraisal. While Handy did not agree with McNair that the 1st Division 
was not representative, he rated Research Branch findings as “findings,” including the ironic 
quotes in his memo to Marshall. He wrote to the chief of staff that what Osborn had reported was 
obvious: “Most of the „findings‟ of General Osborn‟s report are about what is normally to be 
expected from soldiers, particularly when they have a chance - as they probably did in this case - 
to „bellyache‟ without restriction.” Handy, however, more thoughtful than McNair, was struck by 
a different finding of Research Branch: 
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  There is one matter, however, that to my mind is serious if General  
  Osborn‟s survey indicates the real feeling of the men - that is the  
  attitude toward company officers. When 38% of the men in a company, 
  even though they are „veterans classified as relatively not ready for 
  combat,‟ and when half the companies in a regiment have more than 
  half their men who want to serve in combat under „few or none‟ of 
  their company officers, something is radically wrong. I am not sure 
  that General Osborn‟s report presents the true picture. If it does 
  and the feeling in this division is representative of that throughout  
  the service, I would state that our army is in a very, very bad  
  condition. I am sure that in the last war I was never associated with 
  an outfit where the condition shown by General Osborn existed. 
  I suggest: (1) that General Osborn be directed to examine his method 
  of sampling with a view to determining definitely that it does or does not 
  represent the real feeling of the men; (2) that General Osborn be directed to 
  investigate several other divisions, particularly to determine the attitude 
  of their men toward company officers. I feel that we must first determine 
  whether the conditions shown by General Osborn‟s report actually 
  exist. That having been done, corrective steps can be taken if  
  necessary.
238
 
 
 Handy clearly was a man in transition from the McNair‟s old, intuitive understanding of 
morale, to one based on empirical data. He was suspicious of data, yet he saw its value. He too, 
like McNair, relied heavily on his First World War experience and impressions, yet his 
recommended solution to a morale problem was to gather more data - to confirm or deny his 
initial data. One salutary if unexpected byproduct of Research Branch‟s work during World War 
II, focused as it was on enlisted men, was that it provides a window into officer attitudes of the 
time. And it was men like Handy, whose attitude was in transition, who helped Research Branch 
to overcome resistance to survey research.
239
 “The conservatism,” Stouffer wrote in The 
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American Soldier, “natural to professional men everywhere, and often particularly ascribed to the 
professional soldier, was broken down by the imaginative grasp of the abler leaders.”240 
 Research Branch did indeed overcome much resistance - at least officially. By the end of 
1943, the organization was well established and recognized. In a November 1943 letter to a 
fellow Research Branch officer in the China-India-Burma theatre, the chief military officer of 
Research Branch in Europe, Major Charles Dollard, exulted, “as a result of directives issued by 
the Chief of Staff we now have not only the right, but the obligation, to set up research programs 
in every theater, and, through Osborn, to furnish theater units with questions which we think are 
important and on which comparable data from all theaters are necessary, in order to construct the 
complete picture for the Chief of Staff.”241 Stouffer was able to state with confidence to Osborn 
that by the beginning of 1944, “there will be research units in nine theaters and commands 
outside the Continental United States. This will give us virtually complete world coverage.”242 In 
August 1944, Dollard reported from the European Theater “no substantial resistance to research 
work anywhere in the theater.” His chief problem at that time - shortly after the D-Day invasion - 
was “keeping up with an army engaged in the most dramatic drive in history.”243 
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 On July 1, 1942, Research Branch‟s organization table showed 52 personnel positions 
within the branch, 17 of which were vacant. By September 1 of that same year, the branch had 
grown to 85 positions with 29 vacancies - growing faster than it could man its authorized 
positions. The branch also had a mission statement:  “The mission of the Research Branch is to 
cooperate with heads of other agencies in the Army in discovering problems of the soldier 
needing study; to use scientific techniques in obtaining directly from the enlisted men, and from 
other sources, facts about the problems of the soldier; to analyze these facts; and report them to 
the Chief of the Special Service Division for his own guidance and for transmission to the chain 
of command as an aid in making policy.”244 By war‟s end, 55 military and 68 civilians had 
worked or were working in the Washington DC headquarters of Research Branch, many of them 
prominent sociologists and psychologists. The branch produced well over 350 surveys, studies, 
and information papers, and the voluminous correspondence attendant with any bureaucracy.
 
Their surveys were eclectic, with titles ranging from “Memorandum on the Attitudes of New 
Recruits” (March 1942) to “Attitudes of Dischargees Toward Separation and Evaluation of 
Information Provided at the Separation Center (October 1945).”245 Surveys were generally based 
on attitudes of soldiers in a specific theater, or attitudes towards a specific issue. Sometimes, as 
Stouffer wrote in The American Soldier, the research questions were small, such as the “laundry 
situation in Panama.” Sometimes, however, they were challenging in nature and extremely large 
in scope. Among the latter was the “very serious morale problems of the Infantry,” which 
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Stouffer noted resulted in “revision of pay scales, the introduction of symbols such as the 
Combat Infantryman‟s Badge and the Expert Infantryman‟s Badge, and the development of an 
aggressive program of publicity.”246 The following charts indicate studies undertaken and results 
disseminated and, as well, Research Branch‟s personnel count: 
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Growth and activity of Research Branch, Nov. 1941-Sept. 1942. Samuel A. Stouffer, A Brief Description of the 
Work Performed by the Research Branch. RG 330, Entry 89, Box 970. Asst. Sec. of Defense, Research Division 
Historical File 1941 – June 1955. National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD. 
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 Research Branch completed its first full-scale survey of the 9
th
 Division on December 8, 
1941, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after they had sweated out the details revealed in their 
October 19, 1941 test survey at Camp Lee. On November 5
th
, General Marshall had agreed to the 
survey, despite the non-concurrence of the G-3 (Army operations officer) who had objected “on 
the grounds that the project would interfere with training.” Osborn called the G-3 and persuaded 
him to concur, but even then, the commanding general of the target division - originally the 7
th
, 
not the 9
th
 - refused to cooperate, and as Marshall‟s agreement with Osborn “did not make it 
compulsory for the CG of a division to cooperate,” the 7th was dropped in favor of the 9th.247 
 Working to develop the twelve-step formula on which they would settle by 1944, 
Stouffer and two colleagues selected sixty-five enlisted men as potential group leaders, a group 
which they culled to thirty-two. These men completed surveys on 1,878 soldiers over three days 
(December 8-10), and during the entire period no officers interfered with the process. One of the 
findings that presented itself immediately when the survey data was analyzed was the lack of 
promotions for well-qualified recruits. Research Branch undertook an exhaustive investigation to 
confirm or deny whether this situation was peculiar to the 9
th
 Division only, or whether it was a 
problem throughout the Army. Confirming the latter, the Army amended its policies immediately 
- revising its Officer Candidate School Requirements, and balancing the number of well-
educated men between the Army and the Army Air Forces. General Marshall was pleased with 
the survey, and ordered that more be conducted as the need arose. The Army‟s “History of the 
Research Branch” (February 1, 1944) credited Stouffer with the success of the survey of 9th 
Division and for his guidance of Research Branch throughout the war: “Major credit for the 
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organization and success of the Research operation belongs to the Chief of the Professional Staff 
[Stouffer] who guided the organization from its inception through the war and up until the 
present time. His vision and resourcefulness and driving energy were the „sine qua non‟ of the 
Branch.”248 
 As the war progressed, Research Branch became more articulated in both structure and 
method, and before war‟s end they would do much more than conduct planning surveys. By 
1944, the duties of civilian and military personnel within the branch had solidified, with Army 
officers seeing to administration, while civilians and enlisted men served as technicians or clerks. 
The branch divided itself into the Office of the Chief, where policies were established, and where 
the military Chief of Branch (in succession Munson Jr., Stanley, C. Dollard, and DeVinney) and 
Stouffer as the chief social scientist resided. Reporting to these individuals were the Survey, 
Experimental, Overseas, Statistical, Developmental, Field Study, Production, Editorial, and 
Overseas Analysis Sections. 
249
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A visitor to Research Branch from the YMCA in World War I would be mystified by the SOP - 
where, he would have asked, is the music section?  
 Research Branch, with this organization, pursued not only planning surveys of specific 
units, but also cross-section studies of the entire Army. In addition, they analyzed statistics 
readily available in the Army, such as Absent With Out Leave (AWOL) rates. They transmitted 
their findings to the War Department in a variety of ways, which included results of completed 
surveys, reports on specific issues requested by the Chief of Staff or individual unit commanders, 
and beginning in 1943, through a monthly report, distributed information to commanders in the 
field (down to company grade), which came to be called “What the Soldier Thinks.” 
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What the Soldier Thinks, vol. 1, no. 1. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA. 
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What the Soldier Thinks, vol. 1, no. 1. Courtesy of the George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA. 
 
 Much as The American Soldier is a post-war summary of the many diverse surveys and 
studies conducted by the Research Branch, “What the Soldier Thinks” reports were monthly 
summaries during the war of Research Branch‟s work. In addition to issue-specific reports, the 
Research Branch also published these sixteen “Reader‟s Digest condensed versions” of their 
144 
 
findings.  These reports provided commanders and staffs with information on soldier attitudes - 
what today would be called “actionable intelligence” - on their own soldiers. The first issue bears 
a publication date of December 1943, and includes a primer on morale, an article about the 
relationship between fighting spirit and physical conditioning, and a comforting re-affirmation of 
the old saw that busy soldiers are happy soldiers. Commanders read that the purpose of the report 
was “that of bringing to officers concerned information of practical value in maintaining the 
morale and the fighting efficiency of troops under their command.” For doubters, and those 
comfortable with their own ability to monitor their soldiers‟ morale through intuition, the report 
announced, “Studies of soldier attitudes reported here are based on the statistical analysis of 
replies made anonymously to questions asked of thousands of soldiers in overseas theaters in 
[sic] Continental United States. Such factual evidence is more representative - and therefore 
more generally applicable - than the personal impressions of even the most experienced and able 
officer-observers.”250 
 In addition to the more prosaic articles in the first “What the Soldier Thinks” report, there 
was an article on the pricklier subject of enlisted men‟s attitudes towards their officers. Wisely, 
the authors, under Stouffer‟s guidance, connected each finding with an army regulation to 
prevent “who the hell cares what they think” grousing amongst officers. Here, Stouffer showed 
his acumen in dealing with a large bureaucracy traditionally convinced of its superiority and 
uncomfortable with outsiders. (All civilians were, are, and ever shall be outsiders to the military). 
Stouffer also had a keen grasp of the dynamics of research within Washington, DC. In 1937, he 
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had made an analysis of Washington research agencies for the National Resources Planning 
Board. Reflecting on the experience as he thought about the direction of Research Branch in 
1942, he came to the conclusion that unless researchers and policy makers remained in close 
contact, “research tends to become an assembling of miscellaneous facts in which nobody but the 
research agency is interested.” If there was no vital connection between policy formation and 
research: 
  A vicious circle develops - I have seen it happen several times in 
  Washington. The research men, frustrated because their stuff is not 
  being sought or used, become more and more „academic,‟ satisfying 
  their desire for expression by doing what may be good work from a 
  scientific standpoint, but useless from a standpoint of policy 
  determination. This must not happen here. 
 
Stouffer‟s lofty goal for Research Branch matched his writ from the War Department - “We want 
our Division to be a model in Washington for its marriage of honest, competent research to 
statesman-like policy.”251 
 Reaching this goal was not easy. The urgency of a world war coupled with Stouffer‟s 
drive caused recurring tensions and one minor rebellion of sorts among some of the academics 
with whom he worked. Unused to long office hours, the tedium of government management and 
analysis, and the pressure to produce usable rather than merely interesting results, some of 
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Stouffer‟s colleagues began to complain that they were being overworked. Stouffer understood 
the problem, but his reply was always the same: “We are at war.” He was able to win the day on 
such issues more because of his personal example, however, than because of anything he said.
252
 
Of greater concern to Stouffer and some of his colleagues was the efficacy of providing large 
quantities of information to the War Department at the expense of quality. Stouffer had in effect 
created a bit of a monster with Research Branch. The Army became dependent upon the data 
they provided, and was constantly asking for more, and more frequent reports to be distributed to 
an increasing number of individuals and units. By 1944, Charles Dollard, the military chief of 
Research Branch was even questioning the value and quality of “What the Soldier Thinks:” “I 
am increasingly concerned that the necessity of publishing „What the Soldier Thinks‟ on a 
monthly basis may eventually force us to a superficial analysis of our data, and to overemphasis 
of dramatic stories.” The war ended, however, before the issue of quality vs. quantity reached the 
stage of crisis.
253
 
  
 In addition to the issue of the quality of Research Branch work versus the increasing 
demands for output, there was another crisis within Research Branch which came very close to 
causing Stouffer to resign. Had that happened, the entire enterprise might have been shut down. 
In April 1943, Stouffer wrote to Osborn, expressing his frustration at the proposed idea of a 
                                                 
 
252
 Interview with Dr. Ann Bisconti-Stouffer-Dyke, daughter of Samuel A. Stouffer,  August 7, 2006, 
Washington, DC. Throughout his life, Dr. Bisconti stressed, Stouffer maintained a strong work ethic and 
consummate professionalism. A chain-smoker full of restless energy, he never took sabbaticals and could be found 
at work late into the night - not only during the war years. He preferred to see raw data himself before it was 
processed and analyzed. 
253
 Charles Dollard. “Memorandum for Officers, Enlisted Men and Professional Staff, Research Branch,” 
May 4, 1944. Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Papers Relating to Wartime Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 2: 
Princeton University – Dr. K. Young, HUG (FP) 31.8. The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer, Harvard University 
Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. 
 
 
147 
 
military chief of research “without research training” as the primary decision-maker in Research 
Branch, to the exclusion of “a man who knows research.” Stouffer told Osborn that his 
frustration lay in the age-old problem of responsibility without authority: 
  You have told me time and again that I am responsible for research… 
  you want me to continue to be, even though a new army career man 
  were to be brought in as active head. There are really only three 
  possibilities if this new man comes. (1) The new man and I share 
  responsibility. (2) The new man be a ceremonial director of research, 
  and I continue to have responsibility. (3) The new man be director 
  of research in fact as well as name. 
 
 After analyzing the three possibilities for Osborn, Stouffer concluded that “two men 
cannot run the same organization.” He recommended to Osborn that the third option was the only 
feasible course, and admitted that “this, of necessity, eliminates me from the picture.” 
  If there must be a new man, this is the only solution, both from the 
  military standpoint and the psychological standpoint…It is obviously 
  bad organization to demote the head, bring in a new man, and keep 
  the demoted man around as „adviser.‟ If the demoted head didn‟t have 
  sense enough to resign under the circumstances, he should be fired. I  
  have helped build this staff, man by man, job by job. My heart has 
  gone into it, because it is as bright a dream of practical accomplishment 
  in a crisis as social science ever had in all history….We are just at the  
  dawn of tremendously increased possibilities of usefulness to you and 
  the Army. If the new head is brought in, he must not be handicapped by 
  any staff loyalty to me as ex-director….Therefore, the correct thing  
  under the circumstances is for me to tender my resignation now.
254
 
 
 The issue hung in the balance for several weeks. Osborn did not accept Stouffer‟s 
resignation, yet it remained on the table. In early May, several of the sociologists and 
psychologist of Research Branch sent Stouffer a telegram: 
  We are much perturbed to hear of the possibility that you might leave 
  the Research Branch. All of us came here with the vision of aiding the  
  war effort in the best way we knew how. Bringing social science to the 
  Army is a tremendous task. Under your leadership and guidance, we have 
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  come a long way. All of us honestly feel you are the only social scientist 
  who could have done the job. We feel that the most important part of 
  the task still lies ahead. The war is far from won, and the factor of morale 
  will be increasingly recognized as necessary in winning it. After the war 
  there will be the problem of reintegrating the soldier into a new kind of 
  civilian life. The Army needs progressive ideas and scientific facts. The 
  job ahead of us will require a determined fight. We need you to lead this 
  fight. We need you to develop a long range program of research and to 
  develop theory and methods in the service of our government. Without 
  you as head of the professional staff, the program of the Research Branch 
  might degenerate into mere hack work. Working closely with you, we can 
  keep our work vital.
255
 
  
 There is more than a little tone of contrition in the telegram, and it may have been that the 
complaints of overwork had prompted the Army to consider appointing a military head of 
research. In his letter to Osborn, Stouffer mentioned “whatever rumors may have come to you,” 
but did not elaborate. In the event, most likely through the machinations of Osborn and the 
second threatened mutiny of the Research Branch Staff (this time over the loss of Stouffer, rather 
than overwork), no career officer came to replace Stouffer, and he remained the head of the 
professional staff through the end of the war. During the six weeks or so surrounding these 
events in Research Branch, the Allies took Tunisia, leading to an Axis surrender in North Africa, 
the SS began to reduce Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto, US airplanes shot down Admiral 
Yamamoto‟s plane, and the British began to recruit women into their Home Guard. In Stouffer‟s 
home, in the atmosphere of rationing, his daughter Ann was crushing orange pellets into white 
margarine to make it look like butter.
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 Stouffer‟s statement to his sometimes recalcitrant staff 
that “we are at war” was more than just a slogan. 
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 Notwithstanding the disagreements - sometimes outright arguments - Research Branch 
had amongst themselves and with other individuals and agencies, they remained a surprisingly 
cohesive and self-critical organization throughout the war. They were constantly refining 
methods, searching for new ways to survey, and submitting their thought processes to rigorous 
criticism and analysis. They also continually sought the advice of other experts, and made 
considerable efforts to expand their sources of information. 
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Chapter 6 
Stouffer and Research Branch during World War II - Refinement 
 
 In the fall of 1944, when it might be expected that a successful research organization 
connected to a great bureaucracy would have rested a bit on its laurels and settled into a routine, 
Stouffer was still looking for ways to refine and improve Research Branch operations. He was 
looking ahead, not behind, and hoped his thoughts would help Research Branch in “charting our 
future plans.” Although he acknowledged that his ideas were “pretty obvious,” he sought to 
classify the levels of research he was then conducting as “observation,” “controlled observation,” 
and “controlled experiment.” Stouffer was chary about observation. He warned his colleagues 
that simple observational reports lend themselves to “editorializing.” “Moreover,” he wrote, “if a 
report merely exposes defects without specifically suggesting corrective action, it can be 
punishing, and backfire on the researcher.” In addition to the “anxiety” such reports aroused, 
they could provide “ammunition which can be used by the devil as well as by the angels.” While 
not dismissing observation as a tool, Stouffer thought its major flaw was that it did not render a 
“prima facie case for making any given recommendation.” Observations had severe limitations, 
although Stouffer acknowledged that they were the starting point of all research. 
 Controlled observations were of a higher order in Stouffer‟s mind, as they limited the 
observation to two or more preselected groups. The results rendered “approximate those of a 
controlled experiment,” with the proviso that the controlled experiment offered greater reliability 
than controlled observations because variables were more easily controlled in the former. 
Therefore, Stouffer favored the controlled experiment because it “represents the only research 
method which embodies in the research the recommendations for action.” Stouffer was seeking 
to find ways of raising the level of Research Branch‟s labors to controlled experiment and away 
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from simple observation, while recognizing that the best he would often be able to get was 
controlled observation rather than controlled experiment. He was also, he wrote, somewhat 
frustrated with the difficulty in getting verification of findings even from controlled 
observations, and was keenly aware of the criticism that would be leveled at Research Branch 
were he unable to do so: 
  If the Division is concerned with helping the Army discover what 
  practices really will improve morale - both as a contribution to winning 
  this war and erecting doctrines for leadership of the post-war army -  
  some effort must be made to follow up the method of controlled observation 
  by explicitly getting put into practice in certain units the presumptive lessons 
  learned therefrom and then observing whether they really work….If the 
  war were to end today and if the Army should ask us what single practice 
  General Osborn‟s million-dollar research operation has proved to be 
  helpful to morale, we honestly could not cite a scrap of scientific evidence. 
  The curtain would go up on the stage and there we would stand - stark 
  naked.
257
 
 
 Ever scientific and ever thoughtful, Stouffer was also frustrated by the lack of 
preparedness of social science before the war, and the inability during the war years for Research 
Branch to move beyond the practical and into the theoretical - a problem of which he was well 
aware even while the war was underway. Shortly before the end of the war, he expressed his 
frustrations to the president of the University of Chicago: 
  We here are forever haunted by the fact that what we are accomplishing 
  is such a small fraction of what might have been done if the science of 
  social psychology had been ready at Pearl Harbor with a body of tested 
  theory. I believe that one of the great obligations of those of us in social 
  sciences who go back to our universities after the war will be to reexamine 
  critically the shortcomings of the kind of crude pressure job we have done, 
  and to help reformulate social psychological theory sharply so that hypotheses  
  can be tested by crucial controlled experiments, with the aid of new 
  quantitative tools.
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 Stouffer was a good as his word, as The American Soldier proves. Although The 
American Soldier is in fact primarily a work of data, it is not a work of unprocessed data. And 
there are examples of discrete theory in it, such as that of relative deprivation.
259
 Still, Stouffer 
was all too aware of the poor state of psychology and sociology in practical application when the 
war began, and wary of the temptation to fall back on “common sense” when science proved 
unequal to the task at hand: 
  The truth is that, except for providing broad and none too explicit 
  ways of looking at problems, most of the theories of social psychology 
  and sociology were not in very good shape for practical application. As 
  a substitute, one had to fall back on empirical generalizations from 
  common sense experience, and these, when dressed up in the jargon of 
  our profession, became quickly confused with propositions deducible 
  from scientific theory.
260
 
 
 While their main concern remained gathering data and making recommendations to the 
War Department, Research Branch staff members found time to analyze carefully the holes in 
their program. In early 1945, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., one of the contributors to The American 
Soldier, sent Stouffer a three-page memorandum entitled “Gaps in the Research Program.” He 
identified several, to include problems in validity and prediction, experimental design, interview 
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techniques, and the very “nature of combat morale,” the knowledge of which he determined was 
“woefully inadequate.” Cottrell‟s memo was representative rather than exceptional, and revealed 
much about the attitudes of Research Branch, even as Research Branch was attempting to 
understand the attitudes of soldiers. The branch remained self-critical throughout the war, despite 
its crushing burden of surveys, reports, and analysis of the Army as a whole.
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 Cottrell attached to his memo a nine page list of “Embarrassing Questions.” Everyone in 
the branch was asked to “imagine yourself two years hence talking with an intelligent and 
interested social scientist of psychological or sociological background.” What questions would 
they be asked? How would they answer them? The exhaustive list they compiled contained 
questions about the definition and theory of morale, methodology and the soundness of the 
methodology Research Branch had used during the war, theory of attitudes, problems of cause 
and effect, etc. Most of these questions had no concrete answers, though The American Soldier 
attempted to deal with many of them. Sociology, even after the experience of Research Branch 
during World War II, remained young as a science.
262
 
 Perhaps because of their discomfort with their methods, Research Branch, and their 
parent organization, the Information and Education Division, were tireless seekers of data, and 
they were willing to go to extreme lengths to get it. “On 29 January 1945,” wrote Lieutenant 
Colonel Arthur Goodfriend in a twenty page report to Osborn, “I exchanged my status as an 
officer and editor-in-chief of The Stars and Stripes for that of a private in the Reinforcement 
Command.” Goodfriend‟s subsequent report made for some interesting reading. In addition to 
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editing Stars & Stripes, Goodfriend had also edited Warweek and Army Talks - all War 
Department house organs designed to keep soldiers informed. Goodfriend, in becoming a private 
replacement, was seeking not only to experience winter warfare in Germany, but also “to have 
the infantry soldier‟s reaction to the work of the Special and Information Services.” He 
recognized that his experience was a unique one, and not transferable to the entire Army - what 
Stouffer would call an observation rather than a controlled observation or controlled experiment 
-  yet his report remains compelling.  
 Goodfriend joined the 86
th
 Reinforcement Battalion at Aachen, where he spent one night 
before joining the 78
th
 Infantry Division while it attacked the Siegfried Line. He observed that 
the way the reinforcement battalion and Infantry division had received him was “simple, 
humane, and as good as conditions and operations permit.” Goodfriend then identified the 
soldiers‟ four enemies, “The German. The weather. Squalor. And poor equipment.” The soldiers 
he observed rated the statement that American soldiers were the best equipped in the world as a 
“boast,” and they marveled at the superiority of German equipment, which they “made every 
effort” to substitute for their own. He also observed that in addition to the equipment the 
Infantryman took into combat, he was also loaded down with “great quantities of impracticable 
and unusable equipment,” which “he leaves in the rear when he goes into combat,” and “never 
sees it again.” Of special interest to Stouffer and Research Branch would have been 
Goodfriend‟s observation that the Infantryman “is conscious of the fact that while he suffers, 
others do not - and those who do not, seem to have no understanding of his problems, nor 
sympathy for his plight.” While respecting his company officers, Goodfriend noted, the 
Infantryman “resents the chicken shit that comes down from the higher brass.” 
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 Goodfriend‟s next observations revealed much about what anthropologists would call the 
“lifeways” of the World War II American soldier when it came to attitudes, morale and 
expectations (the last of which Stouffer and his colleagues made much of in The American 
Soldier): 
  Hot chow comes twice a day, with cold K rations at mid-day. Cigarettes 
  are fairly plentiful; matches are scarce. PX rations…amounted to half a 
  package of tootsie rolls. Other amenities are either totally lacking or are 
  pitifully scant. One copy of the Stars and Stripes reached our platoon in three 
  …days. Even in the 86th Reinforcement Battalion at Aachen, the day room 
  had no radio. The portable phonograph was broken….There were no movies 
  because the generator was broken. There was no light for the same reason, 
  so that the men could neither read nor play cards, but only sit and talk in the 
  darkness. Promises of large quantities of improved equipment arriving in the 
  theater, or of lavish entertainment, or of special service facilities - promises 
  of any sort which are unkept - seriously depress morale and lower respect 
  for the Army. The fact that the Air Force and Armored Divisions get well 
  designed, warm, attractive clothing further deflates the infantry soldier‟s 
  ego and efficiency. 
 
 Goodfriend ended his detailed report to Osborn, which included a list of exactly what 
equipment he was issued at the Reinforcement Depot, with a reminder that his findings and 
recommendations were “subjective,” and he suggested that “a more broadly based analysis of 
winter fighting conditions be undertaken. Those conclusions which are not supported by such an 
analysis should be disregarded. Others, which find collaboration in a sufficiently large 
percentage of cases should be the basis of remedial action.”263 
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 Goodfriend‟s report - an individual, subjective observation though it may have been - was 
valuable to Research Branch for several reasons, not the least of which was that it confirmed that 
some of the work they had done on morale in the Infantry had taken effect. Goodfriend recorded 
the passing comment of a soldier - “You don‟t get a combat infantry badge in this division if you 
come down with trench foot.”264 The Combat Infantryman‟s Badge was one of many measures 
recommended by Research Branch which became (and still is) Army policy. Low Infantry 
morale, in addition to neuropsychiatric casualties, race relations, officer-enlisted relations, and 
demobilization, was one of the five most difficult problems Research Branch took on during the 
war. One of the ways the War Department sought to raise Infantry morale was with the Combat 
Infantryman‟s Badge - authorized in November 1944 and retroactive to December 7, 1941. The 
award came with an extra $10.00 a month, and all those Infantrymen who had exhibited 
“satisfactory performance of duty in ground combat against the enemy” were eligible for the 
badge. Additional measures included a revision of Infantry pay scales, and a publicity campaign 
to help “glamorize the infantryman.”265  
 After the war, Stouffer described for the American Philosophical Society the problems in 
the Infantry and the attempted solutions. Many Infantry soldiers, particularly as they compared 
themselves with the Air Corps, felt they were poorly paid, badly trained, and had little chance for 
advancement. They often saw their branch as a dumping ground for the draft. There was nothing 
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special about being an Infantryman, they felt, despite their difficult mission. Mechanized warfare 
had not removed the need for “boots on the ground,” nor had it reduced Infantry mortality rates. 
When General Marshall became aware of the extent of low Infantry morale, he ordered a specific 
study on the issue, which Research Branch conducted. Out of the study came morale 
improvement measures such as the Combat Infantryman‟s Badge and increased pay.266 There is, 
of course, little Stouffer could have done about the major factor in low Infantry morale - their 
high rate of casualties. In the two months succeeding D-Day alone, US forces suffered about 
100,000 casualties, 85,000 of which were Infantrymen.
267
   
  As Research branch continued to seek data, both formally and informally, the picture 
they formed for the War Department of morale was bleak indeed. Hadley Cantril, of Princeton‟s 
Office of Public Opinion Research and a consultant to Research Branch, had suggested early in 
the war that some sort of “panel of correspondents in army camps be established” from among 
former students who had entered the service. “My thought was that…these letters might be very 
revealing of Army morale.” Stouffer deemed the idea “swell,” and some of the letters Research 
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Branch received, although certainly not the scientific surveys which Stouffer favored, were 
revealing of at least some soldiers‟ morale.268 Cantril forwarded to Stouffer almost immediately 
an eleven page letter from Sergeant Rutledge Jay, assigned to a stateside Army Corps 
Headquarters. His position there as a records clerk gave him the opportunity to “see everything 
that comes in or goes out on the subject of training.” He hoped from this position “to be able to 
abstract a kind of boiled down description of the army‟s conception of its methods and 
intentions.” 
 Jay‟s letter is - unexpected. It conforms to neither the stereotypical G.I. rant about 
“chickenshit,” nor to the patriotic dreams of American ideology. One is tempted to quote the 
whole, typed letter. Jay wrote to Cantril that he had no contact with “people who possess in 
themselves that continuing, persistent interest in observation of life which is so important to me.” 
Instead, Jay found himself “stifling in the dust of small daily acts and fatigues,” which caused 
him to observe his surroundings even more keenly. “Some of the fellows,” Jay told Cantril, “call 
civilian life „the real world.‟ I get a kick out of the implication they express in that phrase, 
namely the sense of cultural loss. Civilian life means also for them „the grown-up world,‟ for the 
army atmosphere, so far as the enlisted men are concerned, resembles in  many ways the 
constrained and limited little world they last experienced as children in school.” Jay went on to 
discuss, intelligently and in detail, military psychology, morale, and the place of the army in 
society. Notwithstanding some hyperbole, Jay indicated also that the problem Raymond B. 
Fosdick had identified at the end of World War I - that of officer-enlisted relations - had not gone 
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away: “This is a caste system we live in, rigid. The enlisted man is an untouchable. The more 
able enlisted men subvert the orders of their officers….The cultural conflict is very acute. The 
fact is that the military leaders feel insecure….The more insecure they are the heavy [sic] the 
hand of oppression….More democratic leadership is absolutely and urgently required.”269  
 Not all of the letters Stouffer received were as focused or insightful as Jay‟s. Many were 
more conversational and less analytical. Still, they offered him insights which he must have 
found valuable. One man wrote to him in January 1942, one month after Pearl Harbor, from a 
training exercise in the California desert:  
  A noticeable change occurred in the temper of our men here. Some 
  of the old cadremen of long army service haven‟t borne up so well. 
  They‟ve been too accustomed to a garrison existence, town life, and 
  spit and polish. They‟ve become too convinced that they would never 
  see action. I still place my chief reliance in the recently inducted 
  men who haven‟t been imbued with the harmful characteristics of [sic] 
  meaningless training over a long period provides. They don‟t like the 
  army and want to fight the war….We‟ve had a striking example of the 
  effects of furloughs on morale these past weeks. Immediately on 
  publicizing the granting of furloughs, the group esprit drops. Each 
  man becomes a self-seeking individual, thinking of nothing but the 
  possibility of getting home for a week. The men feel lazy and lack 
  spirit, and I wish it were possible to let the whole battalion go at a time…. 
  The problems have wide ramifications…..270 
 
 
 The letter would have interested Stouffer, because it conflicted with received wisdom and 
intuition. There seem to be no crusty old NCOs who look after the draftees in a fatherly way, but 
rather slightly past their prime NCOs with no initiative. It is, rather, the recruits who inspire 
                                                 
 
269
 Jay Rutledge to Hadley Cantril, July 12, 1942. Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Papers Relating to Wartime 
Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 2: Princeton University – Dr. K. Young HUG (FP) 31.8. The Papers of 
Samuel Andrew Stouffer, Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. 
 
 
270
 Alfred J. DeGrazia to Samuel A. Stouffer, January 8, 1942. Samuel Andrew Stouffer: Papers Relating 
to Wartime Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 1: American Journal of Sociology - Post War Plans of 
Soldiers, HUG (FP) 31.8. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. 
 
 
 
160 
 
confidence. Nor is leave, as was generally thought, necessarily good for morale. These are the 
types of issues Stouffer would put to further study. (It is also interesting to note that in G.I. 
letters of the World War II era, unlike today, “army” is almost never capitalized. Indeed, the 
prevailing attitude among soldiers seemed to be, as this soldier wrote to Stouffer, “they don‟t like 
the army and want to fight the war.”) Stouffer, though far on the side of survey research, was 
clearly aware of the value of such anecdotal evidence as well - much of which he included in The 
American Soldier. 
 In addition to these letters and many like them - from students of psychology, social 
psychology, or sociology - Stouffer also received many unsolicited letters. Several of these came 
from draftees who were seeking jobs in Research Branch. One particularly colorful letter came 
from Joe Rosenstein, a conscript stationed at Fort Ord in February, 1942. He enclosed his 
transcripts from his work in sociology and political science at the University of Chicago, pointed 
out to Stouffer that he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and concluded in no uncertain terms: 
“My presence in this moth-eaten, horse drawn 76th FA Bn [76th Field Artillery Battalion] can 
hardly be called crucial to national defense + I feel in all sincerity that I could do my country + 
the army a greater service in some work such as that which you are helping to direct.” Rosenstein 
had been in the service for three months.
271
 He did, however, do more than ask for a job. Shortly 
after Stouffer received Rosenstein‟s letter, he got one from his sociologist colleague at the 
University of Chicago, E.W. Burgess. Burgess forwarded a paper by Rosenstein entitled “A 
Study of the Adjustment of the Civilian to the Army Occupational Structure,” and asked Stouffer 
for some time “to talk with you then about Rosenstein not only of him but as a type of young 
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sociologist in the army that might utilize his sociological training in the interest of the national 
effort.”272 
 Stouffer also received other, more disconcerting letters. Keith Kane, the Assistant 
Director in Charge of the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of Facts and Figures - bureaucracy 
in wartime knows no bounds - wrote to Stouffer in May 1942 to tell him that “we have received 
a letter from the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety reporting a widespread rumor that a 
large number of Jewish men have, through dishonest methods, escaped the draft.” Kane 
requested that Stouffer provide him with figures to refute the rumor. Stouffer replied to Kane that 
the rumor had come to his attention on several occasions, but that he could offer little help, as 
Research Branch had “no data, either available or obtainable on the number of Jewish men in the 
Army. No record is kept of religion, in any office.” He suggested perhaps a pilot study of a city, 
or checking with the Selective Service.
273
 The rumor seems to have persisted, as Harvard 
psychologist and member of the Committee for National Morale Gordon Allport wrote to 
Stouffer a few months later that “the most current and mischievous rumors in the country are 
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anti-Semitic in character. Of these the most frequent rumor is that Jews are evading the draft.” 
He urged Stouffer to take a sampling, or to at least “get the matter before proper officials.”274 
 The rumor problem, much like rumors themselves, would not go away. Stouffer 
corresponded about it with the writer Leo Rosten, who had earned a PhD in sociology at the 
University of Chicago and in 1942 was working at the Office of War Information (OWI), of 
which he would become deputy director. Rosten sent Stouffer some guidance OWI had sent to 
newspaper editors and publishers on rumor control, and expressed the hope that Stouffer could 
conduct a study on rumor in the Army. Stouffer replied, “I wish it would be possible for us to 
make a really decent study of rumor in the Army….We tried an open ended question in which 
we asked - „What rumors have you heard recently and do you believe them?‟ - with no results 
that were worth a damn. What we drew was almost exclusively gossip about future movements 
of the outfit.”275   
 The correspondence between Rosten and Stouffer indicated in more ways than one the 
lengths to which the United States was willing to go to keep citizens-soldiers, and citizens, 
focused on winning the war. The intellectual power dedicated to these functions, spread out over 
dozens of federal agencies created for the war effort, and the resources allocated to these 
agencies indicate that the United States understood it was engaged in a war of national survival, 
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and that everything possible had to be done to win that war - to include assessing and controlling 
attitudes. It also indicated what a difficult problem Stouffer, who considered himself a scientist, 
had on his hands, as some questions remained maddeningly resistant to the ministrations of 
survey research. 
 Research Branch had better luck with fear and neuropsychiatric casualties. After the 
rather lackluster performance of American troops during Operation Torch - their debut in the 
European Theater in North Africa - and the debacle at Kasserine Pass, Research Branch, in 
cooperation with the Neuropsychiatry Branch of the Surgeon General‟s Office, conducted a 
survey and produced “Report B-66: Fear of German Weapons.” Dated October 1, 1943, the 
report was based on responses to questions by over 700 enlisted men who had recently been 
evacuated from North Africa, and indicated at first glance the strange, almost bizarre nature of 
attitudes which resist all logic: 
 “1. The German 88 mm. gun is considered by the men to be both the most 
 frightening and most dangerous German weapon. 
 
 2. Men rate the dive bomber as the second most frightening weapon, despite 
 the fact that they consider it relatively ineffective in inflicting casualties. 
 
 3. The light machine gun and rifle are seldom rated as most frightening 
 or most dangerous weapons, although their effectiveness is shown by the 
 fact that they account for a high proportion of the wounds among the men 
 interviewed. 
 
 4. Only about half of the men say that combat experience reduced their fear 
 of the weapon that was most frightening to them. 
 
 5. The proportion of men considering bombing most frightening decreases  
 with increased combat experience, while the proportion fearing artillery increases.” 
 
 Soldiers here revealed that factors other than what is most likely to hurt them accounted 
for their fear, which is not quite as strange as one might think, when one remembers that we are 
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all as children more afraid of the dark and the boogeyman than we are of car accidents. Normal 
men in abnormal circumstances may tend to revert to a more childlike state, and the 
psychologists and sociologists of Research Branch acknowledged in the report that “To bring 
about some balance between the known effectiveness of weapons and the degree to which men 
fear them is a major problem of soldier training.” Recommendations for solving this problem 
from the surveyed soldiers included more training under live ammunition, training with captured 
enemy weapons, more training on protection from German weapons, discussions on fear, and 
more realistic combat simulations.
276
 Within six weeks of the release of Report B-66, the 
National Defense Research Council requested a copy of the report on behalf of the Navy, which 
was considering “the usefulness of battle noise equipment in the selection and training of Naval 
personnel.”277 So it went with the majority of Research Branch‟s work - everyone wanted a copy. 
 In April-May of 1944, Research Branch questioned 454 men for Survey Number S-126, 
“Psychoneurotic Survey.” The survey included men in the 96th Station Hospital “that are not 
deemed curable in the European Theater of Operations, and are to be shipped back to the United 
States,” and “men from the 312th General Hospital who are less severe psychoneurotic cases.” 
189 of these men had never seen combat. The survey proceeded as most all of them did, with 
questions designed to obtain demographic data: Age, education, marital status, time in and 
branch of army service, etc. Then the questions moved on to demographic inquiries that might 
bear on the problem of psychoneurosis in combat, such as birth order, employment history -
                                                 
 
276
 Fear of German Weapons: Based on A Survey of Enlisted Men Recently Evacuated from North Africa. 
Joint Study by Neuropsychiatry Branch, Surgeon General‟s Office and Research Branch, Special Services Division 
Army Service Forces, War Department Washington, DC Oct.1, 1943. 1, 12-13. Record Group 407, Entry 360, Box 
2113. Army AG Classified Decimal File 1943-45, 330.11-33.14, 10-1-45. National Archives of the United States, 
College Park, MD. 
 
277
 Charles W. Bray to Special Services Division, War Department,  Nov. 11, 1943. Record Group 319, 
Entry285, Box 303. C/S US Army Chief of Information, Troop Information and Education Division, Decimal File 
061.2 1942-1948.  National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD. 
 
165 
 
“Before you came into the army, had you ever been fired or asked to resign from a job?” - and 
participation in “Blood Sports,” defined as “Football, boxing, basketball…and any other 
vigorous sport involving bodily contact.” Bedwetting, fingernail biting, and fighting all figured 
in the survey, but most compelling are the questions on attitudes: 
Question #16: In general, what sort of a time do you have in the army? 
    Of 454: 
      62    1. I have a pretty good time in the army 
           222   2. It‟s about fifty-fifty 
           154   3. I have a pretty rotten time 
             16   0. No answer 
 
Question #26: Do you think the things we are fighting for are worth risking your life for?   
                 
           290   1. Yes. 
            76    2. I think so, but I‟m not sure. 
            31    3. No 
            42    4. Undecided 
            15    0. No answer 
 
  Question #27: If it were up to you, what kind of outfit would you rather be in?                  
 
            131   1. In a combat outfit overseas 
             86    2. In a non-combat outfit overseas 
           191    3. In an outfit that will stay in the United States 
             46    0. No answer 
 
 
Question #28  If it were up to you to choose, do you think you could do more for your country as 
a soldier or as a worker in a war job? 
 
            90   1. As a soldier 
           279  2. As a war worker 
             69  3. Undecided 
            16   0. No answer 
 
Question #29  If it were up to you, and you yourself had to decide, would you choose to be a 
soldier or a civilian? 
 
           110   1. Would choose to be a soldier 
           260   2. Would choose to be a civilian 
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            65   3.  Undecided 
            19   0.  No Answer
278
 
 
 
 What Research Branch learned particularly from this survey, among a great many other 
insights, was that while 290 of 454 respondents thought that what they were fighting for was 
worth risking their lives, 260 of the same 454 would choose to be a civilian rather than a soldier. 
These kinds of findings would typically translate into propaganda about the issues through Army 
newspapers and films, to include Stars & Stripes and Frank Capra‟s “Why We Fight” films, and 
Research Branch would conduct follow up surveys to determine the effectiveness of this 
propaganda in reshaping soldier attitudes. (Psychologists analyzing this particular survey 
determined that 175 of the soldiers surveyed were normal, while 279 were psychoneurotic). 
 Although there was great frustration among Army psychiatrists and psychologists during 
the war regarding the Army‟s ineptness at anticipating and handling neuropsychiatric casualties, 
Research Branch staff did what they could to dig into the subject and offer assistance. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, there was a vibrant, rigorous, and public discussion of what would later 
be called post-traumatic-stress-disorder during the war. Not only were the personnel in Research 
branch heavily engaged in these investigations, but so also were scores of their consultants 
scattered at universities throughout the nation. Chief among these latter was John Dollard - 
brother of Charles Dollard, one of the military chiefs of Research Branch - of the Institute of 
Human Relations at Yale. Stouffer‟s correspondence with John Dollard during the war was 
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extensive, as both men tried to get beyond the feeble conceptions of cowardice and malingering 
that surrounded neuropsychiatric casualties.
279
 
 Seeking to counter the abysmal record of screening for psychosis and other psychiatric 
disorders during the initial expansion of the US Armed Forces, one of the contributions Research 
Branch made in the area of neuropsychiatric casualties was to assist the Surgeon General‟s office 
in developing screening criteria. In late 1944, the War Department required that all draftees 
complete the Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct, developed by Robin Williams, Shirley Star, 
and Louis Guttman  - all later contributors to The American Soldier. The adjunct consisted of 
twenty-three questions, and was designed to weed-out those recruits most likely to suffer 
neuropsychiatric symptoms if allowed into the Army: 
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 Unfortunately, such instruments proved to come too late and to be rather blunt. Selective 
Service screened twenty-million men during the war, and called fourteen-million of them to 
active service.
280
 The Army disqualified for service on the basis of emotional disorders 970,000 
men - 169,624 for psychiatric reasons.
281
 And still there were 929, 307 neuropsychiatric 
casualties, a number almost equal to those disqualified for emotional disorders. 
282
 
 Research Branch and their consultants were more successful in initiating an informed and 
public discussion of neuropsychiatric casualties during the war. Their jumping-off point was 
John Dollard‟s study of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War - then in progress 
and published in 1944 as Fear in Battle by The Infantry Journal. Although the Lincoln Brigade 
was for the most part made up of ideologically driven volunteers who differed markedly from the 
draft-driven conscripts of the Second World War, Dollard for his study interviewed three-
hundred Lincoln Brigade veterans, and exchanged information with Stouffer not only on content, 
but on survey strategies. “There are a lot of interesting problems on sampling on which I will 
need your advice,” Dollard wrote to Stouffer, “The chief one concerns how finical to be about 
sampling the Spanish vets; since we want to predict behavior in American soldiers wherever 
possible and since there is considerable difference between the two groups.” Dollard was not 
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writing his study on the Lincoln Brigade simply as an academic exercise. He hoped, as did 
Stouffer, that it would be useful during the contemporary war.
283
 
 Useful it was, but perhaps even more useful was a handbook published in 1943 entitled 
Psychology for the Fighting Man: What You Should Know About Yourself and Others. A product 
of the National Research Council and the Science Service, the book was edited by H.S. Langfeld, 
Walter V. Bingham, Gordon W. Allport, and E.R. Guthrie, with the responsibility for final edit 
belonging to E.G. Boring of Harvard and M. Van de Water of Science Service. Listed as 
“collaborators” on the work are sixty contributors, representing such institutions and agencies as 
Brown, Harvard, Princeton, Queens College, the Personnel Procedures and Special Services 
Sections of the War Department, the Offices of War Information and Public Opinion Research,  
Pennsylvania and St. Elizabeth‟s Hospitals, and the Universities of Chicago, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington. Among the contributors were psychologists, military physicians and officers, and 
sociologists of national reputation, to include J.W. Appel, A.W. Kornhauser, E.L. Munson, Jr., 
Stouffer, and Kimball Young. Many were members of or consultants to Research Branch. 
 The directions to contributors from the editors are instructive beyond their time, as they 
illuminate what the editors were willing, unashamedly, to ask in the context of a world war. They 
wanted a basic psychological text directed solely at officers. They wanted facts, simply stated, 
and no theorizing whatsoever. No thought was to be given to “academic colleagues,” utility was 
to be paramount, and the editors reserved the right not only to edit, but to completely rewrite 
contributions if they felt it necessary to do so. The contributors and editors also received no fee. 
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It is difficult to imagine the contributors responding at all to such demands outside of the context 
of a world war.
284
 
 Respond they did, however, producing a handbook that was devoted to the normalization 
and management of fear. Psychology for the Fighting Man told its readers that soldiers were 
normal, but that circumstances for them were abnormal. Therefore, abnormal reactions were in 
fact normal, and understanding men and their adjustment to Army life and to combat were 
critical to maintaining sound morale: 
  For instance, soldiers need to understand men in order to understand 
  themselves and their comrades, and officers must learn how to interpret 
  and influence the conduct of those for whom they are responsible. The 
  soldier must know about human needs, motives, and emotions - about 
  fear, when it comes, and what to do about it - about anger, when it is 
  useful, when it makes trouble - about zest which is the core of good 
  morale in a unit - about anxiety and the sense of insecurity - about 
  indignation against the enemy and irritation against comrades - about  
  the relation of food and of sex to the military life. He should also know 
  the relation of all these things to morale and thus learn how to avoid 
  bad morale and build up good morale.
285
 
 
After serialization and initial publication in 1943 and reprinting in 1944, Psychology for the 
Fighting Man, at twenty-five cents per copy, sold 400,000 copies.
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 Psychology for the Fighting Man, although addressed to military officers, did not go to 
press without securing the intellectual underpinnings and interest of the academic community. 
Shortly before it was published, the University of Chicago and the Walgreen Foundation for the 
Study of American Institutions had organized a series of lectures on the impact of war on 
society, which were delivered in the late fall of 1942. William F. Ogburn, one of Stouffer‟s 
mentors and head of the sociology department at Chicago, asked Stouffer to contribute a lecture. 
Originally entitled “War and the Soldier,” Stouffer gave his lecture on November 10, 1942, and 
it was subsequently published, along with several of the other lectures, as “Social Science and 
the Soldier” in American Society in Wartime (1943). In his lecture, Stouffer detailed the 
trajectory of attitude research from its psychological beginnings in World War I through the 
survey research of World War II to 1943. He also detailed the work of the Information and 
Education Division under Frederick Osborn, and described the activities of Research Branch. As 
with all lectures or articles of this kind, the War Department had to approve public 
dissemination, which they did - yet another indication of what the government was willing to do 
to keep citizen soldiers fighting. The psychological and sociological research dedicated to the 
war was no secret.
287
 Stouffer delivered his lecture two days after the Americans invaded North 
Africa. 
 By 1944, Stouffer‟s discoveries in military psychology and sociology had made it to 
Hollywood. In a frank and open depiction of that most delicate and painful of wartime 
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phenomena - neuropsychiatric casualties (NPs) - Selznick International Pictures released “I‟ll Be 
Seeing You,” starring Joseph Cotten, Ginger Rogers, and Shirley Temple. Cotten, playing 
Sergeant First Class Zachary Morgan, an NP who had sustained his psychological wounds in the 
Pacific, returns home on leave, and struggles to maintain control by talking to himself: 
  Don‟t get worried Zack. Don‟t get worried Zack. That bayonet wound 
  is all healed, but the wound in your mind is going to take a little more 
  time. That‟s why the doctors gave you this ten day leave from the  
  hospital, to prove to you that you can go out in the world again and find 
  a place for yourself. It‟s going to take a little while to get your timing 
  back. You‟ll drop things and be a little slow but you‟ll get well. They 
  told you you would. The important thing is not to get too tired, not to 
  give in. Then you won‟t get any of those, those things that wind up with 
  a shot in the arm or a tub or that little room with the barred window. 
  You can fight those things off Zack if you‟ll believe that you‟ll get well. 
  Stop thinking about yourself Zack. You‟ll get well, you‟ll get well,  
  you‟ll get well. 
 
During Cotten‟s monologue, the camera cuts briefly to an open magazine article on his bed - 
“The Problem of the Neuro-Psychiatric Soldier.”288  
 Shortly after the war, Hollywood offered “The Best Years of Their Lives,” which also 
dealt openly and frankly with the emotional trauma of soldiers returning from the war, and John 
Huston produced a documentary, “Let Their Be Light,” about the recovery of neuropsychiatric 
casualties. The issue was out in the open and fundamentally informed by the work of Stouffer 
and Research Branch. Cowardice, the lack of “fighting spirit,” and malingering, the intuitional 
answers for such casualties, would no longer be accepted without question. Because fear cannot 
be replicated in training, the lessons learned regarding neuropsychiatric casualties tend to be 
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forgotten between wars, and the intuitional answers reassert themselves until enough sufferers of 
what has come to be called PTSD stress the system to force a return to research and reason.
289
 
 In addition to low Infantry morale, neuropsychiatric casualties, and demobilization, race 
relations between black and white soldiers were also a major concern of Research Branch. 
Stouffer as it turned out once again happened to be the right man in the right place and time. He 
had considerable experience with issues of race, having participated in Gunnar Myrdal‟s 
landmark study An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. In 1942, 
however, Stouffer‟s concerns were less philosophical and more prosaic. His task then was one of 
social engineering within the army - a task which required close study of race relations and the 
problems inherent therein. By June 1942, with the organization up and running, Stouffer was 
looking ahead to the major issues Research Branch would have to tackle. Among these he listed 
“Attitudes of Negroes.” The need was great, for the information the War Department was 
receiving on black soldiers and their Army experience revealed several major problems.
290
 A 
study done on the 4
th
 Infantry Division at Camp Gordon, Georgia in the summer of 1942 
prompted Stouffer to send a memorandum to the military chief of Research Branch (then John B. 
Stanley) on the “Attitude of White Soldiers Toward Use of Facilities by Negroes:”  
  The expected differences in attitude of Northern and Southern soldiers 
  shows up, although it may be surprising how many Northerners would 
  deny Negroes any share in white facilities even if this meant the Negroes 
  would have to go without facilities. The better educated within each 
  region are somewhat more liberal than the less educated, as would be  
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  expected. Differences are small in the South but quite sharp in the 
  North, the less educated Northerners tending to be about half way 
  between other Northerners and Southerners in their attitudes.
291
 
 
 A few weeks after Stanley received Stouffer‟s memo, he received a secret study by the 
Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Information on “Memphis Negroes and the War.”  The 
study was part of a series entitled “Negroes in a Democracy at War.” The report illuminated the 
grievances of black soldiers. Chief among these was their realization that they were “not being 
treated democratically” and that they were not “given adequate opportunity to participate in the 
war effort.” The report also revealed a dynamic critical to Stouffer‟s thinking about survey 
design: “‟Yes suh, the Army is all right to our people.‟ When asked whether the Army treats 
Negroes fairly, seven out of ten Memphis Negroes gave this sort of answer to white interviewers. 
But only four in ten said that the Army is fair to Negroes when talking to interviewers of their 
own race.” Stouffer knew that the identity of the interviewer was critical, which is why he chose 
interviewers and survey administrators from among the units he studied.
292
 
 The Army in World War II was segregated, and remained so until 1948, when President 
Truman desegregated the military under Executive Order 9981. “Separate but equal” proved to 
be a vexing problem for the War Department and Research Branch as indicated by a military 
censor‟s report from New Orleans in 1943. The censor had examined 3,146 letters of the 494th 
Port Battalion (made up of mostly black, or “colored” troops) in the final week of May of that 
year. Most of the letters were addressed to families in the North or Midwest, where segregation 
existed more by tradition than by law, and was often not enforced. The censor reported that “the 
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general tone of the letters indicate that the men have not become adjusted to local conditions and 
they resent not being accorded the same privileges they received in the North and Middlewest.” 
“Local conditions” as seen by these soldiers: 
  They treat us like dumb brutes and not men. 
  These white folks are afraid of Northern colored people and there 
  is trouble all the time. 
 
  It is getting dangerous down here…the white people and the colored 
  people can‟t get along together. We are getting tired of being treated 
  like we are. We are planning on starting a race riot. 
 
  I witnessed my first race riot down here and they was shooting 
  at each other in the street just like in the cowboy pictures. 
 
  If they don‟t move the 494th away from here there won‟t be 
  any Louisiana.
293
 
 
The censor‟s report, with nine pages of such excerpts from soldiers‟ letters, was duly forwarded 
to the Special Services Division, of which Osborn‟s Information and Education Division and 
Stouffer‟s Research Branch was a part.294 
 It seemed there was more to fear then than combat. In a report to the Chief of Army 
Service Forces, Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, summarizing a survey on 
transportation facilities for black troops which Somervell had requested, Osborn noted “an 
undercurrent of feeling on the part of officers in the field that preferential treatment accorded the 
Negro soldier is undermining disciplinary control. In some instances, this lack of discipline 
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causes white officers to fear their Negro troops.”295 Still, Osborn was sanguine about the 
attitudes of black soldiers, despite the fear of their white counterparts. Shortly after he sent his 
note to Somervell, he wrote to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, “Negroes appreciate 
the attempts on the part of the Army to accord them fair and equitable treatment,” he stressed, 
and they “have a capacity for developing pride in their outfit and in the Army.”296 
 The issue of race, however, bore careful watching, and Osborn designated Research 
Branch consultant and University of Pennsylvania sociologist Donald Young as his advisor on 
race relations. Young summarized the policy implications of Research Branch surveys on the 
attitudes of black soldiers, beginning from the premise revealed in the research that “Negro 
soldiers have more doubt than white soldiers concerning the importance of their role in the Army 
in comparison with their role in civilian life, and since they have serious doubts concerning the 
status of Negro civilians both during and after the war, there is need for morale building 
information on the stake and role of the Negro in the war.” Young, initially careful not to make 
outright recommendations, suggested, or rather noted that Research Branch surveys had 
suggested more news on the achievements of black soldiers, assignment of black soldiers to 
“important military duties, including combat,” and more news on enemy racial policies. 
Warming to his task, Young then became almost directive: 
  The War Department should take all possible measures to assure full 
  respect by both military and civilian personnel for the man in uniform, 
  whether he be white or colored. This involves (1) Effort to impress on 
  white military personnel the necessity for avoiding behavior towards 
  Negro soldiers, either on or off duty, which is patronising or plainly 
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  indicative of a belief that the Negro is not capable or worthy of 
  being a soldier. (2) Acceptance of responsibility by commanding 
  officers  for the protection of their men from abuse and 
  exploitation by civilians. 
 
 Young accepted segregation as a necessary evil, but stressed the need for it to be “kept at 
a minimum.”  He also stressed that “since Negro soldiers prefer Negro lieutenants, efforts should 
be made to increase the supply of colored officers.” He ended his summary by reminding the 
War Department that, despite what was not depicted in Frank Capra‟s “The Negro Soldier,” “the 
development of high morale among colored soldiers is closely related to the history of their 
treatment as a disadvantaged minority in the United States.” He also pinned success or failure 
squarely on the Army leadership. The success or failure of black soldiers was “in large measure 
dependent on the success which the Army may have in gaining a better understanding of the 
causes of dissatisfaction and on the utilization of such knowledge by the higher War Department 
authorities in their advice and direction of commanding officers in the field.”297  
 The War Department accepted and implemented almost all of Research Branch‟s 
proposals as outlined by Young, codifying them in early 1944 in a pamphlet entitled “Command 
of Negro Troops.” The introduction closely paraphrased Young‟s comments: “The purpose of 
this booklet is to help officers command their troops more effectively by giving them 
information which will increase their understanding of their men….The Negro in the Army has 
special problems. This is the result of the fact that the Negro group has had a history materially 
different from that of the majority in the Army.”298 In the few weeks surrounding the publication 
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of “Command of Negro Troops,” the Americans had reduced the Japanese naval bases at Truk 
and Rabaul, landed at Anzio, and bombed Monte Cassino. 
 The final major problem faced by Stouffer and Research Branch during the war was 
demobilization, both in preparing soldiers to be demobilized, and in the method to carry out the 
movement and civilianization of eight million soldiers. “According to reports,” Osborn wrote in 
October 1943, “made by Raymond B. Fosdick in 1920, and all Army comment on the period of 
demobilization after the last war, insufficient training was given to troops in preparation for their 
return to civilian life, while at the same time discipline and morale deteriorated rapidly because 
the men were not usefully occupied or informed during the period from the cessation of 
hostilities to the time when they could be discharged from the service.”299 As the war drew to a 
close, Research Branch focused increasingly on soldier attitudes toward demobilization, and as 
was their habit, they began with Army experience from the First World War. Marshall wanted a 
comprehensive plan that would encompass both educational and recreational activities, but 
Research Branch provided more than that - they also provided the mechanism for demobilization 
in the point system. After several surveys, Research Branch recommended that soldiers be 
redeployed to the United States and released from active duty based on a system of points 
accrued for time in service, overseas tours, awards, and combat duty. Stouffer wrote somewhat 
proudly in The American Soldier, “The idea of a point system for demobilization had been 
conceived in the Research Branch and accepted by the War Department and the President.”300 
 The work that Stouffer and Research Branch were doing drove a great deal of the 
massive effort to educate and prepare soldiers for demobilization. Their preliminary conclusions 
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prompted Osborn to request that his superiors “prepare informational facilities, i.e., daily news 
service, newspapers, radio, and film, so that at the proper time it can inform the soldier and the 
Command on the progress….This program must be full blown and ready to go into effect upon 
cessation of hostilities.”301 Fortunately, the Army had at its disposal vast resources for this kind 
of education, so Stouffer‟s findings and recommendations could make it into the field quickly. 
The Armed Forces Radio Service broadcasted from 176 stations, supplemented by 54 foreign 
stations. Their feature films, documentaries, and newsreels reached millions of soldiers; the 
Army News Service sent 80,000 words a day to newspapers and radio stations, and the 
circulation of the Army newspaper Stars & Stripes reached 1,200,000 in the European Theater of 
Operations alone. 3,000 posts and Army units published their own papers, Yank magazine 
printed 2,400,000 copies a week, with 1,000 weekly contributions from soldiers and 1,500 
weekly letters to the editor. The Army also produced “Newsmaps,” which portrayed graphically 
the progress of the war on one side, and on the other provided command and other messages to 
troops. As for formal education, the Army offered in cooperation with 85 universities over 200 
vocational and technical courses through correspondence. Enrollment shortly after the end of the 
war exceeded 1,300,000. The Army also provided classroom versions of these and other courses, 
with an enrollment of over 700,000 in approximately 1,000 schools.
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 Research Branch undertook several studies on demobilization. Their concerns as they 
wrote them down, were “vocational and educational anticipation of men after discharge,” and 
determining “weights of the factors (length of time in the Army, length of time overseas, 
decorations, and number of dependents) to be used in deciding which men will be released from 
the Army first.” They also investigated soldier preferences on educational courses, soldier 
knowledge of and opinions about the G.I. Bill, attitudes toward the proposed post-war changes to 
soldier life insurance, adjustment of returnees, and “post-armistice psychological problems,” to 
include “aggression towards various groups, dissatisfaction with stated and avowed war aims, the 
causes of the war, etc.”303 All of these studies were carried out with Stouffer‟s characteristic 
rigor. One of the European Theater of Operations surveys required the commander to administer 
the survey to 2,400 soldiers, 1,600 of which were to be combat troops, and 800 service troops. 
5% were to have one year or less of service, 50% 13-24 months, 25% 25-36 months, and 20% 37 
months or over. Cross tabulations were to be made by age, marital status, number of children, 
length of service, length of time overseas, and number of campaigns. The request for this 
information went out on July 24, 1944, six weeks after D-Day, and a reply was required by 
August 15.
304
 In the intervening three weeks, the US Army launched “Operation Cobra” to break 
out of defensive positions in Cherbourg, Patton‟s Third Army was activated for the dash across 
France into Germany, and the US Fifth Army crossed the Arno. That the War Department was 
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willing to undertake such massive and distracting surveys during the major closing offensives of 
the war indicates the importance they attached to Stouffer‟s work. Clearly, for most senior 
civilian and military leaders, intuition had given way to policies grounded in research.
305
 
 The rigor did not end with survey design, however. Stouffer‟s work really began when he 
received the survey results. He had to run the survey data cards through International Business 
Machines (IBM) tabulators, control variables, ensure validity, reliability, and consistency, and 
finally write up a report of findings and recommendations. Methodology then, was paramount to 
his work, and he and his colleagues in Research Branch were developing the methodology in the 
context of a world war, which required state of the art analysis of vast amounts of data. 
Fortunately, Stouffer had Cornell Professor Louis Guttman on his team, who developed the 
scalogram to help manage information. As Guttman described his scalogram in its development 
phase to Stouffer in 1942, “it would once and for all do away with weighting problems,” and 
“form a rapid, efficient, theoretically sound, and quite easily understandable method of scale 
construction.”306 The mathematics and statistical analysis which went into the scalogram 
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rendered not only a verification of questions through repetitive similar questions, but also 
correlated each item under study with the others. Coupled with Rensis Likert‟s scale for 
determining the intensity of attitudes, Lazarsfeld‟s theory of latent structures, and other checks 
on reliability and validity, the survey results Stouffer and Research Branch handed to the War 
Department were as near as scientifically sound as possible at the time.
307
 
 The responses of soldiers to demobilization surveys indicated that they believed “older, 
married combat veterans with long overseas service should be the first men out.” On the face of 
it, this declaration seemed relatively simple. But they also wanted combat, overseas service, 
length of service, physical condition, number of dependents, age, and civilian occupation to be 
considered. When one applied Research Branch‟s analysis to the problem, it became clear just 
how complicated this, and most other issues studied by Research Branch during the war truly 
were, and why tools such as Guttman‟s scalogram and the general rigor with which Stouffer 
approached his duties were so vital - as was a recognition of limitations: 
  The problem becomes that of evaluating the relative importance 
  of the various factors when certain of them apply to an individual 
  while others do not - for example, should the married men with one  
  child and two years service in the States be released before or after 
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  the single man who has served overseas for two years and has seen 
  combat…? The problem of establishing weights is made extremely  
  complex by the fact that in the men‟s thinking these factors are not  
  discrete, operating with equal importance in all cases…. It seems  
  unlikely, therefore, that any exact weighting scheme can be worked  
  out on the basis of percentages of men who favor release of individuals 
  characterized by any complex of the factors under consideration. What 
  probably can be done is to establish a ranking of importance of  
  certain specific complexes or combinations of factors, from which 
  deductions may be made as to the weight men consider fair.
308
 
 
 The Research Branch SOP, detailed though it might have been, only went so far in 
providing guidance for determining soldier attitudes. But it went much, much further than 
anything which had been applied prior to Stouffer‟s arrival in Washington. That the Army was 
even willing to consider soldier attitudes in making decisions was a major change in the 
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philosophy of managing men at war. Answers to such questions, had they even been asked prior 
to the groundbreaking work of Research Branch, would have been “whatever the mission of the 
moment requires,” “whatever is convenient for commanders,” or “whatever can be enforced 
through authoritarian means.” By the close of the Second World War, major policy decisions 
were no longer governed solely by the intuition of commanders. The US Army was willing to 
expend considerable resources in determining what soldiers thought, and applied that research to 
its decisions. 
 “The late Samuel Stouffer,” remembered sociologist Thomas Pettigrew, “one of 
America‟s greatest sociologists,  
  always became incensed when a layman blithely reacted to a finding 
  of behavioral science with, „Who didn‟t know that?‟ He countered with 
  a simple true-false test of ten items, the „obvious, common sense‟ answers 
  to which had all been demonstrated to be incorrect by rigorous social 
  research. Most of those who take Stouffer‟s test miss every item. The moral 
  is clear: many behavioral science findings appear obvious only after the 
  fact.
309
 
 
Intuition, then, in Stouffer‟s mind, was not a good basis for making decisions or forming policy. 
Additionally, Stouffer showed great dedication and effort in all his work. In preparing a report 
for the President, “he slept on the desk Saturday night,” remembered Research Branch alumnus 
Jack Elinson. “Sunday he entered the numbers and revised the prior report. Monday it was typed 
and delivered to the President.”310 As the guiding force of Research Branch, Stouffer personified 
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James Gavin‟s characterization of the work of Research Branch as a “monumental contribution 
to the science of making citizens of a free country win its wars.” 
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Chapter 7 
 
Postbellum: Legacy and Relevance of Research Branch and The American Soldier 
 
 “In the event of remobilization of research functions,” reads a hastily typed memo of 
1955 in the files of the National Archives, “valuable counsel, based on pase [sic] experience with 
attitude assessment among military personnel, should be sought from the following.” The list of 
names recorded was short and distinguished, but could have been longer. It included Stouffer, 
who had gone to Harvard to found and direct the Laboratory of Social Relations, Leland C. 
DeVinney, Acting Director of the Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation, Charles 
Dollard, President of the Carnegie Corporation, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Secretary and Director 
of Research at the Russell Sage Foundation, Carl I. Hovland, Sterling Professor of Psychology at 
Yale and founding director of the Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program, and 
William W. McPeak, Vice President of the Ford Foundation.
 311
 Though short, the list was 
representative of the post-war positions and influence of the sociologists and psychologists who 
had worked with Stouffer in Research Branch. Eight Research Branch alumni served as president 
of the American Sociological Association.
312
 Veterans of Research Branch maintained contact 
with one another, often served as advisors and consultants for the Department of Defense, and 
from their universities, government positions, foundations, or businesses, exerted a considerable 
influence on the military and sociology.
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 The American Soldier was similarly influential within professional circles. Military 
sociologist Charles C. Moskos, Jr. named The American Soldier “perhaps the most valuable 
source of information on the World War II serviceman,” and historian John Madge devoted an 
entire chapter of his Origins of Scientific Sociology to Research Branch and The American 
Soldier, noting that “the United States Army was extremely fortunate in securing the scientific 
services of many fine social scientists in Research Branch under the highly professional 
leadership of Samuel A. Stouffer.”314 Sociologist Libby Schweber, writing for the Revue 
d‟Histoire des Sciences Humaines in 2002 labeled The American Soldier “a turning point in the 
history of American sociology. The book heralded the ascendance of statistics as the 
authoritative method and an associated rise of instrumental positivism as the dominant style of 
reasoning.”315 
 In his introduction to The American Soldier, Stouffer identified three audiences: military 
officers, historians, and social psychologists and sociologists. It was Stouffer‟s hope that “if our 
nation again should be forced to defend itself in a global conflict, some of the findings may help 
prevent in another war mistakes which were made in this one. If we are to be vouchsafed a 
generation of peace, scholars can add these experiences to other experiences and use them as a 
help in building a social science.” These audiences have indeed found the work of Research 
Branch, as summarized in The American Soldier, interesting, useful, and even compelling. But 
                                                                                                                                                             
Carnegie Corporation. He knew leading figures in the Social Science Research Council and recruited a number of 
them to serve in other parts of the Information and Education Division. The result was that those fortunate enough to 
be working in the Research Branch had both an extraordinarily talented group of mentors and consultants and an 
extraordinary set of ties that would open doors and  facilitate access to a wide variety of opportunities. As Nathan 
Maccoby put it: „The Research Branch not only established one of the best old-boy (or girl) networks ever, but an 
alumnus of the Branch had an open door to most relevant jobs and career lines. We were a lucky bunch.‟” 
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there were also three unintended audiences who showed as much interest in Stouffer‟s survey 
research as the intended audiences - businessmen, government, and pollsters. An analysis of all 
six audiences yields a compelling picture of the influence of Stouffer and The American Soldier; 
providing not only a view of the ascendance of survey research over intuition, but also a 
confirmation of what the US government had done during the war and continued to do after it to 
equip not only their soldiers, but their society as well. “Just as World War I gave new impetus to 
the study of aptitudes,” Stouffer observed, “World War II has given new impetus to the study of 
attitudes.”316 Even after the war, the work of Research Branch had an irresistible inertia - a 
momentum that demanded scientific analysis of social questions in the face of the reflexive force 
of intuition.   
 Despite the dismissive tone of the 1955 note, the military has continued to regard survey 
research as a valuable tool. The offices change, the names are reworked, and organizational 
structures come and go, but surveys remain a key component in military personal management, 
as Stouffer predicted they would in the first pages of The American Soldier:   
  Since the war, the Research and Development Board which reports  
  Directly to the Secretary of Defense has established a committee on  
  Human Resources. This is a recognition, both by scientists and the military, 
  of the fact not only that social and psychological problems are crucial 
  in modern war…but also that they are now amenable to scientific 
  study. In the peacetime Army, Navy, and Air Force there may be a 
  good many officers, especially among those teaching in Service 
  schools or among those developing new training and personnel plans, 
  who can find in the Army‟s experience, as recorded here and there 
  in these volumes, an idea which they can translate into a program of 
  experimentation for the future.
317
 
 
 In the years immediately following World War II, the Defense Department kept in close 
contact with Stouffer, who in 1946 had left both the War Department and the University of 
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Chicago to take up a sociology professorship at Harvard and to direct the new Laboratory of 
Social Relations there. Stouffer‟s papers at Harvard are full of Defense requests, both formal and 
informal, for advice, service, comments, consultations, classes, and speeches, as new officers 
filled personnel and military school management positions and learned the lessons Stouffer had 
taught their predecessors: 
  Dear Dr. Stouffer,          February 12, 1949 
  I hope I can count on your availability to help us out from time to 
  time on the many problems which we encounter in the fields in which 
  you have done such distinguished work. 
 
       James Forrestal 
       Secretary of Defense
318
 
 
 A few months after Stouffer received this note from Forrestal, the Information and 
Education Division  - which had been renamed “Army - Air Force Troop Information and 
Education Division” - was transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and renamed 
once again, becoming the “Armed Forces Information and Education Division.” The original 
Information and Education Division, of which Stouffer‟s Research Branch was a part, had been 
purely an Army affair during the war, but its success had been such that the survey program was 
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extended to include all the services. The chief of the Division, Paul Guernsey, wrote to Stouffer 
in 1946: “You would be absolutely amazed to see the current pile up of study requests in our 
shop for Army alone….There are some very interesting projects, including several experimental 
studies.” Guernsey also noted that he was extremely short-handed: “With our present staff, 
however, to attempt to do all or any great number of these studies would represent a 3-5 year 
project. At least we are not lacking for work.”319 As had the rest of the Army, Research Branch 
had been considerably downsized at the end of the war. Still, it maintained an ambitious research 
agenda. Guernsey wrote to Stouffer again in 1951, in the midst of the Korean Conflict, indicating 
the scope of the new Armed Forces Information and Education Division activities: 
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Paul D. Guernsey to Samuel A Stouffer, January 16, 1951.  Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1950-1953,  
Box 14, Correspondence: Educational Testing Service - Gage N.L., HUG (FP). 31.6. Harvard University Archives, 
Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. 
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 Among the scores of consultation requests Stouffer received, he was asked by Johns 
Hopkins, then undertaking research for the Army, to consult on their project, and he was also 
asked and agreed to direct a study for the RAND Corporation, contracted to the Department of 
Defense, on attitude measurement.
 320
  The Army Surgeon General‟s Office contacted him when 
they were considering continued use of the Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct, the Deputy 
Director of the Women‟s Army Corps asked him to consult on the “adjustment of service women 
to group living,” and the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department asked him to travel to 
Germany as part of a team to evaluate post-war German publications.
321
 Stouffer was also 
repeatedly asked for recommendations on personnel who could work in research for the 
Department of Defense. An example of one of these requests came from John B. Stanley, former 
military chief of Research Branch and in 1951 the chief of the Intelligence and Evaluation 
Division of the Army‟s Psychological Warfare Office. Stanley was “visiting several of the 
Eastern universities in an effort to beat the bushes for personnel who might be useful in the 
psychological warfare intelligence field,” and wanted to know if Stouffer could direct him to 
“someone at Harvard with whom I might discuss this problem or to individuals who might be 
interested in this field.”322 Requests of all kinds continued unabated until Stouffer‟s death in 
1960, and among his many projects for the military were consultations in 1954 on the Vietnam 
area study, and extensive work on Project Revere, an analysis of the effectiveness of propaganda 
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leaflets.
323
 During these years it appeared that neither the Department of Defense itself, nor 
institutions conducting personnel research for the Department of Defense, were willing to reach 
conclusions on sociological issues without Stouffer‟s advice. 
 Some of the requests for Stouffer‟s advice and insights were less formal, coming from 
officers working in the field. One such inquiry, referred to Stouffer, came from an Army clinical 
psychologist interested in “working on the problem of educating the families…of 
neuropsychiatric casualties:” 
  I have been working with neuropsychiatric casualties in Army 
  hospitals for two years, and I have been frequently confronted 
  with the problems created by unfortunate attitudes in the family 
  or community of the casualty. So far as I know, the only attempts 
  to deal with these problems have been magazine articles and the like, 
  which have had a limited audience and have probably not done too 
  much good. My belief that ordinary people can be taught to have the  
  right kind of attitude toward psychiatric illness derives from my 
  work in group therapy, where the casualties themselves were able 
  to overcome their secondary anxiety through understanding as well 
  as through authoritative assurance.
324
 
 
There were many more such requests, including one from a Navy officer heading the Personnel 
Psychology Branch of the Naval Medical Research Laboratory who wanted to attend one of 
Stouffer‟s seminars at Harvard. The officer was working with Fordham University on the 
“submariner stereotype.”325  
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 Stouffer never went out of style with the military in his lifetime, partly because one of the 
abiding realities of military life is the constant rotation of personnel who must learn the ropes of 
their new jobs quickly, and just as quickly are moved to other jobs. Stouffer often received 
requests such as this one, from a harried Air Force officer who in 1953, apparently unaware of 
The American Soldier (or the spelling of Stouffer‟s name) found himself responsible for a morale 
survey: 
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 Stouffer also received a request for assistance from a better informed officer who wanted 
to carry Stouffer‟s research further: 
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 Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence, 1950-1953, Box 20, Correspondence: T - XYZ,  
 HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. 
 Among the formal presentations Stouffer delivered to the military in the post war years 
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was one at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in late 1957, untitled, but described by 
him as a talk about “the social sciences and some of the implications that they may have in the 
world today, particularly with respect to the military.” He told his audience he had visited a 
business in the Midwest (unnamed) which was conducting over forty social science surveys, and 
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to do so. He then told them that the Air Force had just 
cut from their budget about thirty sociologists and psychologists, who immediately found 
employment in the business world, and that some had received four or five offers. He decried the 
loss, and then tried to explain to his audience why social science research was of great value to 
the military: 
  I think this is a very serious loss. Some of these people were working on 
  what might be called basic research, and I know there were probably 
  people in the Defense Department who did not think too much of basic 
  research. I saw an editorial in the New York Herald Tribune a few days 
  ago quoting the late Secretary of Defense as saying that basic research is 
  when you don‟t know what you are doing. And there is a feeling that this  
  is a kind of luxury. This is not a new feeling for America. DeTocqueville, 
  100 years ago, commented that Americans didn‟t seem to be too much 
  interested in basic ideas, but they were tremendously interested in  
  inventing gadgets, in making applications. I think this has been true, as 
  people in the physical sciences would tell you. But there has been, in the 
  last generation, at least, a serious effort in America to develop some real 
  research of a first-class character, some real thinking in the basic social 
  sciences, with the thought that this does pay off. For example, the 
  American Telephone and Telegraph Company, in the Bell Laboratories, 
  have established a Social Science Unit which explicitly is told that, 
  „We are not interested in your doing anything of immediate value to the  
  Bell Laboratories, but we are concerned here that you get down and work 
  at the kind of fundamental problems whose application some way might 
  be of importance to telephone people, but we don‟t really care.‟ The people 
  who were working on the transistor in the Bell Labs were not working 
  on a practical job at the time. They were fooling around with some basic 
  ideas, and out came the transistor. There is some reason to believe that in 
  the field of the social sciences and in psychology basic research will pay off. 
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  As he did throughout his career, Stouffer demonstrated the unreliability of “common 
sense,” for his audience through a discussion of relative deprivation.326 He then discussed a study 
funded by the Office of Naval Research on small group leadership, and another devoted to 
determining what kind of person is willing to accept new ideas - both significant issues for the 
military. He discussed propaganda, training, Skinner, Pavlov, and Marx. And he told his 
audience that he hoped the Russians “have some of their psychologists and their sociologists 
working on problems like tail fins, and not all of them working on the problems of how to 
improve the efficiency and striking power of their Armed Forces. “As a patriotic American,” he 
concluded, “I hope that we will not lose this one, that we will not let anybody get ahead of us on 
the utilization of the truth that the social sciences can contribute.” He was, as ever, appealing to 
reason over intuition, and hoping that his audience would continue, as they had done in the 
Second World War, to bring social science to bear to equip American soldiers to fight.
327
 
 The perceived value of particular departments within any institution can be measured by 
those which survive downsizing. Although its value was well-recognized, Research Branch was 
not immune to the massive demobilization which took place at the close of World War II, 
followed later by additional downsizing as President Eisenhower, relying on the growing 
American nuclear arsenal, introduced the “New Look” military. Rejecting wholesale dissolution 
of the functions of Research Branch, the Army, and later the Defense Department sought, as all 
institutions facing budget cuts do, to farm out attitudinal surveys and analysis of results to 
diverse agencies in an effort to save money, and some of this dispersal did occur in the years 
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immediately following the Second World War.
328
 However, Research Branch made its case for 
excusal from the chopping block clearly. In a mince-no-words reply to justify its existence, the 
branch reminded Chief of Staff Eisenhower that “It has long been recognized that command 
decisions made without consideration of morale factors may lead to disaster.” The reply also 
highlighted the special nature of survey research: “It must be remembered that attitude 
research…represents, in fact, a field of specialized social science research,” requiring skilled 
professionals educated in that field.
329
  (In other words, people like Stouffer, who could tell the 
Army to cut AWOL rates by changing uniforms, did not grow on trees). The argument worked 
initially, but as the Army downsized and America‟s nuclear arsenal grew, the perceived need for 
a large staff of sociologists and psychologists in the Department of Defense dimmed. Although 
the defense establishment maintained some of these in their headquarters, many were only 
brought in for temporary consultations, and the Research Branch morphed by 1948 into the 
smaller Army-Air Force Troop Information and Education Division of the Office of the Chief of 
Staff of the Army.
330
 Still, attitude research has never entirely left the Army, and after some 
dropping-off in the late fifties and early sixties, strengthened successively with each new 
conflict.  
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 Although the Army currently maintains its own research organizations and personnel, it 
also has farmed out a considerable amount of its research tasks to contractors. Chief among these 
is the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation in Santa Monica, California. RAND has 
been conducting research and publishing studies for the Department of Defense and others for 
more than sixty years, and Stouffer participated in some of its early studies. Two of RAND‟s 
latest studies, Psychological and Psychosocial Consequences of Combat and Deployment with 
Special Emphasis on the Gulf War, and Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive 
Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery list Stouffer and The American 
Soldier in their bibliographies. RAND researcher Bruce Newsome also used The American 
Soldier for an article entitled “The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation.” Perhaps more 
significant for Stouffer‟s legacy and relevance, however, was his presence at the inception of 
RAND. If, as author Alex Abella claims in Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the 
Rise of American Empire, “RAND has literally reshaped the modern world,” Stouffer‟s reach is 
long indeed.
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 Sixty years after Princeton published the work of Stouffer and Research Branch in The 
American Soldier, US Army personnel research is conducted by The US Army Research Institute 
(ARI), which maintains a Personnel Survey Office. Additionally, ARI conducts research in the 
areas of training, leader development, and selection and classification of soldiers, and also 
maintains Basic Research and Occupational Analysis sections. ARI traces its beginning to the 
activities of psychologists during World War I, who developed the first systematic screening and 
classification systems for soldiers. World War II, however, provided what ARI refers to as their 
“direct ancestor” - the U.S. Army Personnel Research Office in the Office of the Adjutant 
General, which worked closely with Stouffer‟s Research Branch in the Information and 
Education Division. ARI‟s mission: 
  The mission of the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and    
  Social Sciences is to enhance individual and group performance along  
  with group decision making and individual decision making. Advances   
  in the behavioral and social sciences are being made to meet Army   
  operational requirements. ARI is the  primary research institute for    
  conducting research and analysis on personnel performance and training.    
  The research contributes to recruiting, selection, assignment, training,    
  mission performance, and situational awareness. Technical assistance is   
  provided for the organization, the people, and the technologies for the  
  future affecting all parts of the Army. Quality people, leader development,   
  and training are the Army‟s Imperatives that ARI‟s programs support.  
  ARI is the Army‟s primary laboratory conducting research and analysis on  
  personnel, training, and leader development. Our focus is on the human    
  element in the Army. Our research and analysis contributes to the entire                 
  life cycle of recruiting, selection, assignment, training, and mission        
  performance. ARI:  
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  provides new technology to meet the personnel and training challenges of the 
 Army;  
  conducts studies and analyses to address short-term issues and respond to 
 emerging "hot topics"; and  
  provides technical assistance on critical issues affecting all parts of the Army -
 the organization, the people, and the technologies for the future.  
  ARI's programs support three of the Army's Imperatives: Quality People,      
  Leader Development, and Training. 
 Twice a year at a minimum, every year since 1958, the Army has conducted the Sample 
Survey of Military Personnel (SSMP). ARI provides installations with a random sampling of 
names of soldiers to be surveyed, and asks standard questions generally related to quality of life, 
as well as additional questions on specific issues on a rotating basis. If special issues present 
themselves, questions pertaining to those issues are often added, sometimes at the direction of 
the Army leadership, sometimes at the request of special constituencies within the Army - such 
as branches or specific commands or installations. Responses are not mandatory, and the Army 
has seen a decline in responses over the years, most recently due to the suspicion soldiers have of 
web-based surveys as “phishing” traps to gather personal and financial information, or their 
annoyance with spam. Still, even though most surveys are web-based, the Army receives enough 
responses (thousands) to create and process statically significant data files which they analyze to 
assist commanders in forming policy. The Army gathers anecdotal as well as statistical data 
through interviews in addition to the SSMP, and the issues at hand drive both the focus of 
surveys and the formation of questions.
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 After the military, Stouffer named his next audience for The America Soldier - historians: 
  Another audience is the historians. If by some miracle a cache should 
  be found of manuscript materials telling of the attitudes towards combat 
  of a representative sample of, say, a hundred men in Stonewall Jackson‟s 
  army, the discovery would interest Civil War historians. We have in  
  these volumes [The American Soldier] data drawn from the expressions  
  about their Army experiences, at home and abroad, of more than half a  
  million American young men who were queried at one time or another 
  during World War II. What these men had to say is a page of the history  
  of the war and of the history of America. The data should be of special  
  interest to the newer generation of historians, who are as much interested 
  in institutions and the rank and file comprising them as they are interested 
  in big personalities and big dramatic events, and some of whom are now 
  getting training in the interpretation of statistics along with other 
  techniques of contemporary social science investigation. From some 
  points of view, the attitudes of soldiers, especially toward many of 
  the traditional practices of Army life, do not make a pretty historical 
  picture. But these young men were Americans. Their unwillingness 
  to accept with complacency some of the ways in which the Army  
  did things may not have been out of keeping with historic American 
  traditions of resistance to authoritarian controls, especially when 
  authority was coupled, as in the leadership system of the Army, with 
  special social privileges for the wielders of power.
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employment status, family adaptation to Army life, volunteering for combat and volunteering for Operations Other 
than War.” ARI is keenly aware of their history: “Legacy from World War II: During World War II America‟s best 
and brightest stepped forward to contribute to the Allies‟ war effort. Some served in combat on the front lines in the 
European and Pacific Theaters. Others made their contributions elsewhere in ways that capitalized on their unique 
skills and abilities. At the U.S. War Department, a very select few used their social science skills, supported by that 
relatively new data collection tool - the attitude and opinion survey. Survey research pioneer Elmo Roper advised 
the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, in April 1941 to make use of surveys to collect information 
from soldiers to guide military administration and policies. The list of the names of those in supporting roles in the 
Research Branch of the Morale Division reads like a Who‟s Who in behavioral science, starting with Samuel A. 
Stouffer,  lead author of The American Soldier. The findings of the four-volume work [sic] were based on the 
surveys done by the Research Branch to „provide a base of factual knowledge which would help the director of the 
Army Information and Education Division [Osborn] (formerly the Morale Division) in his administrative policy 
decisions. Some of the survey questions asked during WWII addressed basic personnel matters, such as soldiers‟ 
expectations for promotion, job satisfaction and job assignments. Other questions directly addressed levels of morale 
after survey findings had indicated that units with the lowest levels of morale before entering combat had higher 
non-battle casualty rates during battle than did units with higher levels of morale. Another survey found that soldiers 
with three or more years of overseas duty were less likely than those with less than three years of service and no 
overseas duty to be willing to serve longer. Those soldiers with no prior overseas duty were willing to serve longer, 
regardless of number of years already served. One of the key outcomes of the survey work was obtaining soldiers‟ 
preferences in the development of the „point system,‟ the basis for discharge after the war.” ARI makes as much use 
of counterintuitives as Stouffer and others, such as Paul Lazarsfeld did. They began their Spring 2002 Newsletter by 
asking “Do you believe this statement? „In today‟s Army, senior noncommissioned officers have weaker computer 
backgrounds than the young enlisted soldiers.‟ Contrary to the beliefs of many, we found this statement was invalid. 
Just the opposite was typically the case.” 
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In this paragraph, Stouffer not only identifies one of his audiences, but also suggests the value of 
The American Soldier (and the American soldier) as a resource for historians, and even hints at a 
line of historical inquiry. How have historians responded? 
 Historical response to The American Soldier has been mixed to be sure, and defies neat, 
categorical classifications. That it has left its mark on historiography and remains a landmark 
work is beyond doubt, but the use, or lack of use, historians have put it to has varied over the 
decades after its publication. Sometimes they use it without knowing it, sometimes they 
reference it as a scholarly, reflexive genuflect to a landmark work, and sometimes they analyze it 
in detail. Few have looked behind The American Soldier to the sources and archives which 
describe its making. Others, as did Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., have consigned it to the realm of 
bureaucratic, statistical, inhuman explication of “common sense,” unworthy of inclusion in a 
humanist academic discipline. 
 Although some historians have been uninterested in or dismissive of The American 
Soldier, Stouffer was clearly interested in historians and their work. In the spring of 1948, one of 
Stouffer‟s wartime colleagues, Celia Gibeaux, let him know that the first volume of the Army‟s 
official history of World War II was available for purchase. Three days later, Stouffer ordered 
the book from the US Government Printing Office. The volume included a partial description of 
demobilization planning, of which Stouffer‟s Research Branch was an important part. Research 
Branch operations, then, were written into history even before publication of The American 
Soldier. The Army‟s official history of World War II, commonly known as the “Greenbooks” 
after the color of their covers, is to historians of the Second World War what the Official Records 
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of the War of the Rebellion (OR) is to Civil War historians - a landmark, indispensable 
resource.
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 The American Soldier echoes and reverberates in historical literature in ways that are also 
much more subtle. In his masterful That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the 
American Historical Profession, historian Peter Novick described the state of historians‟ salaries 
in the early to middle part of the twentieth century: “The sense of relative deprivation was 
furthered by the decline between 1890 and 1940 in the ratio between average academic salary 
and that of the unskilled laborer from more than 5:1 to less than 2:1.” One cannot know whether 
Novick, publishing in 1988, knew the idea of relative deprivation came from The American 
Soldier. Whether or not he knew, he used the term without definition (other than context), 
assuming that his readers - mostly other historians - would understand a major sociological 
theory. One of the ideas from Research Branch has entered common academic discourse.
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 Novick also engaged in a lively discussion of the atmosphere of the post-World War II 
historical profession. A debate was raging among historians at the time about the value, or lack 
thereof, of the empirical approach to history. “Postwar sociology and political science, not to 
mention economics, Novick wrote, “were in their most hyperempiricist period,” and 
  a handful of aggressive promoters of social scientific history, most 
  prominently Lee Benson…made far reaching claims for the fruits 
  historians could reap from the codification of systematic procedures 
  drawn from the social sciences….But Carl Bridenbaugh inveighed 
  against those who would „worship at the shrine of that bitch - goddess 
  QUANTIFICATION.‟ And Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. insisted that „Almost 
  all important questions are important precisely because they are not 
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  susceptible to quantitative answers.”336 
  
Schlesinger had an almost visceral negative reaction to the quantitative data in The American 
Soldier. He remained unconvinced by Stouffer‟s inclusion in the volumes of a considerable 
amount of anecdotal information, as well as Stouffer‟s argument that Joseph Conrad‟s 
description of a hurricane was just as important for historical understanding as barometric 
pressure readings. 
 Still, many historians have embraced Stouffer‟s work as critical to their own. Few 
historians writing about American soldiers in the Second World War fail to include The 
American Soldier in their bibliographies, and some have found it critical to their arguments about 
the identity of World War II G.I.‟s. Among these are Lee Kennett (G.I: The American Soldier in 
World War II), Gerald F. Lindermann (The World Within War: America‟s Combat Experience in 
World War II), and Michael D. Doubler (Closing with the Enemy: How G.I.‟s Fought the War in 
Europe, 1944-1945). Perhaps more significantly, Sir John Keegan, one of the world‟s foremost 
historians, included The American Soldier in the bibliography of his landmark The Face of 
Battle. This book, more than any other in the twentieth century, directed the attention of military 
historians away from general officers and maneuver, and on to soldiers and their behavior. If one 
recognizes that attitudes often govern behavior, the next stop for the historian of American 
soldiers in World War II is The American Soldier.
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 Stouffer and The American Soldier normally do not appear in general reference history 
books about the military, warfare, or the Second World War, although he is mentioned under the 
heading of “Combat Effectiveness” in The Oxford Companion to American Military History.338 
Close by in the same entry appears a much more recognizable name, that of Army historian
339
 
S.L.A. Marshall, described by the Oxford Companion as “a persuasive, self-promoting reserve 
officer who wrote convincingly if controversially of his after-action interviews with infantry 
units.” Marshall published in 1947 a fabulously popular book which held the US Army in virtual 
thrall for the next thirty years - Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future 
War. In it, he proceeded from a polemic against the folly of atomic reliance to the ostensible 
thesis of the work; that only twenty-five percent of American Infantrymen fired their weapons in 
combat during World War II. The remainder is his interpretation of the behavior of American 
Infantrymen in combat. Although not the first man in modern times to recreate battle experience 
through after-action reports, he gives only a slight nod to the man who was (Ardant du Picq in 
Etudes Sur Le Combat). Marshall‟s was a nationalist interpretation; he claimed that American 
society‟s superior superego stayed the trigger finger. The low ratio of fire was in fact attributable 
to more practical considerations: The man who fires exposes himself to fire, and what happens if 
to him if he fires, kills, and is later captured? In short, fear. 
340
 
Marshall did prove that he could distill some generalities of combat from those specifics 
relating only to one incident, yet his points of departure were deliberately flawed to help him 
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make his argument. He is included here because of his influence on the American officer corps, 
where his ideas were accepted without any deep analysis - largely because Marshall traded on his 
own soldierly identity as a combat veteran of World War I. His was an official song of praise to 
the superior Judeo-Christian ethic of the American soldier, and he is still widely read and 
discussed in Army professional schools. Marshall is also notable for what he does not say - the 
logic of his position necessarily delimits neuropsychiatric casualties from occurring at all. Most 
important for the purposes of this study, it is possible that The American Soldier did not have a 
greater affect on the Army, or at least on the average line officer, because Men Against Fire did. 
The later was published two years before the two-volume, 1,274 page The American Soldier, and 
at a breathlessly paced 215 pages, Men Against Fire was and remains just the kind of book which 
appeals to busy, bottom-line oriented officers. Additionally, Men Against Fire found its way onto 
service school reading lists, while The American Soldier did not, and sociologist C. Wright Mills 
found Men Against Fire “of greater substantive worth than The American Soldier.341 The same 
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Fire was succeeded in its wild popularity among Army officers and others in 1995 by Lieutenant Colonel Dave 
Grossman‟s On Killing. Grossman is often quoted and referenced in military and psychological circles, as well as in 
the popular press, and he bases many of his arguments on Marshall‟s Men Against Fire. While he also referenced 
The American Soldier,  he does so only on four pages of On Killing, while Marshall‟s work garnered twenty-one 
pages. Grossman also mistakenly cites five volumes of The American Soldier, of which there are only two, although 
he could have been forgiven for assuming four, as the last two volumes of Studies on Social Psychology in World 
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would not have made statements in On Killing such as “no one has looked into the specific nature of the act of 
killing,” (p. xiii) which Stouffer and Research Branch had looked at in detail and reported faithfully in The 
American Soldier. The picture Stouffer presented was a complex one, resistant to generalization. In July 2009, The 
New Yorker published “The Kill Company: Did a Colonel‟s Fiery Rhetoric Set the Conditions for a Massacre?” by 
Raffi Khatchadourian. The piece explored the murder of three detainees by American soldiers in Iraq in May of 
2006. Khatchadourian reported that the brigade commander of the unit involved had purchased and distributed 
copies of On Killing to his brigade. Grossman‟s premise is simple enough: Humans are hard-wired to resist killing. 
But “with the proper conditioning and the proper circumstances, it appears that almost anyone can and will kill.” (p. 
4). The brigade commander seems to have taken that idea to heart, and did his best to condition his men to kill, 
while also reminding them of the laws of land warfare. In the event of the murder, Grossman‟s simple argument 
broke down. Khatchadourian noted that an Iraqi had used a baby as a human shield shortly before the murder, and 
quoted Grossman: “If the [women and children] become threatened…the psychology of battle changes from one of 
carefully controlled ceremonial combat among males to the unconstrained ferocity of an animal who is defending its 
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dynamic may apply to historians, who generally have given Marshall greater play than Stouffer. 
Historians tend to read the work of other historians, and Marshall held that title, while Stouffer 
did not. Still, wise historians have taken Marshall with a grain of salt. Keegan gave him 
considerable praise in The Face of Battle, but also noted the glibness of Marshall‟s arguments: 
“They are arguments of which the academic historian, trained not to simplify but to portray the 
complexity of human affairs, ought to beware.” Keegan‟s instincts were correct. A dozen years 
after he wrote these words, historian Roger Spiller uncovered and published evidence that 
Marshall had essentially cooked his numbers.
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den.” Grossman‟s formula does not account for the soldier who refused to take part in the murder, nor does it 
account for several other soldiers in the unit who had refused to kill in similar circumstances, but who had no 
problem killing in others. Grossman dismisses arguments that Marshall‟s work - upon which he bases his own - does 
not meet scholarly standards, and notes that his own work is based on a five year program of research, yet one 
searches On Killing in vain for a research model, experiments, guiding methodology, or statistically significant data 
that he did not borrow from others. He also claims the triad identity of soldier, scientist, and historian, although his 
highest degree is an M.Ed in counseling psychology. Had he undergone the academic rigor of the traditional 
historian and scientist, he most likely would not have overlooked the four year, 500,000 man study summarized in 
The American Soldier, which paints a much more complex and therefore more realistic picture of soldiers and 
killing. It is difficult to imagine General Marshall turning to him for advice, as he did to Stouffer. Grossman now 
runs the “Killology Research Group.” (Dave Grossman. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in 
War and Society. New York: Little, Brown, 1995. Raffi Khatchadourian. “The Kill Company: Did a Colonel‟s Fiery 
Rhetoric Set the Conditions for a Massacre?” The New Yorker, July 6 & 13, 2009. 40-59). C. Wright Mills. The 
Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  53-54. 
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 The American Soldier has proven significantly flexible (or has been bent far enough by 
historians), to be listed in the bibliographies of those who write heroic versions of the war as well 
as those whose work attempts to de-romanticize World War II, and to be left out of books about 
the war altogether. One will find it listed and referenced in G.I. hagiographer John C. McManus‟ 
The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II, as well as in Michael 
C.C. Adams‟ ironically titled The Best War Ever: America and World War II. And Stouffer 
makes no appearance at all in three of the best history books about the attitudes and behavior of 
G.I.‟s in World War II, though none were written by historians: Paul Fussell‟s Wartime: 
Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War, John Glenn Gray‟s The Warriors: 
Reflections on Men in Battle, and Eugene B. Sledge‟s With the Old Breed at Peleliu and 
Okinawa.
343
 Pete Maslowski found The American Soldier useful in 1970 for a journal article 
about Civil War Soldiers, and Benjamin Alpers found it indispensable to his 1998 article on the 
democratic US Army in World War II.
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 Stouffer and The American Soldier have proven perhaps most invaluable to social, rather 
than military historians, and it is they who have put both the man and his work to their best use. 
Sometimes these historians explore issues related to the war, such as William M. Tuttle, Jr. in 
Daddy‟s Gone to War: The Second World War in the Lives of America‟s Children. More often, 
they are looking directly at social science and the history of sociology, psychology, and survey 
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research. Since its publication in 1987, Jean Converse‟s Survey Research in the United States: 
Roots and Emergence, 1890 - 1960 has become somewhat of a bible in this area of study, and as 
Converse‟s periodization runs almost congruently with Stouffer‟s life, he is a leading member of 
her dramatis personae, and Research Branch and The American Soldier are key to her work. 
(Converse is more properly by training a sociologist rather than an historian. However, as Survey 
Research has had such a major influence on both disciplines, it is proper to include her among 
historians). Converse‟s Survey Research was preceded by John Madge‟s The Origins of 
Scientific Sociology, (1962) also a landmark work, which includes a chapter entitled “Social 
Science and the Soldier” - almost wholly devoted to Research Branch and The American 
Soldier.
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 In 1967, Northwestern University professor of history Robert Wiebe published an inquiry 
into the institutionalization and organization of the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The Search for Order, 1877-1920 touched off a flurry of interest - mostly 
from intellectual and social historians - in American modes of thought, the transfer of ideas, and 
the people and institutions which housed, developed, and propagated those ideas.
346
 Wiebe, 
ending his inquiry at 1920, while Stouffer was still and undergraduate, does not mention him. It 
is difficult, however, to find an historian who Wiebe inspired that does not. And while it would 
be impossible here to list all or even a majority of the works influenced by Stouffer and his 
World War II labors, a few of the more recent works will help in giving one a sense of Stouffer‟s 
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historical legacy, relevance, and the scope of his influence - as reflected in their titles and 
publication dates: 
 Ellen Condliffe Lagemann The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, 
 Philanthropy, and Public Policy, (1989). 
 
 Ellen Hermann. The Romance of American Psychology. Political Culture in the Age of 
 Experts, (1995). 
 
 J. Michael Sproule. Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media 
 and Mass Persuasion, (1997). 
 
 James H. Capshew. Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional 
 Identity in America, 1929-1969, (1999). 
 
 Christopher S. DeRosa. Political Indoctrination in the U.S. Army from World War II to 
 the Vietnam War, (2006). 
 
 Sarah E. Igo. The Averaged American. Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass 
 Public, (2007). 
 
 David Paul Haney. The Americanization of Social Science: Intellectuals and Public 
 Responsibility in the Postwar United States, (2008). 
 
 David H. Price. Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American 
 Anthropology in the Second World War, (2008).
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 In short, historians, much as they do with any source, take Stouffer and The American 
Soldier as they find them, do not find them at all, find them and choose not to use them, employ 
them selectively to make their arguments, or embrace them as an invaluable resource in 
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understanding American society and its Army in World War II - as many historians have done. 
There is no denying that The American Soldier is a yardstick of sorts, by which works on 
American soldiers in World War II and works on sociology, psychology, and survey research are 
often measured. Historian Richard H. Kohn described it in 1981 as “the most famous study ever 
done on American enlisted men,” based as it was “on extensive interviews with the troops during 
World War II and the product of sophisticated analysis by a team of outstanding scholars.”348 
Few studies of American soldiers in the Second World War are completely credible without at 
least some grounding in The American Soldier, and readers picking up any work on American 
soldiers in that war would do well to check the bibliography for Stouffer and The American 
Soldier.  
 Stouffer‟s third specified audience was social psychologists and sociologists: “This is the 
main audience to which these books are addressed,” he wrote. “The study of personal and 
institutional adjustment to new social situations may be stimulated both by the findings in these 
volumes and their shortcomings.”349 And sociologists and social psychologists have indeed 
shown a keen and enduring interest in The American Soldier. It signals for them more than an 
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indicator of their importance and influence. They also see in it the methods and influence of 
survey research, the relationship during the war between the government and their discipline, 
some nascent theory such as relative deprivation, and a host of lines of inquiry which it began. It 
also can be credited with starting an entire new subfield - military sociology. 
 In 1999, sociologists T.P Schwartz and Robert M. Marsh published “The American 
Soldier Studies of World War II: A 50
th
 Anniversary Commemorative” in the Journal of 
Political and Military Sociology. While they recognized the value of The American Soldier, they 
also commented that it had been somewhat neglected. According to Schwartz and Marsh, by 
1999, The American Soldier had become, even in sociological circles, a work that was more 
known about rather than known - the fate of many a classic. 
  1999 marks the 50
th
 anniversary of the publication of The American 
  Soldier, a book in four volumes that has been called one of the 
  most influential social science studies during this century and the 
  beginning of empirical studies in military sociology. And yet, its  
  actual findings, about social relations between officers and enlisted 
  personnel, Blacks and Whites, combat veterans and raw recruits, and 
  many other topics, seem to be neglected in contemporary social 
  science. 
  
 Schwartz and Marsh went on to highlight some of the more enduring and provocative 
findings in The American Soldier, to include contextual impact on attitude and behavior, 
reference groups and relative deprivation, the complex dynamics of mass media, the interaction 
of social structure and military morale, cohesion and performance, the findings related to fear, 
hostility, and aggression, and the power of peer groups. Hoping that their essay would encourage 
“more social scientists, in the U.S. and abroad, to build upon its monumental achievements,” 
Schwartz and Marsh also highlighted some of the counterintuitive findings in The American 
Soldier, and observed that perhaps the reason the volumes had fell somewhat into disuse was that 
“they are not codified or summarized according to an over-arching theoretical framework,” and 
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that “despite its simple and clear language, its many empirical findings are mired deep within 
long and descriptive paragraphs that are dispersed throughout the four large and weighty 
volumes that constitute TAS.” 
 Such an analysis borrows much, and reasonably so, from the reviews of The American 
Soldier which followed its publication in 1949. Chief among the complaints were a lack of 
theory set into an easily accessible structure and the length of the work, which many found, and 
still find, somewhat daunting. It also borrows, not insignificantly, from Stouffer himself, who 
stated repeatedly and emphatically that The American Soldier was designed neither to provide 
theory nor to be an easy read, but was instead a “mine of data,” meant to stimulate further 
research. The American Soldier, in short, makes no argument. It presents evidence and largely 
leaves conclusions to the beholder. It is a product of social engineering during a war of national 
survival, and its pretensions to anything other than evidence from which others could build 
arguments are limited. Schwartz and March quote John Clausen, a member of Research Branch, 
who underlined Stouffer‟s emphasis: “The Research Branch was not established to advance 
social science research.” But they also quote another Research Branch alumnus, Robin Williams, 
Jr., who explains succinctly the enduring value of The American Soldier: “Many of the ideas and 
analyses of The American Soldier seem now to have diffused into the general culture of social 
science. In the process, the shipping tags often are lost. But the important fact is that permanent 
additions to our knowledge have remained.”350 One of these permanent additions was the journal 
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in which Schwartz and Marsh wrote, for the work of Research Branch was instrumental in 
establishing military sociology as a sub-field of their discipline. 
 The diffusion to which Williams referred was evident during the war, and even moreso 
immediately afterward, when sociologists had a chance to catch their breaths and reflect on what 
World War II had brought to their discipline. Over the next half century they would, many of 
them, publish prolifically, and whether or not their subjects dealt specifically with The American 
Soldier, their experience during the war affected them for their entire careers, and in turn 
affected their discipline. “It was” as Williams remembered sixty years later, “the Experience of a 
20
th
 Century lifetime.” Most of the participants in Research Branch agreed with Williams. 
Seventy-five percent of twenty-four of them surveyed in the early 1980‟s by Research Branch 
alumnus John A. Clausen reported the experience as having a significant influence on their 
careers.
351
 Nor did interest in The American Soldier confine itself simply to those who had been 
members of or consulted with Research Branch. Other sociologists were keenly interested in 
what had been learned during the war. 
 In March 1946, the entire issue of The American Journal of Sociology was devoted to 
matters military, with World War II providing the primary body of evidence. Entitled “Human 
                                                                                                                                                             
Williams, sixty years after the fact, remembered his service with Research Branch as a patriotic effort for the nation 
as well as a way to further the influence of sociology. “On the zeitgeist level, I think a main factor was our 
conviction that WWII was both a necessary and a just war. We saw our work as a direct contribution to that effort 
and we were determined to prove - in the face of much skepticism and downright hostility - that social science had 
something important to contribute. On the personal-social level, we were a gang of enthusiastic (close to fanatical)   
collaborations [sic], arguing furiously, taking risks, and (unknowingly) forging lifetime bonds of respect and 
friendship. It was the Experience of a 20
th
 Century lifetime.” (Robin M. Williams, Jr. to the author, October 13, 
2003). 
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 John A. Clausen. “The American Soldier as a Career Contingency.” Social Psychology Quarterly, vol. 
47, no. 2 (June 1984): 207-213. (210). Among the comments from Research Branch alumni in Clausen‟s survey: 
“The Research Branch was a high grade university for me.” “Influenced me to become an expert in research design 
and analysis.”  “Because I worked with Carl Hovland, my experience probably sealed my fate as becoming 
permanent faculty at Yale.” “Gave me direct experience with field research - made a social psychologist out of me.” 
“I learned technical skills…I formed lifelong friendships (and professional ties with the brightest and best social 
scientists of my generation). I learned data analysis from Stouffer and I was caught up in the enthusiasm of the entire 
staff for doing high quality work on subjects of importance.” “Contact with Sam Stouffer and an amazingly capable 
staff was a priceless post-graduate experience which could not have been duplicated in an academic milieu.” 
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Behavior in Military Society,”  the issue included essays on “Group Psychotherapy of Military 
Offenders,”  “Informal Social Organization in the Army,” “The Making of the Infantryman,” 
“Characteristics of Military Society” “Aggressiveness in Military Training,” “Research on 
Veterans Adjustment,” and several others. The editors noted that “So far, very little has been 
published on the social psychology of the soldier,” and what had been published had by written 
“almost solely by professional writers, by veterans with a flair for the dramatic, by journalists, 
and by cartoonists.” They felt it was time for sociologists to write about a subject of considerable 
importance: “This issue of The Journal of American Sociology is devoted to the social 
psychology of military life. It is an attempt to describe and interpret a central phenomenon of 
wartime: the transformation of the civilian into the fighting man. This gigantic demonstration of 
the vast remaking of human nature constitutes, for the various sciences of human behavior, a 
research challenge of the first magnitude.” The editors also prefigured Stouffer and The 
American Soldier in their approach and goals: “The papers in this symposium are admittedly 
exploratory and their conclusions are tentative….The papers are presented to throw light on a 
neglected but important area of human experience and to stimulate interest in further and more 
systematic research.” And although The American Soldier was still three years from publication, 
one of the contributors, Arnold Rose, was an alumnus of Research Branch. His essay considered 
“The Social Structure of the Army.”352 
 Rose‟s article was one of the first of many from those who had worked in or with 
Research Branch. A small sampling includes Robin M. Williams, Jr. “Some Observations on 
Sociological Research in Government during World War II” (1946) “Field Observations and 
Surveys in Combat Zones” (1984), and “The American Soldier: An Assessment, Several Wars 
Later” (1989). M. Brewster Smith contributed “The American Soldier and Its Critics: What 
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survives the Attack on Positivism?” (1984), and John Clausen wrote “Research on The American 
Soldier as a Career Contingency,” (1984). The last two essays, along with Williams‟ “Field 
Observations” an essay by Arthur Lumsdaine “Mass Communication Experiments in Wartime 
and Thereafter” and an introduction by John Clausen were part of a social psychology 
symposium entitled “The American Soldier and Social Psychology,” given at the annual meeting 
of the American Sociological Association in 1983, and printed in Social Psychology Quarterly in 
1984. Lumsdaine was a member of Research Branch, and though not an author of The American 
Soldier proper, was one of three authors (the other two were Carl I. Hovland and Fred T. 
Sheffield) of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volume III: Experiments on Mass 
Communication.
 353
 
 Publication of The American Soldier in 1949 resulted, and in short order, in a symposium 
on the work which described it as “a body of empirical findings that push forward on several 
frontiers of social psychology and sociology.” The hosts, sociologists Robert K. Merton and Paul 
F. Lazarsfeld, sought in the symposium, “to explore the nature of the social science terrain that 
has been opened up.” The papers of the symposium were published in book form in 1950 as 
Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of “The American Soldier,” 
and included essays by Edward A. Shils, “The Primary Group in the American Army” Robert K. 
Merton and Alice Kitt, “Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior,” Hans Speier 
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“‟The American Soldier‟ and the Sociology of Military Organization,” Patricia L. Kendall and 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld “Problems of Survey Analysis,” Samuel A. Stouffer “Some Afterthoughts of a 
Contributor to „The American Soldier,‟” and Daniel Lerner, “‟The American Soldier‟ and the 
Public.”354  
 While running the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard, Stouffer himself wrote 
extensively and published eclectically in the years after the Second World War, and while some 
of his essays and articles dealt directly with Research Branch and their activities, many reached 
beyond that specific experience. For Scientific Monthly he wrote “Government and the 
Measurement of Opinion” (1946), for American Sociological Review “An Analysis of 
Conflicting Social Norms” (1949), and for The American Journal of Sociology “Some 
Observations on Study Design” (1950), to name just a few. In 1954 he published in The Public 
Opinion Quarterly “1665 and 1954,” his presidential address to the American Association of 
Public Opinion Research.
355
 The address deftly compared and contrasted the plague of the 
seventeenth century with the atomic threat of the twentieth, including the excesses of 
McCarthyism. Stouffer told his audience that social scientists were key to understanding the 
human condition and offering assistance to policy makers, but that much work had yet to be 
done. “Psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, and even economics,” he said, 
“are still in their infancy. The few thousand research studies a year published in all these fields 
are a mere handful as compared with the researches indexed annually in physics, biology, and 
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chemistry. Some of us grossly under-estimate the time and sweat and money required to test a 
hypothesis in social science.”356 Stouffer‟s drive and exhortations to his colleagues for additional 
achievement in the social sciences were a significant part of his legacy. 
 Stouffer used his year as President of the American Sociological Association (1953) to 
stress the need for scientific approaches to sociology, and to guide young sociologists just 
beginning their careers. His presidential address, delivered at Berkeley that year and later printed 
in the American Sociological Review, was entitled “Measurement in Sociology.” He asked his 
audience “Why should not we, as sociologists, take an explicit look at the process of invention in 
the discipline of sociology itself, as a special case of the general working of invention in 
technology and science?” He then went on to explain that invention is not solely a process of 
gadgetry, and that culture -“the readiness to see” - was just as important: 
  A central proposition in the theory of inventions is the postulate that an 
  invention in technology or science ordinarily is not a discovery like an 
  uncharted island emerging from the Pacific mist before the eyes of a 
  Captain Cook, but rather is a long process of juxtaposing, in new 
  combinations, complexes of elements all or most of which are already 
  well known. Among the obvious conditions for such a new juxtaposition 
  are readiness to see if it happens and the technical possibilities of 
  seeing it. 
 
 Stouffer‟s message was that sociologists were in the best position to be prepared to see, 
and that they therefore should become the innovative, scientific thinkers of the future: 
  I think that many, if not all, of the necessary ingredients are now present 
  in our sociological culture. The ingredients are highly complex collections 
  of ideas, of recorded experience, and of research techniques, some of them 
  mathematical. Who will put these ingredients together in sociology? Not 
  the philosopher, speculating in his arm chair. Not the sensitive artist, 
  watching human activity with a dramatist‟s eye. Not the statistician who 
  is solely concerned with making a better probability model or measuring 
  device. Rather, the sociologist who combines several of these skills in his 
  own head, or the small sociological team which brings a few specialists  
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  together in a concerted enterprise.
357
 
 
 Stouffer also included in the ASA meeting for 1953 pre-recorded messages from each of 
the ex-presidents of the ASA. He had asked them to answer, for new members, the question 
“What are the best words of counsel you can give to a young Ph.D. just launching his or her 
sociological career?” In addressing the future and his younger colleagues, Stouffer demonstrated 
clear interest in his influence and legacy for his profession.
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 Stouffer also assisted a new generation of sociologists in their studies of the military. A 
few years before Morris Janowitz published The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political 
Portrait, (1960), he was asking Stouffer assist him with a bulletin he was writing for a Russell 
Sage Foundation series on sociology in military organizations. “The idea behind it,” Janowitz 
wrote to Stouffer, “apparently is for me to write a brief overview of what has been done and how 
sociology might relate itself to the problems of changing military organization.” Stouffer 
consented to serve on Janowitz‟s advisory committee, and Janowitz sent him the bulletin 
manuscript with a request that he “mark up the manuscript, or tell me about your reactions.”  
Janowitz would go on to found and preside for twenty-two years over the Inter-University 
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), a direct result of his work with Russell Sage and 
Stouffer.
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 Stouffer‟s assistance to sociologists and other scholars continued well after The American 
Soldier and long after his death. Few sociologists who write on the military (and some who write 
on other subjects) have not consulted The American Soldier. A small sampling of such writings 
in scholarly journals includes David N. Solomon‟s “Sociological Research in the Military” 
(1954),  Charles C. Moskos, Jr.‟s “Racial Integration in the Armed Forces” (1966), Segal, Lynch 
and Blairs‟ “The Changing American Soldier: Work-Related Attitudes of U.S. Army Personnel 
in World War II and the 1970s” (1979), William H. Sewell‟s “Some Reflections on the Golden 
Age of Interdisciplinary Social Psychology” (1989), and Guy L. Siebold‟s “Core Issues and 
Theory in Military Sociology” (2001). Considering the scope of The American Soldier, it would 
be a brave scholar indeed who wrote about or taught modern military sociology without Stouffer 
in their bibliographies and syllabi.
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 Stouffer‟s major work subsequent to The American Soldier confirmed his legacy in 
sociology. In addition to his influence as the director of the Laboratory of Social Relations at 
Harvard and his publications in professional journals, he published in 1955 what many believe to 
be his most influential work - Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross Section of 
the Nation Speaks Its Mind. Again using survey research, Stouffer demonstrated that the average 
American was much less concerned with communism than the demagogue Senator Joseph 
McCarthy wanted people to believe. For his pains, Stouffer received special attention from J. 
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Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and had to show cause to retain his 
security clearance - a case he won. Having recovered from McCarthyism, in the months 
immediately before his death Stouffer turned his attention to population studies.
361
 
 Stouffer‟s death in 1960 prompted the publication of a collection of some of his essays, 
Social Research to Test Ideas, (1962) and additional articles, to include Phillip Hauser‟s “On 
Stouffer‟s Social Research to Test Ideas”(1962), and Herbert H. Hyman‟s “Samuel A. Stouffer 
and Social Research” (1962). Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties was reprinted in 
1992, and remains a classic in survey research along with The American Soldier. Stouffer was 
also honored with a chapter on his life and work in The Lives of Harvard Scholars in 1968.
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 Sociologists have written their own history of their profession, and few of them have left 
Stouffer out. A sampling includes Andrew Abbott‟s Department and Discipline: Chicago 
Sociology at One Hundred (1999): “Samuel Stouffer, the leader of the modern survey 
researchers, believed that only modern survey analysis could produce the building blocks of a 
discipline.”  Martin Bulmer‟s The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, 
and the Rise of Sociological Research (1984): “Ogburn‟s most brilliant and distinguished student 
was Samuel Stouffer….Stouffer is so much identified with The American Soldier and his later 
career at Harvard that his graduate origins at Chicago are frequently overlooked.” Herbert H. 
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Hyman‟s Taking Society‟s Measure: A Personal History of Survey Research (1991) includes an 
entire chapter on “Stouffer‟s Surveys: Research Branch of the War Department.” Merton and 
Riley‟s Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation: Glimpses of the American 
Experience (1980) includes an essay by Jackson Toby entitled “Samuel A. Stouffer: Social 
Research as a Calling.” Jennifer Platt‟s A History of Sociological Research Methods in America, 
1920-1960 (1996): “The work done [by Stouffer and Research Branch] had high disciplinary 
prestige, cemented by the publication of the American Soldier volumes. Modern survey method 
had in effect been created, and was both institutionalised in the survey research units now in 
universities and theorised in the spate of publications on method which followed.”  And when the 
American Sociological Association celebrated its centennial with Craig Calhoun‟s Sociology in 
America: A History, (2007), they were careful to include considerable information on Stouffer, 
Research Branch, and The American Soldier.
363
 Stouffer also may be found in both the Oxford 
Dictionary of Sociology and the Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology. 
 Stouffer‟s influence on sociologists, as well as historians and the military, seems clear, 
and would doubtless lead him to some satisfaction that he reached his intended audiences. There 
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were, however, three additional audiences which were keen to know what Stouffer had 
discovered about survey research: businessmen, government, and pollsters. Seemingly everyone 
wanted Stouffer‟s judgments on how to analyze attitudes and opinions, from Standard Oil to 
Elmo Roper.
364
 
 A few months after the war, the National Research Council and the Social Science 
Research Council formed the joint “Committee on Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and 
Consumer Wants,” for the purpose of “promoting the exchange of information and experience 
among workers in business, government, and the universities who are facing similar problems in 
developing increasingly efficient methods of measurement.” Stouffer was named chairman, and 
Princeton mathematics professor Samuel S. Wilkes vice-chairman. The executive committee 
included Frank Stanton who would within a year be named president of the Columbia 
Broadcasting System
365
 and Research Branch consultant Rensis Likert of the US Department of 
Agriculture and creator of the Likert Scale for attitude measurement. Other members included 
pollsters George Gallup and Elmo Roper, Edward Battey of Compton Advertising, Walter 
Shewart of Bell Telephone, and Research Branch  alumni or consultants Paul Lazarsfeld of 
Columbia, Hadley Cantril of Princeton, Philip Hauser of the US Department of Commerce, and 
Carl Hovland of Yale. Of the eighteen total members, six, or fully one-third, had worked with 
Stouffer and Research Branch during the war.
366
 
                                                 
 
364
 The Papers of Samuel Andrew Stouffer. HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University Archives, Pusey Library, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
365
 Stanton and Stouffer had maintained close contact during the war. In mid-1942, Stouffer mooted 
Stanton to head Research Branch activities in Europe, but the combination of Stanton‟s duties as Director of 
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 In addition to his work with the Committee on Measurements, Stouffer was a member of 
the American Standards Association, the American Economic Association, the Population 
Association of America, the National Committee on Atomic Information, the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, the American Philosophical Association, Phi Betta Cappa, the 
American Statistical Association, the Sociological Research Association, the Institute of 
Mathematical Statistics, the Population Association of America, the Psychometric Association, 
and the Harvard and Cosmos clubs. He was also appointed to the Board of Syndics at Harvard, 
granted an honorary degree at Princeton, and in 1950 elected to the prestigious American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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 From positions such as these and several others, Stouffer fielded questions from business, 
government, and pollsters on who to hire and how best to measure and adjust the attitudes of 
consumers and voters. The American Association of Advertising Agencies invited him to speak 
to them on “developments in the social sciences and what they mean in relation to the 
development of advertising as a more useful force in our economic system.”368 The American 
Association for the Advancement of science extended a similar invitation for their centennial 
                                                                                                                                                             
Research for U.S. Army, 1942 - 1945, Box 2: Princeton University - Dr. K. Young. HUG (FP) 31.8. Harvard 
University Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA. Other members of the committee were F.G. Agnew, American 
Standards Association,  Archibald M. Crossley of Crossley, Inc.  (a New York market research firm), W. Edwards 
Deming, US Bureau of the Budget, Robert F. Elder, Lever Bros. Co. (Elder was an advertising consultant for the 
soap manufacturing firm), Darrel B. Lucas,  New York University professor of marketing, and C.L. Warwick, 
American Society for Testing Materials. 
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celebration. The Atomic Scientists of Chicago wanted a bulletin on the recent polls on Atomic 
Energy. The Committee for Mass Education in Race Relations of The American Film Center, 
Inc., wanted some of his wartime reports for a “program of films in race relations.” The head of 
listener research at the BBC wanted to talk to him. McCann-Erickson Advertising wanted him to 
see their research on teenagers and “their consumer habits.” Syracuse University wanted to know 
who to hire as a social statistician, and so on. Stouffer‟s papers contain correspondence from the 
White House, the US State Department, American Telephone & Telegraph, the Educational 
Testing Service, the Ford Foundation, General Motors, RCA, Kimberly Clark Corporation, the 
National Education Association, the Library of Congress, the Organization of American States, 
The University of Liverpool, the US Department of Commerce, International Business 
Machines, the National Broadcasting Company, the Lipton Tea Company, the NAACP, 
International Harvester,  Boeing, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, and so on. Who 
should we hire? Is our study sound? Will you consult for us? Will you speak/write/advocate/ 
review/listen/comment? Sometimes, retailers would conduct their own studies, and then refer 
them to Stouffer for comment. One of the more interesting of these was a detailed study by 
Schlitz in 1958 on the demographics, psychology, and preferences of American beer drinkers.
369
  
 Pollsters, in particular Elmo Roper, had been interested in Research Branch and its work 
well before the United States entered World War II. Osborn was corresponding with him in the 
fall of 1941, and two years later, when Roper read the second edition of “What the Soldier 
Thinks,” he wrote to Osborn with congratulations: “It seems to me you are amply demonstrating 
the great worth of public opinion research on a scale and for a purpose which we old 
practitioners had little chance to do. I think your job is a meritorious one, and everyone 
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connected with it should feel justly proud.” Osborn forwarded Roper‟s letter to Stouffer, and the 
two stayed in close contact for the remainder of their careers.
370
 In the final days of the war, 
summing up for Roper the major activities of Research Branch, Stouffer added, “no comment on 
our work would be complete without reference to the debt we owe, in particular, to you and 
Gallup, not only for personal help and encouragement from time to time, but also for the long 
accumulation of experience in your organization upon which we have so freely drawn, and for 
the training in civilian life which you gave to some of our key personnel.”371 In the postwar 
years, Roper would turn often to Stouffer to draw upon the latter‟s experience. Roper, in addition 
to working with Stouffer on the Committee on Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes, and 
Consumer Wants, asked for his advice on personnel hires, studied with him after the disastrous 
results of presidential election polling in 1948, employed him as a consultant for the 1956 
presidential election, and relied on his expertise as a colleague for professional conferences and 
panels.
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 In 1951, Stouffer acknowledged that his work with Research Branch had applicability 
beyond his stated three audiences in The American Soldier. In an NBC radio discussion for the 
University of Chicago Roundtable, Robert K. Merton asked him “what did all this research work 
amount to?” Stouffer replied: 
  It is a little hard to say. I am probably a biased witness on the subject, 
  but I am inclined to think that the kind of research we did in the army 
  has been proved to be applicable to industry and to education, and that 
  it will help make democracy work more efficiently. Of course, there 
  are skeptics about the kinds of things we did. One of the most interesting 
  skeptics reared his head just the other day when Red Star, the official 
  journal of the Soviet army, paid us the compliment of saying that in 
  serving our bourgeois masters we were doing very ridiculous things for   
  democracy. I am a little proud of that review.
373
 
 
 Stouffer as a professional and a human being had an influence also on those in his 
immediate orbit. But the most important legacy of Stouffer is his contribution to survey research. 
The reflex to dig through census records for demographic information and social conclusions 
was transformed into asking specific questions to answer specific problems - survey research - 
largely due to the efforts of Stouffer and the importance of Research Branch and The American 
Soldier.
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hue and cry, and few could forget, particularly writers, editors and readers of the Chicago Daily Tribune, the 
photograph of a triumphant Harry Truman holding up the headline from that paper “Dewey Defeats Truman.” 
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Chapter 8 
Reviews and Criticism of The American Soldier 
 
 
 Princeton University Press prepared for the release of The American Soldier as most 
publishers do - press releases, synopses, and descriptions of the scope and content of the work. 
This preparation was enough to gain the attention of the three constituencies most likely to have 
an interest in the work: soldiers, historians, and sociologists - Stouffer‟s audiences. These three 
groups tended to key on the same findings, and offered criticisms in the same areas. The findings 
which most interested them were the point system for redeployment at the conclusion of World 
War II, the problems with the Infantry, race relations, neuropsychiatric casualties, officer-
enlisted relations, primary groups, combat, selection and training of recruits and their subsequent 
classification and assignments, and the Air Corps. Their criticisms of The American Soldier 
included the length and complexity of the work, the obviousness of some of the findings, its lack 
of theory and the related complaint that the work was not real science, the idea that the surveys 
and The American Soldier itself was inimical to democracy, the charge that the work was nothing 
but an exercise in committee consensus and as a result was somewhat mechanical, and the 
accusation that the methods employed were inappropriate to the subject being studied. Charts I 
and II below highlight the major critics, the journals in which they wrote, and their interest in 
findings, as well as their specific criticisms: 
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Reviewer Journal P/N Point System Infantry Race Education NPs Off/Enl Rel Pri Gp Combat Sel/Tng Clas/Asgn Air Corps
Allport, G. Abnormal & Social Psych P X X X X X X X X
Blakely, H. Armed Force P X X X X
Demerath, N. Social Forces P/N X X X X X X
Dupuy, R. Christian Science Monitor N X X
Gavin, J. New York Times P X X X X X X X X X
Glazar, N. Commentary N X X X X
Hittle, J. US Navy Proceedings P X X X X X X X
Lazarsfeld, P. Public Opinion Quarterly P X X X X X X X X X
Lee, A. Annals of Pol & Soc Science N X X X X X X
Lynd, R. New Republic N X X X X X X
Murdock, G. Amer. Sociological Review P X X X X
Newhall, R. MS. Valley Hist. Review P X X X
Nye, W. Field Artillery Journal P X X X X X X
Reid, R. Negro History P X X X X X X X
Riley, J. Amer. Sociological Review P X X X X X
Ropp, T. South Atlantic Quarterly N X X
Shanas, E. Amer. Journal of Sociology N X X X X
Schlesinger, A. Jr. Partisan Review N X X X X
"V., G." Infantry Journal P X
Notes: P/N = positive or negative review (Demerath's is balanced).
Point System refers to the demobilization point system used to determine which soldiers would redeploy first.
Infantry refers to the major problems in maintaining infantry morale due to their high casualty rate.
Race refers to Black-White relations.
Education refers to educational levels and their affect on diverse aspects of soldier adjustment and performance.
NPs refers to Neuropsychiatric issues related to fear and adjustment to combat.
Off/Enl Rel refers to officer/enlisted relations as part of a hierarchical status system.
Pri Gp refers to primary groups and their affect on morale.
Combat refers to all issues related to combat.
Sel/Tng refers to issues of selection and training and Clas/Asgn refers to classification and assignment..
Air Corps refers to finding specific to the Air Corps.
Some reviewers went into detail regarding the findings, while others merely mentioned them. Mention garnered an X on the chart, even if the comment 
was as general as that of Alfred Lee's: "how they liked their assignments, how they reacted to the status system." (X for Clas/Asgn and X for Off/Enl Rel).
The full name of the journal in which Lee's review appears is Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
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Reviewer Journal P/N Long/Complex Obvious No/Weak Theory Not Real Science Harmful Committee Work Mechanical Method
Allport, G. Abnormal & Social Psych P X X
Blakely, H. Armed Force P X
Demerath, N. Social Forces P/N X X X
Dupuy, R. Christian Science Monitor N X X X
Gavin, J. New York Times P X
Glazar, N. Commentary N X X X X X
Hittle, J. US Navy Proceedings P
Lazarsfeld, P. Public Opinion Quarterly P X X
Lee, A. Annals of Pol & Soc Science N X X X X
Lynd, R. New Republic N X
Murdock, G. Amer. Sociological Review P
Newhall, R. MS. Valley Hist. Review P X
Nye, W. Field Artillery Journal P X
Reid, R. Negro History P X X
Riley, J. Amer. Sociological Review P
Ropp, T. South Atlantic Quarterly N X X
Shanas, E. Amer. Journal of Sociology N X X X
Schlesinger, A. Jr. Partisan Review N X X X X X
"V., G." Infantry Journal P X
P/N = positive or negative review. Demerath's review was balanced.
Long/Complex refers to the work being indegestible to the layman.
Obvious refers to findings that are "common sense."
No/Weak Theory refers to the absence of universal explanatory or predictive schema.
Not Real Science refers to clams that TAS  is masquerading as science.
Harful refers to the methods and findings of TAS as destructive of democracy through authoritarian social engineering, or misguiding sociologists.
Committee Work refers to the insidious effect of consensus upon scholarship.
Mechanical refers to suspicion of the IBM machines that tabulted the data for TAS  findings.
Method refers to suspicion of the constructs and or process of gathering and analyzing data for TAS.
The full name of the journal for which Lee reviewed TAS is Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
 
 Primacy of place for the military reviewers goes to Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, 
commander of the famed 82nd Airborne Division during the war. Writing in the New York 
Times, Gavin aptly titled his review “A Monumental Study of the Citizen Soldier in War,” and 
placed his finger on the reason Research Branch was created: “One of the most difficult 
command requirements in a democracy‟s army is that of reconciling the hardships of war with 
the personal needs of the citizens under arms.” He recognized the tension between the demands 
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of winning battles and the maintenance of troop morale, as well as the need for an organization 
such as Research Branch to keep commanders apprised of the attitudes of their soldiers. 
Although he noted that The American Soldier offered evidence that was “carefully examined and 
well presented,” he also observed that the information was “loosely organized at points and a bit 
given to mathematical explanations at times.” As did many other reviewers of The American 
Soldier, he offered a tacit request for a shorter, easier to read work.  
 As an officer himself, Gavin noted the with some regret the paucity of officer surveys 
conducted by Research Branch, and hinted at a desire for more hard theory rather than just 
evidence, “The authors put the question but offer no answer: „To what extent can it be assumed 
that the men of the United States Army were in fact willing to subordinate their personal aims to 
the goal of winning the war?‟” Sympathetic as he was to the work of Research Branch and to The 
American Soldier, Gavin‟s stars show in this comment: “Conducting the affairs of an army on 
the basis of a survey of the opinions of its members - admitting the interdependence of military 
efficiency and morale - is a dangerous luxury in our contemporary world.” Still, Gavin‟s review 
was overwhelmingly positive, and he praises The American Soldier as “unique in the history of 
war,” and “a monumental contribution to the science of making citizens of a free country win its 
wars.”375 
 Writing in the Field Artillery Journal, Colonel W. S. Nye leavened his largely positive 
review with a refrain common to most all of the military reviewers. Recognizing that the authors 
did not intend “to compile a report for popular consumption,” Nye wrote that “the material 
probably is not yet in a form usable by senior officers charged with making and implementing 
high-level decisions,” and that “the flow of professional jargon in the opening chapter is apt to 
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frighten away the casual lay reader.” Nye‟s analysis encompasses the tension between running an 
army on consensus and the impulse to understand soldiers and managing in particular the 
relationship between officers and enlisted men. “Anything,” he observed, “which can contribute 
to better leadership is worth exploring.” After reviewing some of the major findings in The 
American Soldier, among which he lists getting the job done rather than ideology as the prime 
motivator for soldiers, the control of fear, and the dynamics which led to the point system for 
redeployment, Nye concluded his review by registering some skepticism with the idea of 
determining the rightness of a policy based on its popularity.
376
 
 Identifying himself only as “G.V.,” the reviewer for Infantry Journal fairly gushed about 
The American Soldier, writing that the work done to gather the data that went into it is “an utter 
necessity for the future of every armed service.” The American Soldier, G.V. wrote, proved “that 
there is only one scientific way of discovering the true morale of troops.” Obviousness, intuition, 
and common sense are to G.V. the inadequate tools of the past. G.V. does not, however, 
recommend the book be read by “every leader,” because, like many other reviewers, he is put off 
by “the technical language of statistics.” G.V. longs for a shorter, better organized version of the 
book - an executive summary. “To the present material thus cut down and simplified should be 
added some brief suggestions of the best ways for leaders to use such information.” G.V. 
recommended that such a simplification be done by an “Army man” and a “social psychologist” 
working together. Their first task, G.V. stressed, would be to “set down their own biases as 
completely as possible,” because “bias with respect to military matters is apparent in more than 
one place in the present book.” The book that would come out of such a transparent 
collaboration, G.V. believed, should be “read by all students at schools at which leadership is 
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any part of the curriculum,” for “no book could be more convincing than a readable transfer into 
layman‟s language of the material this book…contains.”377 
 Reviewing for Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel (and military historian) J.D. Hittle found no fault with The American Soldier. The books 
to him “comprise what is probably the most comprehensive, scientific, and valuable study of the 
thoughts of combat personnel yet to appear in print.” And Hittle set the bar high, comparing The 
American Soldier favorably with Ardant Du Picq‟s classic Etudes Sur Le Combat.378 The 
American Soldier, Hittle wrote, served to “carry the study of the mind of the soldier far beyond 
Col. Du Picq‟s initial exploration of the subject….So extensive is the coverage of subject matter, 
that it is difficult to think of a military personnel question or problem that is not included 
somewhere in these two books.” Unlike G.V., the reviewer for Infantry Journal, Hittle saw no 
bias lurking in the shadows. “Unquestionably, one of the principal attributes of these books is the 
obvious objectivity of its authors.” Nor, unlike most of the other military reviewers, did Hittle 
pine for a shorter version of the work.
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 Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy‟s review for The Christian Science Monitor can only be 
described as bitter. He took issue not only with the length and complexity of The American 
Soldier, but also with its obviousness and lack of theory. Dupuy, like Hittle, invoked Ardant du 
Picq, but claimed that nothing more than du Picq was needed. Content to sojourn in the 19
th
 
Century, Dupuy wrote that “nothing in this work has not been set forth in one fashion or another 
by Col. Ardant du Picq.” Dupuy was content with du Picq‟s “theory” of soldiers in war, which 
rotated around the idea that the heart of man never changes, a conclusion “sadly lacking here [in 
The American Soldier].” The American Soldier was also to Dupuy a bit of a rat maze - 
“ponderous tomes” of “academic minutiae.” The only praise he could offer the work was that it 
was “an honest effort.”  He marvels that “the amazing point is that the writers evidently believe 
that they have made remarkable discoveries,” and lets his colonelcy show in the chagrin he 
demonstrated at not sharing the privileges of “the bestarred.” His criticisms were shared by 
several of the historians and sociologists who reviewed the work, but only the historian Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. approached his level of disdain for The American Soldier.
380
 
 The last of the military commentators discussed here is Major General H. W. Blakely, 
who reviewed The American Soldier for Armed Force. Blakely‟s only complaint, a now familiar 
refrain, was that The American Soldier was too long and complicated. “It is to be hoped that 
some experienced field soldier, blessed with time and intelligence, will condense the wealth of 
information in these volumes into a brief presentation.” While not, as some other reviewers did, 
charging the authors with bias, Blakely comes close in warning “these books must be approached 
with some care. The „main audience‟ [sociologists] talks a language of its own and has its special 
viewpoint.” Blakely separates his review into the sociologist and military viewpoints, and is 
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clearly not comfortable with some of the methodology used to produce The American Soldier. “It 
is easy to believe that some of the tables indicate conclusions that a detailed study of the text will 
prove not to be valid.” Still, and fairly, Blakely points out that some of these doubts may be 
“unjustified.” Blakely keyed on several of the findings in The American Soldier, but concludes 
that “the main value of these volumes, however, is in their study of the soldier during training 
and combat.” 
 Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. published the most acerbic of all the reviews of The 
American Soldier in the Partisan Review. Schlesinger was so caustic that Harvard psychologist 
Gordon Allport, wrote to his colleague Samuel Stouffer, “I can only say there is no vanity like 
that of historians. They feel „threatened‟ and hastily rearrange their feathers.”381 Schlesinger 
pulls no punches, challenging the value of The American Soldier with an ad hominem attack, 
“Sociology has whored after the natural sciences from the start.” He goes on to belittle the work 
as obvious, unscientific, mechanical, and the product of a committee employing bad 
methodology. Because the tone of Schlesinger‟s review is perhaps more significant than the 
content, quotation at length is appropriate: 
  Bursting onto university campuses after the war, overflowing with 
  portentous if vague hints of mighty wartime achievements (not,  
  alas, to be disclosed because of security), fanatical zeal and  
  shameless in their claims, they persuaded or panicked many 
  university administrations into giving their studies top priorities…. 
  The idea of research by committee, six men always being accounted 
  better than one and the responsibility being distributed like the 
  credit lists in a Hollywood film….Well, the social science machinery 
  has been grinding away for some years now….Most of The American 
  Soldier is a ponderous demonstration in Newspeak….Indeed, one can 
  find little in the 1200 pages of text and the innumerable surveys which 
                                                 
 
381
 Gordon W. Allport to Samuel A. Stouffer. Samuel Andrew Stouffer Correspondence 1946-50.Box 
,Correspondence: A - American Statistical Association - Programs for Sessions HUG (FP) 31.6. Harvard University 
Archives, Pusey Library, Cambridge, MA). 
 
 
241 
 
  is not described more vividly and compactly, and with far greater 
  psychological insight, in a small book entitled Up Front by Bill Mauldin. 
  What Mauldin may have missed will turn up in the pages of Ernie Pyle…. 
  The authors of The American Soldier show a sporadic and apprehensive 
  recognition of their lack of originality…. „Social science,‟ thus, does not 
  discover ; it systematizes through quantification and thereby places 
  knowledge on a truly „scientific‟ basis….The individual human experience 
  is supposed to vanish away in the whirl of punch cards and IBM 
  machines….As for history, the authors of The American Soldier have 
  almost achieved the tour-de-force of writing about the American in 
  World War II with practically no reference to the historical context 
  from which he came….Its practitioners are in the stage of alchemy, not 
  of chemistry. 
 
 Schlesinger allowed that the work was “harmless,” written with “modesty and clarity,” 
and acknowledges the usefulness of Research Branch to the Army. These, however, are the only 
words of praise he can muster.
382
 
 Robert D. Reid reviewed The American Soldier for The Journal of Negro History. Reid 
was one of the few reviewers to discuss the process which resulted in The American Soldier, 
namely the work of Research Branch during the war. “Complete cooperation did not always exist 
between policy makers and Research Branch. Much of the information was hastily compiled; 
some conclusions were reached from insufficient data, and there was hesitancy on occasions in 
making explicit recommendations.” Stouffer would have agreed with all of that, as he indicated 
in the first chapter of The American Soldier. Reid, after explaining some of the major findings in 
The American Soldier also, like many other reviewers, mentioned the length and complexity of 
the work. “It is the belief of this reviewer that the material in the volume could have been 
compressed into fewer pages by eliminating constant repetition,” he concluded. 
                                                 
 
382
 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. “The Statistical Soldier.” The Partisan Review vol. 16, no. 8 (August 1949): 852-
856. The American Soldier is not, as Schlesinger wrote, a-historical. Although Stouffer was primarily concerned 
with recording findings made during the Second World War, he goes to considerable lengths to seat the World War 
II G.I. historically - particularly with reference to the First World War and the interwar years. 
242 
 
 The Mississippi Valley Historical Review asked Richard A. Newhall to review The 
American Soldier. Newhall‟s only complaint was that the work was too obvious. “To the laymen 
they often seem to labor the obvious, and to give statistical proof for something already taken for 
granted by men with army experience.” As if he was writing directly to Schlesinger, however, 
Newhall also commented that “occasionally they suggest an optimism as to what may be 
possible with improved techniques in social science which a skeptical historian may not share.” 
Newhall seemed to understand the work better than many of his contemporaries. He recognized 
that the purpose of what Research Branch did during the war was “to turn reluctant civilians into 
effective soldiers quickly,” and that “the army was primarily an instrument for fighting a war and 
only incidentally a sociological laboratory.” In other words, Newhall seems to have actually read 
and understood the first chapter of The American Soldier, wherein Stouffer repeatedly makes 
these same points. 
 Duke University military history professor Theodore Ropp wrote The American Soldier 
review for The South Atlantic Quarterly, and described the work as “the record of one of the 
lesser victories of the war, that of the professional pollsters over an originally hostile and 
skeptical United States Army.” While he noted that “in their solemn documentation of the 
obvious, they are beyond belief” he also praised the authors for their “transparent honesty.” To 
Ropp, who like other reviewers took issue with some of Research Branch‟s methods, the authors 
of The American Soldier “amply proved one of their main contentions. It is possible to test a 
unit‟s morale and to find and correct some of the factors which seriously affect its combat 
efficiency.”383 
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 Among the sociologists (Stouffer‟s main audience), the most balanced review came from 
N. J. Demerath in Social Forces. Unlike Schlesinger, who said more could be gained from Bill 
Mauldin and Ernie Pyle than from The American Soldier, Demerath commented, “Much of the 
reading is as lively as Mauldin and Pyle, though much is necessarily tough going, too.” 
Demerath was tough on The American Soldier for weak theory and conceptualization - “One 
feels that even at this stage of our science, more might have been done with the data at hand” - 
length, complexity, and possibly unsuitable methodology, but he praised it for “imaginativeness, 
technical rigor, and important results.” He also noted that the book was “no mere rehash of 
Research Bureau [Branch] reports,” and judged the work “overpowering in its empirical reach 
and theoretic promise.” He ended his review with the salutary comment, “Social science is 
coming of age.”384 
 The American Sociological Review ran two reviews of The American Soldier, the first by 
John W. Riley, Jr., considered the first volume of The American Soldier, Adjustment during 
Army Life. The second, by George Peter Murdock, dealt with the second volume, Combat and Its 
Aftermath. Riley‟s review was overwhelmingly positive. One of the few reviewers who wrote 
directly about the authors, Riley characterized them as the top in their fields. “From this list, any 
university, starting from scratch, might easily select sociologists and social psychologists to form 
the strongest departments in these two fields.” He described The American Soldier as “one of the 
most significant publications in the social sciences during the last twenty years.” Riley was 
impressed with “the implications - for theory and methodology,” and implied that Research 
Branch had brought the Army and citizen-soldiers together: “The Army qua institution did adapt, 
and individuals qua soldiers did adjust.” Riley praised the methodology used by Research 
Branch and highlighted in The American Soldier, to include scaling techniques in constructing 
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questionnaires, the efficacy of relative deprivation, and the recognition of the significance of 
intervening variables as they relate to attitude formation. He was most impressed, however, with 
consistency, which the historian Robert Reid misconstrued as repetitiveness for its own sake. 
Riley also indicated that the work represented “a series of logically integrated monographs,” 
unlike some other reviewers, notably Ethel Shanas, who did not believe the individual chapters 
had been successfully integrated. 
 Murdock‟s review of volume II was equally enthusiastic. Although Murdock by training 
was an anthropologist, he worked at a time before the walls between the disciplines of 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology had solidified. Unlike many other reviewers, Murdock 
believed that The American Soldier was well balanced between empirical observation and 
theory. “The authors steer a judicious course between the Scylla and Charybdis of social science 
- elaboration of the trite to starboard and, on the port side, over-refinement of theory in relation 
to the factual material controlled.” He dubbed The American Soldier “an intelligent 
presentation,” and did not stop there. The book to him was “epoch-making,” and he recognized 
the true function and value of Research Branch: “A military establishment which fully accepted 
and acted upon the social science conclusions and implications of this and the companion 
volumes could double the effectiveness of its armed forces.” 
 Ethel Shanas, writing for The American Journal of Sociology, was not convinced. She 
believed The American Soldier was not only methodologically unsound and devoid of theory, but 
also that it was downright harmful:  
  In one sense the publication of these volumes is unfortunate. Younger 
  scholars, impressed by the number and stature of its contributors, its 
  distinguished sponsors, and its size, may think that The American 
  Soldier represents „scientific‟ sociology at its best. To use the method of 
  study in this work as the standard for social-psychological research would  
  be regrettable. In the main, the method of study demonstrated is the devising 
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  and use of questionnaires to treat with separate and scattered matters, 
  without the guidance of coherent theory or careful formulation of 
  theoretical premises. 
 
Shanas thought that The American Soldier had “no value” for either understanding behavior or 
sociological theory. The findings could not be extended beyond their immediate context, the 
methods used led to “spurious verification” of findings, and the work offered little of predictive 
value.
385
 Ever the acerbic wit, Gordon Allport, as he had done upon reading the Schlesinger 
review, sent Stouffer his appreciation of Shanas‟ review: 
  With one exception I have never read a more incompetent article in 
  a technical journal than the Shanas review. Is she an undergraduate 
  or a graduate student with a worms eye view of life and science? 
  Like a cockroach she crawls along perceiving nothing in context or 
  in relation. Her horizon is filled with fly specks and her soul with cinders.
386
 
   
 Allport‟s own review of The American Soldier in The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology was predictably more positive. “Someday,” Allport wrote, “an historian of social 
science will be able to place this magnificent monographic report in proper perspective.” Allport 
attempts to do a bit of that himself, conjuring the days during the First World War “when a small 
handful of psychologists rattled around in the Sanitary Corps.” He goes, however, much further 
than that, labeling The American Soldier as something of an academic and political bellwether: 
  I suspect that hereafter one can separate progressives and conservatives 
  in social science according to their opinions of The American Soldier. 
  Progressives will regard it as little less than a portent of salvation. 
  Conservatives will say it is “nothing new” and thus conveniently 
  rearrange the feathers of their professional complacency. 
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 Unlike Shanas, Allport believed that the study of the American soldier during World War 
II had yielded “a source book of information on contemporary American culture.” Allport also 
anticipated the major criticism of the work, “that they do not fully highlight their implications for 
social science.” He believed, however, “that the authors would have merited severer criticism if 
they had turned their immensely valuable source-book into an interpretive treatise. Far better to 
let each reader stretch his own mind and test his own views with the material presented.” He 
ended his review with a special note to historians: “never again, so it seems to me, can historians 
generalize as easily as some of them have in the past concerning the thoughts, feelings, or state 
of morale of troops, officers, or of the classes of society from which they are drawn.”387 
 Nathan Glazer wrote the review for Commentary, with the telling title “‟The American 
Soldier‟ as Science: Can Sociology Fulfil Its Ambitions?” Glazar, thoughtful and careful in his 
review, unfortunately went off the rails from the first sentence: “The ambition of American 
social science is to arrive at general laws of society and human behavior: laws that shall be as 
universal, as precise, and as useful as Newton‟s.” While such an ambition was indeed in the 
minds of many mid-twentieth century American sociologists, it was not the ambition of Stouffer 
and his co-authors in The American Soldier. Glazer charges the authors with being obsessed with 
the physical sciences, slaves to committee work, unproductive of theory, careless in method, and 
mechanical in process. “Unquestionably,” Glazer wrote, “we have scientific method in The 
American Soldier….The question however remains, do we have an approach to the organized 
body of conclusions that form a science?” Glazer, in addition to his questions about science, was 
clearly suspicious of what he called “The Machines” - IBM machines which Stouffer used to 
calculate and collate the data he received from surveys. The machine, Glazer believed, had 
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dictated “a large part of the contents of such a volume….And the clicking of these intricate 
machines so impressively resembles the cold, hard rhythm of real science!” The authors of The 
American Soldier, in Glazer‟s mind, were comparable to Faust‟s man searching for knowledge 
“‟With greedy hand he digs for treasures, and is happy when he finds earthworms.‟” His final 
conclusion is that “rarely was so little useful information about so large a question spread over so 
many pages. All because the aim was science, not understanding; the mechanical and formal 
confining of knowledge, not the increase of it.”388 
 In a letter to a colleague, Stouffer responded, uncharacteristically, with some pique about 
Glazer‟s review: 
  I thought that Glazer‟s review was quite a thoughtful job, even if 
  many things which he said were just plain stupid….I think that we 
  were overly modest in presenting some of our theoretical contributions. 
  I think that our concept of relative deprivation, for instance, which 
  Glazer treats quite condescendingly, is an extremely important general 
  orientation. It perhaps should not be called a theory, and yet using it we 
  were able to make a lot of predictions, some of which were quite contrary 
  to common sense….I personally do not want to get involved in arguments 
  with people about the merits or lack of merits of our stuff. In any case, 
  I‟m a prejudiced witness, and I do think that the fact that we tried to 
  lean over backwards in the modesty of claims has resulted in our work 
  not putting in the hands of those who would like to defend this type of 
  work the best possible ammunition with which to meet the critics who 
  represent a very different school of thought.
389
 
 
 Writing for the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Alfred 
McClung Lee introduced a new criticism of The American Soldier - it was inimical to 
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democracy. “Let us hope,” Lee wrote, “that the consequences of this and similar studies for the 
military and for industry will be to strengthen social science rather than to strengthen 
authoritarian human engineering.” Lee clearly saw Research Branch and The American Soldier 
as instruments of the government, designed to turn American citizen-soldiers into automatons. 
He is chary in his language - Stouffer and his colleagues could “tell themselves that they were 
helping to make an authoritarian framework into one which would both work better to win the 
war and do less damage to the citizens temporarily wearing uniforms and through them to our 
democracy,” but his point is clear. Like other reviewers, he is also suspicious of “‟committee 
thinking,‟” with all that that process implies. “„Committee thinking‟ places a premium on the 
plausible, the pat, and the salable.” His real problem with the work, however, remained his 
perception that “service to citizens in a democracy” through such organizations as Research 
Branch can become “service for those who temporarily control and who wish to control 
segments of our society.”390 He was supremely suspicious of the lengths to which the 
government had gone to get citizen-soldiers to fight a world war. 
 Robert S. Lynd wrote the review of The American Soldier for New Republic, and he 
shared Lee‟s concerns, as indicated by his title - “The Science of Inhuman Relations.” “These 
volumes,” Lynd wrote, “carry magnificent promise and serious threat,” the threat being that 
“these volumes depict science being used with great skill to sort out and to control men for 
purposes not of their own willing.” “Each advance in its [social science] use,” Lynd warned, 
“tends to make it an instrument of mass control, and thereby a further threat to democracy.” 
Punctuating his point, Lynd ended his review with the oracular words, “these dragon‟s teeth may 
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yet breed strife against the very values of democracy and peace for which they [citizen-soldiers] 
presumably fought.”391 
 The final review of this sampling is from Paul F. Lazarsfeld, contributor to volume IV 
(Measurement and Prediction) of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. Lazarsfeld 
began his extended (twenty-eight page) expository review in The Public Opinion Quarterly by 
hoodwinking his readers. Noting that many readers of The American Soldier found “that surveys 
only put into complicated form observations which are already obvious to everyone,” he listed 
some of the “common sense” ideas extant at the time The American Soldier was written: 
Educated men are prone to neuropsychosis, men from rural areas adjust to army life better than 
those from the cities, southern soldiers adapted better to hot climates, white privates were more 
ambitious than their black counterparts, black soldiers preferred southern rather than northern 
white officers, and men wished to return to the States from overseas more before the war was 
over than after it. Anticipating the reader‟s nod of approval and understanding (“why yes, of 
course, everyone knows these things are true”) Lazarsfeld then lowered the boom: “Every one of 
these statements is the direct opposite of what actually was found.” Having handily dispensed 
with the criticism of obviousness, Lazarsfeld then reviewed the basic themes of The American 
Soldier - among which are the significance of the primary group, the importance of frames of 
reference in determining attitudes (relative deprivation), and roles and positions in the army and 
their affect on attitudes. He then summarized the contents of each chapter of both volumes of 
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The American Soldier, and concluded by asking where additional data such as that gathered in 
The American Soldier may be found. Lazarsfeld was clear on the shortcomings of The American 
Soldier in respect to theory and method, but reiterated that the job of Research Branch was one 
of social engineering in the context and with the urgency of a world war.
392
 
 In 1950, Columbia sociologist Robert K. Merton joined Lazarsfeld in hosting a 
symposium on The American Soldier, the purpose of which was “to explore the nature of the 
social science terrain that has been opened up.”393 Out of the symposium came an edited 
collection of contributor‟s essays - Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and 
Method of “The American Soldier.” The book represents the final contemporaneous word on the 
structure, findings, and criticism of The American Soldier, and included essays by Edward Shils 
on primary groups, Merton and Alice Kitt on the theory of reference group behavior, Hans 
Speier on the sociology of military organization, Patricia Kendall and Lazarsfeld on survey 
analysis, Stouffer on his afterthoughts as contributor to The American Soldier, and Daniel Lerner 
on The American Soldier and the public. Continuities thoughtfully considered both The 
American Soldier itself and the initial criticism of the work, and was the first formal step in 
mining the “mine of data” provided in the work. 
 What then does all of this criticism tell us about Samuel A. Stouffer and The American 
Soldier? Firstly, The American Soldier was not a work of theory, despite the cries of sociologists 
and others who demanded it be one. As Stouffer, a survey researcher primarily concerned with 
empirical observation, repeated over and over in The American Soldier and other publications, 
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Research Branch was engaged in a social engineering task designed to equip conscripts to fight a 
modern world war. The data they gathered, summarized in The American Soldier, represented 
only the first step on the march toward theory, and while it offered findings and 
recommendations for further study, Stouffer did not ever intend it to be a theoretical work. 
Unfortunately, its lack of theory may have resulted in its relatively quick shelving - after the 
initial arguments over its efficacy. Like a dictionary or encyclopedia that is referenced less and 
less, what it has to say about attitude determination and soldier behavior over the years has 
become an echo rather than a shout.
394
 
 Secondly, the comments of the reviewers tend to tell us more about the concerns of the 
military, historians, and sociologists at mid-twentieth century than they illuminate in detail The 
American Soldier. As such, they offer a valuable window of American society at that time: The 
cries for a shorter version of The American Soldier indicate impatience with scholarly literature, 
suspiciously arising simultaneously with the dominance of radio and the television. The claims 
of obviousness and the resistance to “the machine” indicate the loudness of the debate between 
scientific empirical research and the humanist approach to creating and understanding 
knowledge. The demands for theory shed light on a discipline trying to find itself.  
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Chapter 9 
Epilogue 
 
 
 What then, do the lives of Samuel A. Stouffer and The American Soldier signify? - for 
books as well as men have lives, and often not perhaps the lives their authors intended. The 
previous chapters have suggested that the evolution of attitude research in the military, the mid-
twentieth century apotheosis of which was The American Soldier, represented a fundamental 
shift in the way soldiers and the control of soldiers were viewed by society. Stouffer‟s life ran 
concurrently with this sea change, the flow of which produced the volitional soldier - a being, 
and many of him, who had to be persuaded rather than flogged, considered rather than ignored, 
and managed by modern, scientific knowledge rather than led by intuition. American politicians 
and military officers were expected by the end of the Second World War not only to aknowledge 
their soldiers, but also to ask them about their thoughts, attitudes, and feelings, and to make 
policy relative to the answers. One article of faith which had been extant for centuries - that 
soldiers were primarily physical beings devoid of intellect or morals and well suited as 
transportation and employment devices for weapons - had been replaced by another, that victory, 
though not guaranteed by good morale, would with it be more assured. And moreover, that good 
morale could be gained by taking into account the attitudes of one‟s soldiers, and that could only 
be done correctly by polling them scientifically.
395
  
 Myth, legend, impression, supposition, experience, tradition, and intuition as the total 
constituent parts of sociological knowledge would no longer do. The change was not confined to 
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the military, but as applied to the American Army in World War II, the invitation to mutiny 
assumed to accompany the production of modern knowledge (polls and surveys), and the 
rejection of modern knowledge which accompanied that idea, transformed as if by magic into 
polls and surveys to prevent mutiny - polls which were enumerated, analyzed, summarized, and 
to some extent sanctified by The American Soldier.
396
 Reluctance to survey became acquiescence 
and finally enthusiasm at the high rate of speed that attends change during wartime, and as much 
as research on the atomic bomb, indicated the lengths to which the US Government was willing 
to go to equip its soldiers to fight a modern war - and perhaps what it was not willing to do as 
well. World War I had brought concerns to democracies regarding the brutalizing properties of 
war.
397
 One way to avoid brutalizing one‟s soldiers was to show concern for their opinions and 
attitudes. In practice, those opinions and attitudes were projected onto American soldiers by 
Progressives such as Raymond B. Fosdick, and the superego of American society ended up 
stressing morals rather than morale, as we have seen. Still, by the end of the First World War, 
Fosdick had identified the traditional, authoritarian way of managing soldiers as hopelessly 
anachronistic, and also as morale issue number one. Also by the end of the war, measurement 
had become the way to produce sociological knowledge.
398
 Pronouncements by great men, such 
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as that of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, that “Men must live straight if they are to 
shoot straight,” were no longer sufficient.399 
 By the end of the Second World War, attitudes had changed so radically that a popular 
and successful American general was excoriated for slapping a soldier, and the execution of 
another soldier for cowardice and desertion - the first such execution in the United States since 
the Civil War - touched off a major controversy.
400
 Also by the end of World War II, the United 
States had amassed a huge bureaucracy to prosecute the war, part of which was the first ever 
branch of specialists to study soldier attitudes and recommend policies based on their findings. 
Historian John Madge wrote in The Origins of Scientific Sociology, “With the United States 
precipitated into World War II, the full range of talents was inevitably mobilized.” While one 
may question the precipitation and the inevitability, one cannot argue the fact of Research 
Branch nor its significance.
401
 A sea change had occurred. 
 And then there was the issue of numbers. Fosdick had some help, both literally and 
figuratively, from The Masses, a socialist magazine which as early as 1916 was lampooning the 
old, authoritarian view of soldiers: 
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Robert Minor. “At Last a Perfect Soldier!” The Masses, August 1916.  
 While The Masses was shut down temporarily in 1917 by the government for 
undermining conscription, the masses themselves could not be denied. There they were, the 
nation in arms: well over three million draftees, over six times the number Napoleon had 
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marched into Russia a century before. Three million conscripts, all of whom had grown up in a 
republic with the creed if not the reality of sacred individualism and democratic principles. How 
could they be merely ordered and whipped into combat without rebelling? Some accommodation 
had to take place between the state and its soldiers, which began with aptitude tests and sing-
alongs and lots of sports in the First World War, and progressed to the survey research of the 
eight million men in the US Army of the Second World War.
402
 And while intuition and the 
Articles of War, military discipline and the will of the commander were not completely left 
behind, they no longer, in themselves, comprised the sine qua non of leadership, a leadership that 
was becoming more and more to resemble management. Max Weber would describe such a 
change as traditional authority, derived from custom, myth, and legend, and wielded by kings 
and priests, evolving into rational authority, derived from rules, bureaucratic procedures, and 
systems administered by specialists. After the First World War political and military patricians, 
acting out of their noble instincts, no longer completely controlled the discourse of authority. 
 Change such as this took place in a national and international context, and the velocity of 
change in social science had never been so rapid as it was during Stouffer‟s lifetime. Social 
science was not slouching, but rather leaping towards empiricism. Sociology in the United States 
had found its professional sea-legs in the flood of organization that broke in the late nineteenth-
century. The professions in those days were frenetically solidifying, and the unfortunately 
acronymed American Sociological Society formed in 1905, when the similarly precariously 
named Andrew Samuel Stouffer was five years old. It is not a stretch then to say that American 
sociology and Stouffer grew up together. (Stouffer, when old enough to understand the 
implication, insisted on a reversal of his first and middle names, just as the A.S.S. later changed 
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its name to the American Sociological Association).
403
 While the professions were 
institutionalizing and business was pursuing efficiency, the United States was quivering on the 
edge of its first empire. All of this activity contributed to the intangible sense that developments 
needed to be understood, controlled, counted, measured - managed. Order was the order of the 
day, and while men still sought to understand the world as they had in the past, this 
understanding was to come through observation and measurement rather than through received 
wisdom.
404
 Science, science, and science. 
 Theirs was the culmination of a long journey. When Lester Frank Ward rose to address 
The American Sociological Society as its first president in 1906, his speech had the tenor of 
Mark Antony‟s funeral oration in Shakespeare‟s Julius Caesar. “I do not propose,” he said, “on 
this occasion to enter into any defense of the claims of sociology to be called a science.” He then 
proceeded to state that not only did sociology have every reasonable claim as a science, but at its 
inception it was in fact superior to well-established sciences which had all proven to be founded 
on theories later discarded. He gleefully mentioned phlogiston in reference to chemistry, and the 
major reversals in astronomy as examples. “No science,” he declared, “was absolutely fixed,” 
but “the place of sociology among the sciences has been definitely fixed.” Ward‟s address was 
entitled “The Establishment of Sociology.” Sociology had arrived, and it was a science.405 
Science of course, is based on observation and measurement, a fact well known to the Chicago 
School of Sociology, who inscribed on their building Lord Kelvin‟s dictum, “When you cannot 
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measure, your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory.”406 Stouffer‟s tool of measurement was 
the survey. 
 During his graduate years, Stouffer encountered at the University of Chicago the ideas 
that would give primacy in policy making to facts rather than intuition. Frederick Winslow 
Taylor summed up this change succinctly in his magnum opus of 1911, The Principles of 
Scientific Management: “In the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be 
first.”407 Stouffer simply took Taylor one step further - his idea being to create and use a system 
to understand men and their behaviors and attitudes. As remembered by one of Stouffer‟s 
colleagues, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Stouffer‟s “academic life coincided with the development of 
empirical social research in the United States.”408  The reflex to dig through census records for 
demographic information and social conclusions was to transform into asking specific questions 
to answer specific problems - survey research - in part due to Stouffer‟s efforts.409 
While many sociologists, including Stouffer, were partially motivated by catholic 
interests,
410
 they also believed fervently that for sociology to be a true science, it had to commit 
itself to developing theories based on sound methodologies. Stouffer made this requirement 
abundantly clear in The American Soldier: 
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 If one were to attempt to sum up the experience in the Research Branch 
 and in the preparation of these volumes, in terms of its indications for the 
 future needs of social science, one might make the following points: 
 
1. Social science requires theories, at least of some limited generality, 
which can be operationally formulated such that verification is possible, 
and from which predictions can be made successfully to new specific 
instances. 
 
2. Such theories demand that the objects of study be isolated and accurately 
described, preferably by measurement. 
 
3. Once the variables are identified, the test of the adequacy of the theory, 
in comparison with alternative theories, must be rigorous, preferably evidenced 
by controlled experiment, and preferably replicated.
411
 
   
 For American sociology as a whole and for survey research in particular - a huge part of 
American sociology - Stouffer‟s influence cannot be overstated. “At the turn of the twentieth 
century,” Sara Igo observed in her 2007 The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the 
making of a Mass Public, “surveys were the province of statisticians, social reformers, the 
federal Census Bureau, and scattered businessmen and entrepreneurs. By the century‟s end, 
social scientific methods, findings, and vocabularies were omnipresent. What had been quite 
unfamiliar several generations earlier had become as natural - and invisible - as the air 
Americans breathed.” The American Soldier, and the work Samuel Stouffer and Research 
Branch did to produce it, stands in the middle of the twentieth century as a defining waypoint in 
the trend of American sociology Igo highlights. The American Soldier was the beneficiary of 
works such as The Polish Peasant and Middletown which came before it, and was the precursor 
to the later work of Kinsey, Gallup, Roper, and scores of political, sociological, and market 
research organizations. Stouffer helped to change the language of social inquiry from that of 
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intuition and supposition to that of science. Every time one hears or reads of surveys, polls and 
pollsters, Stouffer is in the background, informing their work.
412
 
  In 1949, the same year that Stouffer published The American Soldier, Republic Pictures 
released “The Sands of Iwo Jima,” staring John Wayne as Sergeant John M. Stryker. It would be 
pleasingly symmetrical to report that The American Soldier and Sergeant Stryker have been at 
war ever since, as their portrayals of American servicemen in World War II could not possibly 
be more dissimilar. Hollywood‟s heroism, personified by the grizzled Stryker, shows little 
resemblance to the American soldier of The American Soldier, a draftee who was there because 
he had to be, or a regular non-commissioned officer who sometimes did not demonstrate 
initiative, much less heroism. The fact is that in the popular imagination in particular, Stryker 
quickly defeated Stouffer - yet for those who seek a more realistic picture of not only the 
American soldier but also of America itself in World War II, The American Soldier remains a 
touchstone. If The American Soldier demonstrates anything, is demonstrates that the American 
military is, as are all militaries, inextricably linked to the society from which it comes.
413
 
 It has become fashionable for historians to “complicate” history - to attempt to show the 
nuance, contingency, chaos, contradiction, and unpredictability in historical dynamics. Part of 
this movement has been to write history from the “bottom up,” in an attempt to show “identity” 
and “agency” in the lives of ordinary people. Sometimes such approaches, interpretations, 
arguments, and agendas have led to thesis-driven and agenda-laden works which smack not only 
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of fights between historians but also of condescension to one‟s subjects. Works such as The 
American Soldier, a history not written by historians, but rather a massive primary document, 
can aid the historian and the general reader in understanding both the complexity of the human 
condition as well as the idea that few need to be given identity and agency by the historian. 
Attorneys would say of The American Soldier, res ipsa loquiter - the thing speaks for itself. If 
read, it is the corrective for two-dimensional histories of America in World War II. Written 
between 1945 -1949, it gives not only a valuable picture of America during the war, but also 
reflects the concerns of American social science emerging from that conflict and into the nuclear 
age. And while introductions and analyses such as this one hopefully are of some value in 
furthering knowledge by bringing a contemporary perspective to the work, there is no substitute 
for time with The American Soldier. 
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Appendix 
Et. Al: The Co-Authors of The American Soldier 
 
 
 Stouffer‟s name has become so reflexively associated with The America Soldier it is easy 
to forget that he had a strong supporting cast of co-authors; all of whom worked with him in 
Research Branch during World War II. Most all of the co-authors - Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., 
Robin M. Williams, Jr., Irving L. Janis, M. Brewster Smith, Leland C. Devinney, Shirley A. Star, 
Edward A. Suchman, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Marion Harper Lumsdaine - had distinguished 
and influential careers after the war. Their work in bringing social science and survey research to 
what had been largely an area of thought governed by intuition, and the willingness of the 
military to modify its thinking based on their work is a testimony to their influence both during 
and after the war. Their later prominence also reflects their influence well beyond the military. 
Cottrell and Williams served as president of the American Sociological Association and Smith as 
president of the American Psychological Association. Cottrell and DeVinney took positions at 
the Russell Sage and Rockefeller Foundations (respectively), and of the remaining seven co-
authors, six held positions at one or several top American universities. To consider Research 
Branch and The American Soldier without them, or vice-versa, would be the last thing Stouffer 
would want. 
 The co-authors were relatively young when they undertook their labors in the War 
Department, and three of them - DeVinney, Smith, and Williams - served in Research Branch in 
uniform. In 1943 their average age was only thirty, with Cottrell at forty-four the oldest and 
Smith at twenty-four the youngest. Their PhD‟s came from Chicago, Columbia, Harvard and 
Stanford, earned between 1933 and 1950. Williams and DeVinney earned their PhD‟s during the 
war, and five of the nine co-authors earned theirs after the war - making them graduate students 
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under Stouffer during their time in Research Branch. His influence, as well as that of the 
experience of working in Washington DC during the war itself, had a profound affect on them 
for the remainder of their careers.
414
 
 The milieu Stouffer established at Research Branch was intellectually rigorous, 
challenging, and exciting. A newspaperman who thrived on data and deadlines, Stouffer, as one 
Research Branch worker remembered, “would give you a problem of concern to someone 
somewhere in the War Department, and you would pursue it all the way from the first perplexity 
to the final report….I felt that nowhere else in America could I have been part of such an 
important group.” As Jean Converse summed up the atmosphere in Survey Research in the 
United States, Research Branch “did the course…they interviewed, coded, ran the machines, 
constructed the tables, wrote the reports.” Stouffer ran Research Branch with a sense of urgency, 
and such an intense atmosphere could not fail to be productive of bonds that would long outlast 
the war.
415
 
 Cottrell and Williams provide a good example of the intertwining nature of Research 
Branch alumni. Even before the war ended, negotiations were beginning for postwar 
employment. Cottrell wanted Williams to join him at Cornell, and Stouffer, still planning on 
returning to the University of Chicago, wanted Williams to join him there. In the end Williams 
opted for Cornell. Cottrell asked Stouffer to write an official appraisal of Williams, which 
Stouffer did, noting the loss to Chicago. By 1948, Suchman had also joined Cottrell and 
Williams at Cornell. This sort of activity was common among Research Branch alumni in the 
decades following the war. They used their influence and connections to help one another, and 
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like spokes through the hub of a wheel, their connections often ran through Stouffer. To consider 
briefly their individual biographies is to see more clearly the influence of Stouffer and The 
American Soldier.
416
 
 Leonard Slater “Slats” Cottrell, Jr. (1899-1985): Cottrell wrote chapter twelve, volume II, 
“The Aftermath of Hostilities,” and together with Stouffer wrote chapter thirteen, volume II, 
“The Soldier Becomes a Veteran.” Born in Hampton Roads, Virginia, Cottrell completed his 
undergraduate work at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (pre-med) in 1922, and went on to earn a 
master‟s degree (sociology) at Vanderbilt (1926) and a PhD in sociology at the University of 
Chicago in 1933. It was in Chicago that he met Stouffer, and served as one of the judges of the 
data for Stouffer‟s doctoral dissertation, while also serving as a probation officer. A few years 
later, Cottrell joined Stouffer in the sociology faculty at Chicago before accepting an assistant 
professorship at Cornell. He was appointed professor of sociology at Cornell in 1938, a post in 
which he served until 1951 - with time off of course for his work in Research Branch during the 
war. During his last four years at Cornell, he served as Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. 
From 1952-1967 he worked for the Russell Sage Foundation as Secretary and then Director of 
Research. From 1968-1972 he served as a visiting professor of sociology at the University of 
North Carolina, from whence he retired. His academic interests included juvenile delinquency, 
family interactions, and self-development. He died at his home in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.  
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 Cottrell was the chief of Research Branch‟s Survey Section, one of the chief analysts of 
the European and Mediterranean Theaters for Research Branch, and along with Stouffer, Leland 
C. DeVinney, and Carl I. Hovland, served as a member of the technical subcommittee for the 
writing of The American Soldier. He was also one of the select few of Research Branch to begin, 
in the summer of 1946, the conversion of the data gained by the branch during the war into the 
volumes of The American Soldier.
417
 
 Cottrell served as the fortieth president of the American Sociological Association (1950), 
delivering an address on “Some Neglected Problems in Social Research” to the Association in 
September of that year. His publications include Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage (with 
Ernest W. Burgess - 1939), and American Opinion on World Affairs in the Atomic Age (with 
Sylvia Eberhardt -1948). Frederick H. Osborn, head of the Army Information and Education 
Division, of which Research Branch was a part, wrote the foreword for the latter. In 1955 
Cottrell published, with Nelson N. Foote, Identity and Interpersonal Competence. He also served 
with the New Deal Federal Emergency Relief and Works Progress Administrations during the 
Depression, and as a member of the Board of Directors of the Social Science Research Council 
from 1944-1952. After the war he remained close to the military, serving as Chairman of the 
Department of Defense‟s Advisory Group on Unconventional and Psychological Warfare (1952-
1953), and also as a science advisor for the Air Force (1954-1958). Additionally, he sat on the 
Army Scientific Advisory Panel (1956-1958), in 1957 published with J.W. Riley, Jr. “Research 
for Psychological Warfare” in Public Opinion Quarterly, and in 1960 published “Social 
Research and Psychological Warfare” in Sociometry. He served as president of the Sociological 
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Research Association in 1949, and was a member of the National Science Foundation (1959-
1961). Cottrell also edited Sociometry from 1956-1960.
418
 
 Robin Murphy Williams, Jr. (1914 - 2006): Together with Stouffer and Shirley Star, 
Williams wrote volume I, chapter ten “Negro Soldiers,” and with M. Brewster Smith wrote 
volume II, chapter two “General Characteristics of Ground Combat.” Williams was born in 
Hillsborough, North Carolina, and by the time he was nineteen in 1933 had his BS degree from 
North Carolina State College. Two years later he had an MS from the University of North 
Carolina, which he followed with a year of graduate study at Cornell (1935-1936) as a teaching 
fellow in the Department of Rural Sociology. An MA from Harvard followed in 1939, and he 
completed his PhD there in 1943. After the war Williams returned to Cornell, where he remained 
until 1985, and where he served as the Director of Cornell‟s Social Science Research Center 
from 1949-1954. He remained active at Cornell as an emeritus professor until 2003, and from 
1990 until his death in 2006 split his time between Cornell and the University of California at 
Irvine. He died at Irvine Regional Hospital of complications from heart surgery.  
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 Williams‟ service with Research Branch during World War II included a posting to the 
European Theater, where in addition to his duties as senior statistical analyst surveying Army 
and Air Corps personnel in Britain, he accompanied Infantry troops through Belgium and into 
Germany from Normandy. The experience affected him deeply, and he later wrote about it in 
Social Psychology Quarterly, in an article entitled “Field Observations and Surveys in Combat 
Zones.” He also took a look back at his experience in Research Branch and the writing of The 
American Soldier forty years after The American Soldier was published, contributing to Public 
Opinion Quarterly “The American Soldier: An Assessment, Several Wars Later” in 1989. 
Immediately after the war - even before The American Soldier was published - Williams had 
written “Some Observations on Sociological Research in Government during the War” for the 
American Sociological Review, based on his experiences in Research Branch. Williams 
maintained both his interest in the military and his contacts with Research Branch colleagues. In 
1953 he co-authored “Student Reaction to Impending Military Service” for the American 
Sociological Review with The American Soldier co-author Edward A. Suchman, and Rose K. 
Goldsen. In 1958 Williams collaborated with Stouffer and The American Soldier co-author 
Shirley A. Star on “Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies” for Readings in Social 
Psychology, and in 1962 wrote “Are Americans and Their Cultural Values Adaptable to the 
Concept and Techniques of Unconventional Warfare?” for the Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science. 
 Like Cottrell and Stouffer, Williams served as president of the American Sociological 
Association, delivering “Continuity and Change in Sociological Study” as his presidential 
address in 1958. He also published over 150 books, articles and chapters during his career. 
Among his more significant works are The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (1947), Strangers 
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Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities (1964), which he co-authored with John 
P. Dean and The American Soldier co-author Edward A. Suchman, three editions of American 
Society: A Sociological Interpretation (1951, 1960, and 1970), and The Wars Within: Peoples 
and States in Conflict (2003).
 
He was a member of the National Research Council, the National 
Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and also served as 
president of the Eastern Sociological Association, for whom he founded and edited Sociological 
Forum. His interests ran towards group conflict and cooperation, race relations, and peace and 
war. At the time of his death he was teaching a course at Irvine entitled “Altruism and 
Cooperation.” 419 
 Mahlon Brewster Smith (1919 -      ): Smith co-wrote volume II, chapter two “General 
Characteristics of Ground Combat” with Robin Williams, Jr., and wrote alone volume II chapter 
three “Combat Motivations among Ground Troops.” He also wrote volume II chapter five “The 
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Combat Replacement,” and volume II chapter six, “Attitudes of Ground Combat Troops toward 
Rear Echelons and the Home Front.” 
 M. Brewster Smith was born in Syracuse, New York. Still a graduate student when he 
went to work for Stouffer in Research Branch, he gained his PhD in social psychology from 
Harvard in 1947. (His BA and MA came from Stanford, in 1939 and 1940). After the war Smith 
took successive academic positions at Vassar, New York University, the University of Chicago, 
and the University of California (Berkeley and Santa Cruz). He retired in 1988, but has remained 
active; pursuing his interests in definitions of self, political opinions, and the joint between 
society and individual personality. 
 Smith, like Cottrell, worked immediately after the war to begin the process of converting 
Research Branch data into what would become The American Soldier. He also found time during 
that period to write “The Differential Impact of Selective Service Inductions on Occupations in 
the United States” for the American Sociological Review. His work with Research Branch during 
the war was as an analyst in the Experimental Section under Carl I. Hovland, although he had 
originally come to Washington DC as a junior analyst for the Office of Coordinator of 
Information in 1941. In 1984, Smith wrote for Social Psychology Quarterly “The American 
Soldier and Its Critics: What Survives the Attack on Positivism,” and he retains his interest in the 
position of the military in the body politic and in the significance of The American Soldier. 
 Smith served as president of the American Psychological Association in 1978, and chose 
for the topic of his presidential address “Perspectives on Selfhood.”  He also served on the staff 
of the Social Science Research Council (1952-1956), as director of Berkeley‟s Institute of 
Human Development (1965-1968), as vice-chancellor for social sciences at UC Santa Cruz 
(1970-1975), and as president of the Western Psychological Association (1986). His major 
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works, among over 300 publications, include Opinions and Personality (1956 - with Jerome S. 
Bruner and Robert White), Social Psychology and Human Values (1969), Humanizing Social 
Psychology (1974), and his collected writings, For a Significant Social Psychology (2003). 
Smith also edited the Journal of Social Issues (1951-1955) and the Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology (1956-1961).
420
 
 Irving Lester Janis (1918 - 1990): Janis wrote volume II, chapter four, “Problems Related 
to the Control of Fear in Combat,” volume II, chapter seven, “Morale Attitudes of Combat 
Flying Personnel in the Air Corps,” and volume II, chapter eight, “Objective Factors Related to 
Morale Attitudes in the Aerial Combat Situation.” Janis was born in Buffalo, New York. He 
received a BS from the University of Chicago in 1939 and his PhD in psychology from 
Columbia in 1948. Before Janis was drafted into the Army, he analyzed fascist propaganda with 
Harold Lasswell in Washington DC, and afterwards he went to work for Stouffer in Research 
Branch. At the urging of Carl Hovland, he joined the faculty at Yale in 1947, and remained there 
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until his retirement in 1985. Janis then moved to the University of California, Berkeley, where he 
worked in the psychology department until his death of lung cancer at his home in Santa Rosa.  
 Janis worked in the Experimental Section of Research Branch under Carl I. Hovland, and 
in the European Theater. He also joined the small staff who in 1946 began to prepare the data 
gathered by Research Branch into what would become The American Soldier, while 
simultaneously working as a research associate for the Social Science Research Council and as a 
research fellow at Yale, as well as publishing “Psychodynamic Aspects of Adjustment to Army 
Life.” in Psychiatry in 1945. From 1948-1960, Janis was a research consultant for RAND, for 
whom he wrote The Psychological Impact of Air Attacks in 1949, the same year The American 
Soldier was published. During these years he continued to write on military themes and publish 
with Research Branch colleagues, particularly Hovland. In 1951 he published Air War and 
Emotional Stress, based on his earlier work for RAND, and together and with Hovland and H.H. 
Kelly, Communication and Persuasion in 1953. The following year he wrote and presented 
Psychological Effects of Atomic Bombing for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 
 Throughout his careers at both Yale and Berkeley, Janis remained interested in decision-
making, conflict and conflict resolution, and crisis management. His most famous work is 
without a doubt Victims of Groupthink, (1972), which was released ten years later as simply 
Groupthink. The title has entered into common speech, and refers to the tendency of groups to 
value consensus over sound decisions.
 
Janis continued to write until shortly before his death, 
publishing Crucial Decisions in 1989. He was a member of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences and the Academy of Behavioral Medicine Research. M. Brewster Smith co-authored his 
obituary for American Psychologist.
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 Shirley Ann Star (1918 - 1976): Star wrote volume I, chapter nine, “The Orientation of 
Soldiers toward the War,” and with Robin Williams and Stouffer wrote volume I, chapter ten, 
“Negro Soldiers.” She also wrote volume II, chapter nine, “Psychoneurotic Symptoms in the 
Army,” and volume II, chapter ten, “Problems of Rotation and Reconversion.” Star was born in 
Chicago, and earned her BA (1939) and PhD (1950) at the University of Chicago. She also 
earned an AA in computer data processing from Merritt Community College, Oakland, 
California, in 1972. After her work with Research Branch, Star returned to the University of 
Chicago as a senior study director for the National Opinion Research Center (1947-1960). She 
then took two years with Johns Hopkins as an associate professor of mental hygiene in the 
School of Hygiene and Public Health, followed by two years as an independent consultant in 
research design. Returning to Chicago in 1964, she spent her next two years as a project director 
for the University of Chicago‟s Center for Urban Studies. From 1966-1968, she lectured in 
sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. After another few years as a consultant on 
research design, she accepted a position as a senior research associate at the Bureau of Social 
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Science Research in 1973. While attending a meeting in the bureau‟s Washington DC offices in 
1976, she suffered a heart attack and died at George Washington Hospital.
 
 
 Star initially turned down a position in Research Branch, writing to Stouffer in June of 
1942 that she feared the low salary, the expense of living in Washington DC, and most 
importantly, that she would be consigned to clerical work. When she did finally accept, later that 
year, Stouffer assigned her to the Survey Section of Research Branch, and he also kept her on to 
do the initial work that would turn the results of 500,000 individual surveys and hundreds of 
reports into The American Soldier.   
 Although Star‟s interests turned towards race relations and mental health, and she did not 
publish with the frequency of many of her Research Branch colleagues, she did in 1958 
contribute, along with Stouffer and Williams to Readings in Social Psychology, with an essay 
entitled “Negro Platoons in White Companies.” She also, as did many of her Research Branch 
colleagues, stayed in close contact with Stouffer, and sought him out for advice and counsel - 
particularly concerning employment. Her published works include a 1956 pamphlet, Psychiatry, 
the Press, and the Public, which she wrote with others for the American Psychiatric Association, 
and she collaborated with others on The Midway Office: An Experiment in the Coordination of 
Work Groups (1972). Star also was associate editor for Sociometry (1956-1963) and Social 
Problems (1958-1961), and advisory editor for Sociological Methodology. Among the clients for 
whom she consulted were the National Science Foundation, the US Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, the US Census Bureau, and the California Department of Public Health.
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 Edward Allen Suchman (1915 - 1969): Suchman wrote volume I, chapter two “The Old 
Army and the New,” along with Leland C. DeVinney and Stouffer. He also wrote volume I, 
chapter six, “Social Mobility in the Army,” and with Devinney and Stouffer, volume I, chapter 
eight, “Attitudes toward Leadership and Social Control.” Suchman was born in New York and 
gained his BA at Cornell in 1936 and his MA there in 1937. He earned his PhD at Columbia in 
1947. Just prior to the war he was a research assistant for  Princeton‟s Radio Research Project, 
and continued that work at Columbia‟s Office of Radio Research, where he was executive officer 
and research director from 1940 to 1942. He joined Stouffer at Research Branch in 1942, 
remaining there until 1946, and returned to Cornell as a professor of sociology in 1947, where he 
remained until 1958, when he became New York‟s Department of Health Director of Social 
Science Activities (1958-1963). Suchman finished his career as a professor of sociology at the 
University of Pittsburg, remaining there from 1963 until his death. 
 Suchman arrived in Washington DC in 1942 to work in the Survey Section of Research 
Branch - well after he had published “Who Answers Questionnaires?” in the Journal of Applied 
Psychology (1940) - and remained in Washington through most of 1946 to collaborate on the 
initial stages of The American Soldier. He was also allowed by Columbia to use the portion of 
The American Soldier which he wrote as his PhD dissertation. Like Star and most other members 
of Research Branch, Suchman stayed in close touch with Stouffer, and remained interested in the 
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work all of them had done during the war. When the next war arrived, Suchman joined with The 
American Soldier co-author Robin Williams and Rose K. Goldsen to write “Attitudes toward the 
Korean War” for Public Opinion Quarterly, and in the same year (1953), collaborated with the 
same authors for “Student Reaction to Impending Military Service,” published in the American 
Sociological Review.  Eleven years later he worked with Williams again, and others, on 
Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities.  
 Suchman‟s post war interests ran towards public health. He served as a consultant to both 
the US Public Health Service and Puerto Rico‟s Department of Health. From 1959-1963 he was 
a member of the Association for the Aid of Crippled Children‟s Advisory Committee, and he 
also served from 1960-1963 on the New York City Mayor‟s Committee on Narcotics Addiction. 
His many publications include An Introduction to Social Research (1954), which he assisted in 
editing, Occupations and Values (with Morris Rosenberg and Rose K. Goldsen, 1958), and 
Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs 
(1967), published by the Russell Sage Foundation.
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 Leland C. DeVinney (1906 - 1998): DeVinney wrote volume I, chapter two, “The Old 
Army and the New” with Stouffer and Suchman, and volume I chapter three “How Personal 
Adjustment Varied in the Army - Preliminary Considerations,” with Stouffer. He also wrote 
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volume I chapter four “How Personal Adjustment Varied in the Army - by Background 
Characteristics of the Soldiers” with Stouffer, and volume I chapter five “How Personal 
Adjustment Varied in the Army - by Type of Experience in the Army,” also with Stouffer. 
Additionally, he wrote volume I, chapter eight “Attitudes toward Leadership and Social Control” 
with Stouffer and Suchman. Leland C. DeVinney earned his BA at Albion College in 1931, his 
MA at the University of Wisconsin two years later, and his PhD at the University of Chicago in 
1941. He spent 1941-1942 as a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, joining 
Research Branch in January 1943 first as its executive officer and later as military chief of 
branch. He also supervised Mediterranean Theater research and for a short time served in Cairo, 
undertaking studies of Iran and Egypt. (DeVinney, along with Janis and Smith, made up the three 
The American Soldier co-authors who served in uniform during the war). 
 DeVinney was among those Stouffer chose at the end of the war to help prepare Research 
Branch materials for publication. He then accompanied Stouffer to Harvard as the first associate 
director of Stouffer‟s Laboratory of Social Relations, and served on the technical committee, 
along with Stouffer, Cottrell, and Carl I. Hovland, for The American Soldier. In 1948 he went to 
work for the Rockefeller Foundation, first as Assistant Director of Social Sciences (1948-1950), 
then as Associate Director (1950-1962), and finally as Deputy Director of the Humanities and 
Social Sciences. He retired from Rockefeller in 1971, and maintained a private life thereafter, 
occasionally doing consulting work.
 
He corresponded with Stouffer until shortly before 
Stouffer‟s death in 1960. DeVinney‟s publications include, with Earl S. Johnson, “General 
Introductory Courses in the Social Sciences” for American Sociological Review (1942).424 
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 Arthur Allen Lumsdaine (1913 - 1989): Arthur Lumsdaine wrote volume II, chapter one 
“Attitudes before Combat and Behavior in Combat” with Stouffer and Marion Harper 
Lumsdaine. Arthur Lumsdaine was born in Seattle, earned his BS at the University of 
Washington in 1937, and his PhD at Stanford in 1949. He was an instructor of psychology at 
Stanford (1939-1940), and Princeton (1940-1946), and worked with Stouffer and Research 
Branch from 1942-1946. After the war he held a research assistant professorship at Yale (1946-
1949) and then took on duties at the US Air Force Human Resources and Personnel Training 
Research Center as a research scientist and laboratory director from 1949-1958. Following his 
work with the Air Force, Lumsdaine worked for a year as a visiting professor of psychology at 
the University of California at Berkeley, and then for two years as a program director for the 
American Institute for Research in Pittsburg. He returned to California and took up a post as a 
professor of education at the University of California Los Angeles in 1960, where he remained 
until 1965. In that year, he returned to the University of Washington, where he served as 
professor of psychology and education until 1971. Lumsdaine remained a faulty member at the 
University of Washington until his retirement in 1981. 
 Lumsdaine worked as a chief analyst in the Experimental Section of Research Branch, as 
well as in the European Theater Branch. He also, immediately after the war, worked on 
experimental studies at Yale with Carl I. Hovland and Frederick D. Sheffield - work that was 
eventually published in volume III of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Experiments 
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on Mass Communication (1949). (Star and Suchman, along with Stouffer and others, co-authored 
the fourth and final volume of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: Measurement and 
Prediction - 1950). Additionally, Lumsdaine‟s nine years working with the US Air Force Human 
Resources and Personnel Training Research Center, where he began as the Chief of the Audio-
Visual Research Division, are evidence of his continued interest in military studies.
425
 
 Lumsdaine consulted for the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the 
Battelle Human Affairs Resource Center, and the Population Study Center, among many other 
institutions, both public and private. His publications include Learning from Films (1958) - a 
work resulting from his collaboration with Mark May at the Yale Motion Picture Research 
Project - Brain Function and Learning, (editor) with Donald B. Lindsley (1967), which came out 
of studies he had done jointly with UCLA‟s Brain Research Institute and the US Air Force 
Office of Scientific Research, and Evaluation and Experiment: Some Critical Issues in Assessing 
Social Programs (editor) with Carl A. Bennett (1975). He also served as the media editor for 
Contemporary Psychology (1959-1967). In 1984 he looked back on his work in Research Branch 
for Social Psychology Quarterly with “Experiments in Wartime and Thereafter,” in which he 
discussed the beginnings of field experiments on mass communication during the war. 
Throughout his career Lumsdaine remained interested in systems as well as people and 
methodology.  
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 Marion Harper Lumsdaine (1913 - 2001): Marion Lumsdaine wrote volume II, chapter 
one “Attitudes before Combat and Behavior in Combat” along with Stouffer and Arthur 
Lumsdaine. There is little public information on Marion Lumsdaine, nee Marion Rebecca 
Harper. She was born in Seattle and attended the University of Washington, and she earned her 
MA in sociology at the University of Chicago in 1936. She worked in the Survey Section of 
Research Branch as a chief analyst, and also in the European Theater Branch, and helped to 
prepare the raw data gained during the war for inclusion in The American Soldier. In 1945 she 
married Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and returned with him later in life to Seattle, where she died.
426
 
 Although each chapter in The American Soldier has named authors, the authors 
themselves, as well as the technical team of Stouffer, Cottrell, DeVinney, and Hovland were 
quick to point out the contributions of other authors and members of Research Branch to their 
individual chapters. Each chapter of The American Soldier opens with a footnote identifying not 
only the author or authors proper of the chapter, but also those whose work was most critical to 
the chapter. A typical footnote of this type reads, “This chapter was written by Shirley A. Star, 
Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Samuel A. Stouffer. In addition to the authors, analysts who did 
major work in this area include Lyonel C. Florant, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. Dean Manheimer, 
William W. McPeak, Arnold M. Rose, and Robert N. Ford.”427  
 When one considers that Research Branch had, as listed in The American Soldier, 134 
people working in it or consulting for it during the war, many later to become prominent - such 
as John Dollard, Frank Stanton, and Robert Merton - the influence on and through such people of 
Stouffer and Research Branch becomes apparent. Of the authors of The American Soldier proper, 
four (Stouffer, Cottrell, Suchman, and Williams) were as early as 1950 judged by the 
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Sociological Research Association to be “major sociologists,” or some of the most influential 
men in their field.
428
 
 Of the co-authors of The American Soldier, none had a greater impression made on them 
by Stouffer than M. Brewster Smith and Robin M. Williams, Jr. Their recollections of him paint 
a vivid picture of a conscientious man who was working very hard during the war to overcome 
intuition with science, give a valuable glimpse into his personality, and demonstrate his 
influence. Smith remembers the chief author of The American Soldier as a man who 
  internalized an image of himself from his newspaper editing days in 
  Iowa as The Front Page. The ruffled clothes, the ashes, the eternal 
  cigarette…. He was a good fit for the director of Research Branch…lots 
  of chutzpah, enormous energy, indefatigable, lots of imagination, always 
  trying to promote his officers meteorically for the good of the work.
429
 
 
 Williams confirmed Smith‟s impressions: 
 
  Sam was a person of amazing energy. My image of him is one of 
  ceaseless motion and intense mobilization. When he walked, his 
  pace was what to most people would have been running. He chain- 
  smoked - dropping ashes heedlessly. His mind seemed always to be 
  racing beyond what could be said or done in any given period of 
  time….He was wholly committed to the task. If one thing didn‟t 
  work, he would try another and another and another. It follows that 
  he was ingenious and inventive. He was an entrepreneur of legendary 
  alertness and adaptability - always under the flag of social science.
430
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 Howard W. Odum. American Sociology: The Story of Sociology in the United States through 1950. New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1951. 381-383. Included also in this list were Research Branch participants John A. 
Clausen, Louis Guttman, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Donald Young, and Kimball Young. 
 
429
 Jean M. Converse. Survey Research in the United States: Roots and Emergence, 1890-1960. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987. 169. “He was enormously enthusiastic,” Converse wrote, “with a walk that was 
almost a run, a capacity to stay up most of the night feeding punch cards into the counter-sorter, and a passion for 
social science data.” Sociologist Herbert Hyman confirmed these impressions: “Despite the sociological overlay, 
Stouffer never lost the look, straight talk, and breakneck tempo of the proverbial reporter. Jacket off, shirtsleeves 
rolled up, cigarette dangling from his mouth, ashes strewn all over his vest from chain-smoking, bleary-eyed from 
lack of sleep and working through the night against a deadline - such colorful eccentricities are relevant, albeit not 
crucial, to explaining his influence on the staff.”  (Herbert H. Hyman. Taking Society‟s Measure: A Personal History 
of Survey Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991). 81. 
 
430
 Jackson Toby. “Samuel A. Stouffer: Social Research as a Calling,” in Robert K. Merton and Matilda 
White Riley, ed. Sociological Traditions from Generation to Generation: Glimpses of the American Experience. 
Norwood: Ablex, 1980. 133. 
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 It would indeed take a man of Stouffer‟s abilities and charisma to navigate the War 
Department during a world war, while coordinating the activities of Research Branch. Moreover, 
it took someone of his imagination and skill to manage the nine very talented co-authors of The 
American Soldier, both during the war in Research Branch and afterwards as they wrote The 
American Soldier. His contributions were furthered through theirs, and his influence, and that of 
The American Soldier, can be readily seen in their publications, their correspondence, in the 
journals which they edited, and in the projects in which they chose to become involved - and in 
the case of Cottrell and DeVinney, fund. They, as much as Stouffer himself, are an integral part 
of the story of Research Branch and The American Soldier.  
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